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Summary
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is a prominent ac-
cess control language that is widely adopted both in industry and academia.
XACML is an international standard in the ﬁeld of information security. The
problem with XACML is that its speciﬁcation is described in natural language
(c.f. [GM03,Mos05,Ris13]) and manual analysis of the overall eﬀect and conse-
quences of a large XACML policy set is a very daunting and time-consuming
task.
In this thesis we address the problem of understanding the semantics of access
control policy language XACML, in particular XACML version 3.0. The main
focus of this thesis is modelling and analysing access control policies in XACML
3.0.
There are two main contributions in this thesis. First, we study and formalise
XACML 3.0, in particular the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The concrete syn-
tax of XACML is based on the XML format, while its standard semantics is
described normatively using natural language. The use of English text in stan-
dardisation leads to the risk of misinterpretation and ambiguity. In order to
avoid this drawback, we deﬁne an abstract syntax of XACML 3.0 and a formal
XACML semantics. Second, we propose a logic-based XACML analysis frame-
work using Answer Set Programming (ASP). With ASP we model an XACML
PDP that loads XACML policies and evaluates XACML requests against these
policies. The expressivity of ASP and the existence of eﬃcient implementations
of the answer set semantics provide the means for declarative speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation of properties of XACML policies.
ii Summary
Overall, we focus into two diﬀerent area. The ﬁrst part focuses on the access
control language, more speciﬁcally is on the understanding XACML 3.0. The
second part focuses on how we use Logic Programming (LP) to model access con-
trol policies. We show that there is a relation between XACML and LP through
their semantics. We close the thesis by presenting applications in analysing ac-
cess control properties and a case study. These applications show that these
two approaches (AC paradigm and LP paradigm) can be combined together.
We present access control security policies in a Smart Grid from Smart Meter
perspective.
Keywords: Access Control Policies, IT Security, Control Systems, XACML,
Composition Policies, Logic Programming, Answer Set Programming, Smart
Grid, Smart Meter
Resumè
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) er et fremtrædende
adgangskontrol sprog, der er udbredt både i industrien og den akademiske ver-
den. XACML er en international standard inden for informationssikkerhed.
Problemet med XACML er, at dens speciﬁkationer er beskrevet i naturligt
sprog (jf [GM03, Mos05, Ris13]) og manuel analyse af den samlede eﬀekt og
konsekvenser af et stort XACML sæt politikker er en meget tidskrævende op-
gave.
I denne afhandling løse vi problemet med at forstå semantikken i adgangskon-
trolpolitik sproget XACML, især XACML version 3.0. Hovedfokus i denne
afhandling er modellering og analyse af adgangskontrol politikker i XACML 3,0.
Der er to væsentlige bidrag i denne afhandling. Først, studerer og formaliserer
vi XACML 3,0, især den Policy Decision Point (PDP). Den konkrete syntaks i
XACML er baseret på XML-formatet, mens dens standard semantik beskrives
normativt ved hjælp af naturligt sprog. Brugen af engelsk tekst i standardiser-
ing fører til risiko for fejlfortolkning og tvetydighed. For at undgå denne ulempe,
deﬁnerer vi en abstrakt syntaks i XACML 3,0 og en formel XACML semantik.
For det andet foreslår vi en logik-baseret XACML analyse, der anvender Answer
Set Programming (ASP). Med ASP modellerer vi en XACML PDP, der indlæser
XACML politikker og vurderer XACML anmodninger mod disse politikker. Ek-
spressiviteten af ASP og eksistensen af eﬀektive implementeringer af answer set
semantics giver midlerne til deklarativ speciﬁkation og veriﬁkation af egensk-
aber XACML politikker. Vi præsenterer adgangskontrol sikkerhedspolitikker i
et Smart Grid fra Smart Meter perspektiv.
iv Resumè
Nøgleord: Adgangskontrolspolitikker, it-sikkerhed, kontrolsystemer, XACML,
Komposition Politikker, Logic Programming, Answer Set Programming, Smart
Grid, Smart Meter
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Chapter 1
Introduction
To every problem, there is a most simple solution.
Agatha Christie, The Clocks
The thesis addresses the problem of understanding the semantics of access con-
trol policy language eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML), in
particular XACML version 3.0. The main focus of this thesis is
Modelling and analysing access control policies in XACML 3.0.
We ﬁrst simpliﬁed the language by considering only the important parts in
XACLM 3.0, and then we present the semantics of XACML 3.0 in a formal
way. To make practical contribution, we present a systematic technique for
transforming XACML 3.0 policies in logic programs, and then we demonstrate
how the ΠXACML a program obtained by transforming XACML 3.0 policies
into logic programs  makes it possible to use oﬀ-the-shelf answer set solvers to
formally verify properties of access control policies represented in XACML 3.0.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. We ﬁrst present motivation in Sec-
tion 1.1. In Section 1.2 we show related work and problems that we might
4 Introduction
handle through the thesis. Finally, we conclude the chapter by providing a brief
summary of our contributions and guiding the reader to the road map of the
thesis in Section 1.3.
1.1 Motivation
Our daily live is full of access control systems such as keys to doors, guest
invitation lists, passports and visas for entering foreign countries, memberships
in clubs. In the early computer era, access control systems were designed to
mimic one or other of these real world systems. Capability access control
[Lev84] resembles keys, i.e., the access to an object is granted whenever you have
a capability for it. Identity-based capability [Gon89a,Gon89b] is a reﬁnement
of capability to incorporate subject identities. It is like a passport and visa,
where an access to a country is given into particular subjects. Access control
list [PP89] is like a ﬁtness center membership  you get services based on your
membership status.
When the usage of computer systems grew so fast and became more complex
than not just simply to solve simple computation problems, the term computer
security became necessary. A trusted computer system is a must. A fundamen-
tal mechanism to maintain security in computers systems is through controlling
the accesses to the systems. Access control plays an important role in overall
system security.
We need a formal language to model access control policies. We use the language
to make the policies to be understandable in a unique way by anyone so that
there is no ambiguous in the interpretation of the policies. We also need the
language in the development of tools or software that can deal with such policies.
Samarati and di Vimercati [SD01] deﬁned the standard basic concepts behind
access control policies. An access control policy language should
(i) ideally provide a small set of policy composition operators that are simple
to understand and use,
(ii) expressive enough to capture all needed policy compositions,
(iii) ﬂexible enough to compose the basic rules within a policy as well as whole
policies,
(iv) be based on a mathematical foundation that provides for intellectual trac-
tability and eﬃcient analysis, and
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(v) be intuitive and useful for normal developers.
There exist a number of policy languages such as
 XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language)  an access control
language based on XML [GM03,Mos05,Ris13],
 EPAL (Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language)  a security privacy
language built by IBM [AHK+03,BMR04],
 Lithium  a policy language using a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic [HW03,
HW08],
 AspectKB  a formal language for specifying distributed systems with the
ability of specifying security policies in each location based on aspect-
oriented programming [HNN09].
Each of these languages has its own strengths and weaknesses. For example,
XACML and EPAL are intuitive enough for the developers because they use
XML, however their semantics are not formally deﬁned. Thus it makes the
behaviour of the languages not computationally tractable. XACML and EPAL
fulﬁl the property number (v) but they fails to carry out property number (iv).
On the other hand, Lithium and AspectKB are deﬁned using mathematical
formulation but they are not use mostly in industry.
This thesis focuses on exploring and designing an access control policy language
which can be used in the industry and is also computationally tractable. Thus,
we restrict our attention only two kinds of access control languages, i.e., XML-
based access control language and logic-based access control language.
1.1.1 XML-Based Access Control Languages
XML (eXtensible Markup Language) [BPSM+08] is a markup language stan-
dardised by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). The purpose of XML is
to describe data in a format that both human- and machine- understandable,
thus, it can be used for information exchange on the Internet.
XML-based access control language takes the advantages of XML to address a
language for expressing access control policies based on a high level formulation.
The XML-based policies can be easily interchangeable through diﬀerent systems
using the same access control language. This feature is particularly interesting
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in an open environment like the Internet, where a single system, which has to
be protected as a single entity, may be distributed over the Net [dVFJS07].
Some relevant XML-based access control languages are WS-Policy [BBC+06a],
the Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Language (EPAL) [BMR04, AHK+03],
and the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [GM03,Mos05,
Ris13].
WS-Policy. WS-Policy is a W3C recommendation (September 2007) for
expressing Web service policies. WS-Policy includes:
 WS-PolicyAssertions [BHK+03]: a set of general messaging related asser-
tions,
 WS-SecurityPolicy [DLGHB+05]: a set of security policy assertions related
to WS-Security, and
 WS-PolicyAttachment [BBC+06b]: a speciﬁcation how to add policies to
Web services or other subjects such as service locators.
EPAL. EPAL (Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language) is an interoper-
ability language for writing enterprise privacy policies to govern data handling
practices in IT systems according to ﬁne-grained enterprise privacy policies. An
EPAL policy is essentially a set of privacy rules. A rule is a statement that
includes a ruling, a data user, an action, a data category, and a purpose. A rule
may also contain conditions and obligations. Each rule contains a precedence
level. An EPAL policy document consists of three main sections:
 A policy identiﬁer. It consists of information such as Issuer, Version Num-
ber, Start Date, End Date, Replacement Policy Name, Replacement Policy
Version.
 Deﬁnitions of the possible components that can be used in the following
rules. Here is where Data Users, Data Categories, Purposes, Actions,
Context Models, Conditions and Obligations are deﬁned.
 A rule that deﬁnes whether Data Users are allowed (allow) or denied
(deny) to perform Action on Data Category for Purpose under Conditions.
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XACML. XACML is an international standard in the ﬁeld of information se-
curity. In January 2013, XACML version 3.0 was ratiﬁed by OASIS1. XACML
describes both an access control policy language and a request/response lan-
guage. The policy language is used to express access control policies (who can
do what when) while the request/response language expresses queries about
whether a particular access should be allowed (requests) and describes answers
to those queries (responses). XACML has been under development for some
time. In this thesis we consider the newest version called XACML 3.0 [Ris13]
which diﬀers from previous versions in important ways.
XACML represents a shift from a more static security approach as exempliﬁed
by ACLs (Access Control Lists) towards a dynamic approach, based on Attribute
Based Access Control (ABAC) systems. These dynamic security concepts are
more diﬃcult to understand, audit and interpret in real-world implications. The
use of XACML requires not only the right tools but also well-founded concepts
for policy creation and management.
The problem with XACML is that its speciﬁcation is described in natural lan-
guage (c.f. [GM03, Mos05, Ris13]) and manual analysis of the overall eﬀect
and consequences of a large XACML policy set is a very daunting and time-
consuming task. How can a policy developer be certain that the represented
policies capture all possible requests? Can they lead to conﬂicting decisions for
some request? Do the policies satisfy all required properties? These complex
problems cannot be solved easily without some automatised support. The thesis
focuses on XACML since it is a prominent access control language that is widely
adopted both in the industry and the academia.
1.1.2 Logic-Based Access Control Languages
Logic-based access control languages are particularly attractive as policy speci-
ﬁcation languages. One obvious advantage of logic-based languages is that their
semantics is clear and unambiguous. The semantics is given formally so that the
meaning of security policies stated using the language can be precisely deter-
mined. Second, logic-based language are expressive to represent access control
policies without the extra problems that natural language would bring us. The
declarative nature of logic-based languages yields a good compromise between
expressiveness and simplicity. Their high level of abstraction is very close to the
natural language formulation of the policies. Consequently, policy administra-
tors model security policies easier and simpler using logic-based languages than
1The Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) is
a global consortium that drives the development, convergence, and adoption of e-business and
web service standards.
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using imperative programming languages.
The ﬁrst work investigating logic languages for the speciﬁcation of authorisa-
tions is the work by Woo and Lam [WL93]. They proposed a logical approach to
representing and evaluating authorisation. The proposed language is designed
to specify policy bases which encode sets of authorisation requirements. The
precise semantics of policy bases is based on a formal notion of authorisation
policy. The semantics is computable via a translation to extended logic pro-
grams.
Several of the most recent language designs rely on concepts and techniques
from logic, speciﬁcally from logic programming [DeT02, Jim01, LGF03, LM03,
LMW02,HW03,HW08].
1.2 Related Work
There are some approaches to deﬁning access control policies in logic programs,
for instance, Barker et al. use constraint logic program to deﬁne role-based access
control in [BS03], while Jajodia et al. adopt the FAM / CAM language [JSSB97]
 a logical language that uses a ﬁxed set of predicates. However, their approaches
are based on their own access control policy language whereas our approach is
to deﬁne a well-known access control policy language, XACML.
There are two main diﬀerences of our work with other approaches. First, we con-
sider the newest standard of XACML 3.0, ratiﬁed in January 2013, while most
of other work considers XACML 2.0. XACML 2.0 diﬀers XACML 3.0 not only
in syntax but also in the treatment of extended indeterminate values. XACML
2.0 does not accommodate extended indeterminate values. Consequently, its
combining operators are simpler than XACML 3.0 ones. Second, our work em-
phasises on deﬁning the semantics of XACML in the ﬁrst place. We focus on
eliminating the ambiguities in the natural language speciﬁcation of XACML.
Bryans explores the use of process algebra in formalising and analysing XACML
[Bry05]. He presents the core concepts of XACML using Communicating Se-
quential Processes (CSP). Later, Bryans and Fizgerald present a formal seman-
tics of XACML 2.0 in the formal speciﬁcation language of Vienna Development
Method (VDM++) [BF07]. The challenge occurs here because the semantics of
XACML is presented in either CSP or VDM++. Thus, in order to understand
the behaviour of XACML, ﬁrst we should understand CSP or VDM++.
Halpern and Weissman [HW08] describe an XACML formalisation using First
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Order Logic (FOL). However, their formalisation only captures a small fragment
of the XACML speciﬁcation. Kolovski et al. [KH07,KHP07,Kol08] provide a
formalisation of XACML that explores the ground between propositional logic
analysis tools (such as Margrave2 [FKMT05, TK06]) and full ﬁrst-order logic
XACML analysis tools like Alloy [Jac02]. As a basis for the XACML formali-
sation, they use description logic (DL), which is a family of languages that are
decidable subsets of FOL and are the basis for the Web Ontology Language
(OWL). They map a large fragment of XACML into DL but they leave out the
formalisation of the only-one-applicable combining operator, one of XACML
combining operators.
Another approach is to represent XACML policies in terms of Answer Set
Programming (ASP). Ahn et al. give a complete XACML formalisation in
ASP [AHLM10a]. Ahn et al. translate the XACML speciﬁcation directly into
logic programming, so the ambiguities in the natural language speciﬁcation of
XACML are also reﬂected in their encoding.
While other approaches directly go to the implementation, Masi et al. [MPT12]
deﬁne a formal semantics of XACML ﬁrst and later, relying on their formal
semantics of XACML, they build an implementation using Java and ANTLR
tool for parsing generation. With this approach, they have the same intention
as our work, viz. to clarify all ambiguous and intricate aspects of the XACML
standard. Despite having the same goal their semantics is based on older version,
XACML 2.0, while our work is based on XACML 3.0. Moreover, implementing
XACML in procedural language such as Java has a drawback, i.e., it is hard to
show that the results of the implementation agree with their semantics.
1.3 Contributions and Road Map
There are two main contributions in this thesis. First, we study and formalise
XACML 3.0, in particular the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The concrete syn-
tax of XACML is based on the XML format, while its standard semantics is
described normatively using natural language. The use of English text in stan-
dardisation leads to the risk of misinterpretation and ambiguity. In order to
avoid this drawback, we deﬁne an abstract syntax of XACML 3.0 and a formal
XACML semantics. Second, we propose a logic-based XACML analysis frame-
work using Answer Set Programming (ASP). With ASP we model an XACML
PDP that loads XACML policies and evaluates XACML requests against these
policies. The expressivity of ASP and the existence of eﬃcient implementations
2http://www.margrave-tool.org
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of the answer set semantics provide the means for declarative speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation of properties of XACML policies.
XACML Query
in original format
XACML Query
in abstract syntax
XACML Query
in a logic program
XACML Policies
in original format
XACML Policies
in abstract syntax
XACML Policies
in logic programs
XACML Response
Answer Set
Access Con-
trol Properties
in logic programs
Domain Generator
in logic programs
Result
Answer Set(s)
Figure 1.1: Summary of Our Work
Our work is depicted in Figure 1.1. There are two main modules, viz. the PDP
simulation module and the access control (AC) security property veriﬁcation
module. The ﬁrst module transforms policy ﬁles and queries from the original
format in the XML syntax into an abstract syntax, which is more compact than
the original format. Subsequently we generate a query program and an XACML
policies program that correspond to the XACML query and the XACML poli-
cies, respectively. In the second module, we demonstrate how our results make it
possible to use oﬀ-the-shelf Answer Set Programming (ASP) solvers to formally
verify properties of AC policies represented in XACML.
Overall, we focus into two diﬀerent area. The ﬁrst part focuses on the access
control language. More speciﬁcally our focus is on the understanding XACML
3.0. The second part focuses on how we use Logic Programming (LP) to model
access control policies. We show that there is a relation between XACML and
LP through their semantics. We close the thesis by presenting applications in
analysing access control properties and a case study. These applications show
that these two approaches (AC paradigm and LP paradigm) can be combined
together.
This thesis contains ﬁve parts. The road map of this thesis is presented in
Figure 1.2.
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Part I: Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: Access Control at a Glance
Part II: XACML 3.0 Abstraction
Chapter 3: XACML in a Nutshell
Chapter 4: XACML 3.0: Abstract Syntax
Chapter 5: XACML 3.0: Semantics
Part III: A Tool
Chapter 6: Logic Programming Preliminaries
Chapter 7: XACML Transformation into
Logic Programs
Part IV: Application
Chapter 8: Access Control Property Analysis
Chapter 9: Access Control Policies in Smart Grid
Part V: Conclusion
Chapter 10: Conclusion and Future Work
Figure 1.2: Thesis Road Map
Part I: Introduction. This is the introduction chapter and in Chapter 2 we
present a review on access control system at a glance.
Part II: XACML 3.0 Abstraction. Part two discusses XACML abstrac-
tion. First of all, we discuss about the background of XACML in Chapter 3.
After understanding the XACML model, in Chapter 4 we deﬁne a new syntax
which is simpler and smaller than the original one. The purpose of this syntax
is to capture only the important part of the XACML components. Armed with
a smaller syntax, we are ready to deﬁne the semantics of XACML. In Chapter 5
we discusses all of XACML components semantics including combining opera-
tors  algorithms which are used in order to combine two or more access control
policies. The work in this part is based on [RNN12,RNN14].
Part III: A Tool. After fully understanding XACML we are ready to design
a tool that later we can use it for various analysis. The second part of the
thesis focuses on building a tool based on XACML. We use the Logic Program-
ming paradigm in our tool. In Chapter 6 we present preliminaries on Logic
Programming. In Chapter 7 We show how XACML can be transformed into
logic programs and we call ΠXACML for a program obtained by transforming
XACML policies into logic programs and we show a semantic relation between
XACML and ΠXACML in the same chapter. The work in this part is based
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on [RNN13a,RNN13b].
Part IV: Application. The third part of the thesis focuses on the applica-
tions of ΠXACML. We start by doing analysis on access control properties. There
are several combinatoric problems in analysis access control properties. In most
cases, ASP solvers can solve combinatoric problems eﬃciently. In Chapter 8
we present a mechanism for verifying security properties against a set of access
control policies using ASP tool. We show a mechanism to check whether a set
of policies is complete (gap-free). In addition, we introduce a new semantics of
XACML that may capture conﬂicted policies and later we present a mechanism
on detecting conﬂict between access control policies. Last, we present an ana-
lysis on irrelevant policies. A policy is relevant if there is a request such that
the decision is made based on this policy. Usually in a big set of policies, there
is a policy that is irrelevant. This happens because policies are built based on
several components and combined together. The last part of the thesis is a case
study. We present access control security policies in a Smart Grid from Smart
Meter perspective in Chapter 9. The work in this part is based on [RNN13a]
and partly based on [VYR12].
Part V: Conclusion. The thesis ends with conclusion and future work in
Chapter 10.
Chapter 2
Access Control at a Glance
The leader said Open Sesame! and before Ali Baba's
amazed eyes the sealed mouth of the cave magically
opened and the men disappeared inside. To come out
and close the entrance, the leader said Close Sesame
and the cave sealed itself once more.
Anonymous, translated by Richard Francis Burton
Ali Baba and The Forty Thieves
In this chapter we present a review on access control systems. The chapter
starts with an overview on how to design access control systems. In Section 2.2
we present three abstractions of controls that the designers of access control sys-
tem should consider: access control policy, model, and mechanism. This thesis
focuses on analysing and modelling access control policy. Thus, we emphasise
on explaining its background. Generally, there are two kinds of access con-
trol policies, i.e., Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies (Section 2.3) and
Non-Discretionary Access Control (NDAC) policies (Section 2.4). For NDAC,
we only cover the discussion on mandatory access control, role-based access
control, and attribute-based access control, and not beyond that.
This chapter is based on Hu et al. [HFK06], Samarati and di Vimercati [SD01],
and Gollmann [Gol11].
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2.1 Overview
Access control is a mechanism to protect (tangible) asset in the system from
unauthorised use by mediating how an access to the resource is granted or
denied. Access control mechanisms concern only tangible assets such as trea-
sure, buildings, documents, information, equipment, personnel, etc. The access
control mechanisms exclude intangible asset such as eﬃciency, accuracy, perfor-
mance, status, since they cannot be protected directly. Sterne stated that the
term of unauthorised access should encompass two cases [Ste91]. The ﬁrst case
is a subject which exceeds its authorisation, for example, a personnel accesses
classiﬁed document the sensitivity of which is higher than his or her clearance.
The second case is a subject which abuses its authority, for example, a ﬁnancial
oﬃcer might initiate a fraudulent ﬁnancial transaction.
The fundamental design of access control system consists of (see Figure 2.1 as
an illustration):
 a subject : an active entity which initiates a query to access a resource,
 an object or a resource: a passive entity that needs protection from unau-
thorised use,
 an action: an operation that the subject does to the resource when the
access is granted, and
 a reference monitor : an abstract machine that mediates all accesses to
objects by subjects.
Figure 2.1: The Fundamental Model of Access Control.
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The ﬁrst step in developing access control system is to identify the objects that
needs protection, the subjects which initiate the access requests to the objects
and execute activities and the actions that can be executed on the objects and
must be controlled [SD01].
2.2 Access Control Policies, Mechanisms, and Mod-
els
There are three abstractions of controls that the designers of access control
system should consider: access control policy, model, and mechanism [HFK06].
Access control policies are high-level requirements that specify regulations on
how to manage the access. Access control policies can be application-speciﬁc
and thus the application owners should take the consideration. To capture the
security requirements precisely, the designer of access control system should con-
sider 5W+1H questions (Who, What, When, Where, Why, How) when designing
access control policies:
 WHO can access,
 to WHAT resource,
 from WHAT device,
 WHEN the access is allowed (or denied),
 at WHAT time,
 WHERE the access is allowed (or denied),
 from WHAT location,
 WHY the access is allowed (or denied), for WHAT purpose, and
 HOW the access is given.
Access control mechanism describes how the system enforces access control poli-
cies. The access control mechanism must work as a reference monitor [U.S85].
Anderson deﬁned a reference monitor concept as a set of design requirements
on a reference validation mechanism, which enforces an access control policy
over subjects' ability to perform operations on objects in a system [And72]. A
reference monitor should have the following properties:
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 tamper-proof: the reference validation mechanism should be temper proof.
 complete mediation: the reference validation mechanism must mediate all
accesses to the system and its resources.
 veriﬁable: the reference validation mechanism must be small enough to be
subject to analysis and tests, the veriﬁcation methods and the complete-
ness of which can be assured.
Access control models are the formal presentations of the security properties
enforced by an access control system. Both users and application owners are
interested on access control models. The models bridge the gap in abstraction
between policy and mechanism. Using formal deﬁnitions, the application owners
and system developers can deﬁne security properties precisely and unambigu-
ously. Thus, it leads to the possibility of proving security properties. Therefore,
we can argue that the system is correct and secure by proving that the model
is secure and the mechanism correctly implements the models [Lan81].
2.3 Discretionary Access Control
The Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies enforce access control based
on the identity of the subject (requestor) and on explicit access rules stating
what subjects are (or are not) allowed to do. The owner of the object or the
person who has authorisation to control the object's access has the discretion
to decide who can have access to the objects. In general, DAC is used to limit
a user's access to an object [NSP94].
A simple access control model for DAC is the access control matrix. Lampson
[Lam74] made the initial proposal to use the matrix for protecting resources in
the context of operating systems. Graham and Denning [GD72] later reﬁned
the deﬁnition of the matrix for practical implementation. Harrison, Ruzzo, and
Ullman [HRU76] formalised the Lampson's model for analysing the complexity
of determining an access control policy.
In the access matrix model, the state of the system is deﬁned by a triple
(S,O,A), where S is the set of subjects, O is the set of objects, and A is
the access matrix, where rows correspond to subjects, columns correspond to
objects. An entry A[s, o] reports the privileges of s on o. Figure 2.2 illustrates
an example of an access matrix.
The decision policy  either to grant the access or to deny it  for access control
matrix is based on the entry where the subject row meets the object column.
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Code 1 Code 2 File 1 File 2
Ali read, write, execute - read -
Baba - read, write, execute - read
Cashim read read read, write read, write
Mustafa execute execute - -
Figure 2.2: Access Control Matrix
For example, Ali may read Code 1 and File 1, but not the case for Baba, since
there is no entry in column Code 1 and File 1 in row Baba.
It is too complex to manipulate the matrix directly because the number of ob-
jects can be very large. Also a matrix for a real system tends to be very sparse,
so most systems do not store the access rights in a matrix form. Rather, they
use either the Access Control List (ACL) approach or the Capability approach.
In the ACL approach, the matrix is viewed by column (see Figure 2.3 as illus-
tration). Each object is associated with an ACL which stores the subjects and
their access rights for the objects. The list is checked to see whether to grand an
access. In the Capability approach, the matrix is viewed by row (see Figure 2.4
as illustration). Each subject is associated with a Capability list which stores
its access rights to all concerned objects. If it is no in the table, the subject
does not have any access to the object. Possessing a capability is the proof of
possessing the corresponding access rights.
Code 1
Ali read, write, execute
Cashim read
Mustafa execute
Code 2
Baba read, write, execute
Cashim read
Mustafa execute
File 1
Ali read
Cashim read, write
File 2
Baba read
Cashim read, write
Figure 2.3: Access Control Lists
The drawbacks of DAC are as follows [HFK06]:
 The privileges for accessing objects are decided by the owner of the object,
rather than through a system-wide policy that reﬂects the organisation's
security requirements.
 There is no assurance on the information ﬂow in the system since infor-
mation can be copied from one object to another.
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Ali
Code 1 read, write, execute
File 1 read
Baba
Code 2 read, write, execute
File 2 read
Cashim
Code 1 read
Code 2 read
File 1 read, write
File 2 read, write
Mustafa
Code 1 execute
Code 2 execute
Figure 2.4: Capabilities
 There is no restrictions apply to the usage of information when the subject
has already connected to the system. Thus, DAC policy is vulnerable
to Trojan Horse attacks. A Trojan Horse is a computer program with
an apparently or actually useful function, but contains additional hidden
functions that surreptitiously exploit the legitimate authorisations of the
invoking process.
2.4 Non-Discretionary Access Control
Non-Discretionary Access Control (NDAC) is a category for all access control
policies other than DAC. There are several NDAC policies such as Mandatory
Access Control (MAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and Attribute-
Based Access Control (ABAC).
2.4.1 Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is the most mentioned NDAC policy. The
Mandatory Access Control policies enforce access control based on regulations
made by a central authority. Contrary to DAC, in MAC the owner of an object
has no right to change an authorisation to the access. MAC implementations
mostly take place in military security [PP89] where an individual data owner
does not decide who has a Top Secret clearance nor can the owner change the
classiﬁcation of an object from Top Secret to Secret. The objects might be
assigned to hierarchically security level according to National Security Informa-
tion:
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 Top Secret (TS): shall be applied to information, the unauthorised disclo-
sure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave
damage to the national security.
 Secret (S): shall be applied to information, the unauthorised disclosure of
which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally serious damage
to the national security.
 Conﬁdential (C): shall be applied to information, the unauthorised disclo-
sure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally damage
to the national security.
 Unclassiﬁed (U): no security restriction.
Classiﬁcation is the security level given to information based on policy, We
use the same classiﬁcation levels used for clearances to assign classiﬁcations.
Clearance and classiﬁcation go together, in that, a user's clearance is a limit to
the access of information based on the information's classiﬁcation. Classiﬁcation
relation is TS > S > C > U > null. Each security level is said to dominate itself
and all others below it in this hierarchy.
The classiﬁcation assigned to objects and subjects in multilevel MAC depends on
whether it is intended for conﬁdentiality or integrity. A conﬁdential mandatory
policy controls the direct and indirect ﬂows of information to prevent leakages
to unauthorised subjects. Bell and LaPadula [BPCF73,BLD73] formulated two
principles that a system should meet to protect information conﬁdentiality:
no-read-up A subject is allowed a read access to an object only if the access
class of the subject dominates the access class of the object.
no-write-down A subject is allowed a write access to an object only if the
access class of the subject is dominated by the access class of the object.
In the Bell and LaPadula model, a system is composed of sets of subjects S,
objects O, actions A, and security levels L with a partial ordering ≥. A conﬁg-
uration (state) v ∈ V is deﬁned as triple (b,M, f) where:
 b ∈ B = P(S×O×A) as a set of triples (s, o, a) indicating that the subject
s is currently performing an operation a on the object o.
 M ∈M = (S ×O → P(A)) is an access control permission matrix.
 f = (fS , fC , fO) ∈ F = (S → L)× (S → L)× (O → L) yields the maximal
security levels of subjects (clearance), their possibly lower current level,
and security levels of objects.
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The Bell and LaPadula principles stated above are formulated as follows:
simple-property A state v satisﬁes the simple security property iﬀ for every
s ∈ S, o ∈ O : (s, o, read) ∈ b⇒ fS(s) ≥ fO(o). This property captures no-
read-up principle that applies when a person request access to a classiﬁed
document.
*-property A state v satisﬁes the *-security property iﬀ for every s ∈ S, o ∈
O : (s, o,write) ∈ b⇒ fO(o) ≥ fC(s).
The mandatory access control policy only protects the conﬁdentiality of the
information. However, there is no control enforced on its integrity. Low classiﬁed
subjects could still be able to enforce improper indirect modiﬁcations to objects
they cannot write. For instance, integrity could be compromised if the Trojan
Horse implanted by a low classiﬁed subject in the application would write or
modify data in a targeted ﬁle.
Consider the following example. Assume that within an organization, Vicky, a
top-level manager, created a ﬁle Recipe containing important information about
recipes of new products. This information is very sensitive for the organization
and, according to the organization's policy, should not be disclosed to anybody
besides Vicky. Consider now John, one of Vicky's subordinates. Possible clas-
siﬁcations reﬂecting the access restrictions to be enforced could be: Secret for
Vicky and Recipe, and Unclassiﬁed for John. Suppose John is also an inﬁltra-
tor who is sent by a competitor organization. John wants to modify the Recipe
so that it will give bad impact to the Vicky's organization. To achieve this,
John modiﬁed an application generally used by Vicky, to include two hidden
operations, read and write operations on ﬁle Recipe. Then, he gives the new
application to his manager. Suppose now that Vicky executes the application.
Since the application executes on behalf of Vicky, every access is checked against
Vicky's authorisations with Secret as its security level. The read and write op-
erations are allowed since Vicky's security level dominates Recipe security level.
Thus, John can modify ﬁle Recipe without Vicky's notice.
Integrity-based mandatory policies enforce controls on the integrity of informa-
tion which control the ﬂow of information. The same as conﬁdentiality, each
subject and object in the systems is assigned an integrity classiﬁcation. An
example of integrity levels can be Crucial (C), Important (I), and Unknown (U).
Biba [Bib77] proposed a dual policy for safeguarding the integrity of informa-
tion. The semantics of integrity classiﬁcations is as follows:
 The integrity level associated with a user reﬂects the user's trustworthiness
for inserting, modifying, or deleting information.
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 The integrity level associated with an object reﬂects the degree of trust
that can be placed on the information stored in the object (and also the
potential damage that could result from unauthorised modiﬁcations of the
information).
The formalisation of the Biba model is as follows. Consider integrity policies
that label subjects and objects with elements from a lattice (L,≥) of integrity
levels. For example C ≥ I ≥ U. The assignment of integrity levels to subjects
(ilS) and objects (ilO) is given by the functions:
 ilS : S → L, and
 ilO : O → L.
Access control is enforced according to the following two principles:
simple integrity property A subject s is allowed a write access to an object
o only if the access class of the subject dominates the access of the object,
i.e., ilS(s) ≥ ilO(o). This property is also called no-write(to)-up.
integrity *-property A subject s is allowed a read access to an object o only
if the access class of the object dominates the access of the subject, i.e.,
ilO(o) ≥ ilS(s). This property is also called no-read(from)-down.
Satisfying these principles safeguards the integrity by preventing information
stored in low objects from ﬂowing to higher, or incomparable objects. The
integrity-based mandatory policies prevent subjects to indirectly modify infor-
mation they cannot write. Continuing from previous example, possible integrity
classiﬁcation: Crucial for Recipe, Important for Vicky and Recipe, and Un-
known for John. Hence, Vicky only can read Recipe but she cannot write
or modify Recipe. However John can read Recipe, which is bad for the or-
ganization since Recipe is a secret. If both secrecy and integrity have to be
controlled, objects and subjects have to be assigned two access classes, one for
secrecy control and one for integrity control.
MAC policies guarantee better security than DAC policies since they can also
control indirect information ﬂows. However, mandatory policies may become too
rigid. Several proposals attempt to combine mandatory ﬂow control and discre-
tionary authorisations, such as: the Chinese Wall policy [BN89] and authorisation-
based information ﬂow policies [Den76].
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2.4.2 Role-Based Access Control
Ferraiolo and Kuhn [FK92] have formalised Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
as an alternative to the traditional DAC and MAC policies. The main basis of
RBAC is to simplify administration of permissions for large numbers of users.
It is more important to know what a user's organisational responsibilities are
rather than who the user is. RBAC models categorise users based on similar
needs and group them into roles. Permissions are assigned to roles rather than
to individual users. RBAC merges the ﬂexibility of explicit authorisations with
the imposed organisational constraints.
RBAC contains roles, procedures, and possibly data types as intermediate layers
between subjects and objects [FK92]. Role is a collection of procedures. Roles
are assigned to users. A user assigned to a role can execute the procedures
deﬁned for that role. Procedures are high-level access control methods with a
more complex semantics than just read or write. Procedures can only be applied
to objects of certain data types. Each object is of a certain data type and can
be accessed only through the procedures deﬁned for this data type.
There are several beneﬁts of RBAC, such as authorisation management, hi-
erarchical roles, least privilege, separation of duties, and constraints enforce-
ment. From the authorisation management perspective, role-based policies ben-
eﬁt from a logical independence in specifying user authorisations by breaking
this task into two parts: the assignment of roles to users, and the assignment of
authorisations to access objects to roles. This greatly simpliﬁes the management
of the security policy. For example when a new user joins the organisations, the
administrator only needs to grant her the roles corresponding to her job; when
a user's job changes, the administrator simply has to change the roles associ-
ated with that user; when a new application or task is added to the system, the
administrator needs only to decide which roles are permitted to execute it.
Many applications naturally have a hierarchy of roles, based on the familiar prin-
ciples of generalisation and specialisation. The role hierarchy can be exploited
for authorisation inference. For instance, authorisations granted to roles can
be propagated to their specialisations (e.g., the secretary role can be allowed
all accesses granted to adm_staff). Authorisation inference can be enforced on
role assignments, by allowing users to activate all generalisations of the roles
assigned to them (e.g., a user of the role secretary will also be allowed to
play the role adm_staff). Authorisation inference has the advantage of further
simplifying the authorisation management.
Roles allow a user to sign on with the least privilege required for the particular
task he/she needs to perform. Users authorised to powerful roles do not need to
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exercise them until those privileges are actually needed. This minimises the risk
of damage due to inadvertent errors, Trojan Horses, or intruders masquerading
as legitimate users.
The separation-of-duties refer to the principle that no user should be given
enough privileges to misuse the system on their own. For instance, the per-
son authorising a paycheck should not be the same person who prepares them.
Separation-of-duties can be enforced either statically or dynamically. In static
separation-of-duties policies, the roles that may be assigned to a user are ﬁxed
and have to take into account separation-of-duties requirements. In dynamic
separation-of-duties policies, the roles that may be assigned to a user depend
on the current task.
Roles provide a basis for the speciﬁcation and the enforcement of further pro-
tection requirements that real world policies may need to express. For instance,
cardinality constraints can be speciﬁed, to restrict the number of users allowed
to activate a role or the number of roles allowed to exercise a given privilege.
The constraint can also be dynamic, i.e., be imposed on role activation rather
than on role assignment. For instance, while several users may be allowed to
activate role chair, a further constraint can require that at most one user at
a time can activate it. The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [FSG+01] has published a widely used classiﬁcation of RBAC levels.
The levels are deﬁned incrementally. Each level includes the features of the
previous level.
 Flat RBAC: users are assigned to roles, permissions are assigned to roles,
users get permissions via role membership; user-role reviews are supported.
 Hierarchical RBAC: adds support for role hierarchies.
 Constrained RBAC: adds support for separation-of-duties policies.
 Symmetric RBAC: adds support for permission-role reviews.
There are some issues missing from RBAC. The simple hierarchical relationship
may not be suﬃcient to model the diﬀerent kinds of relationships that can occur.
Diﬀerent ways of propagating privileges (delegation) should then be supported.
For example, a secretary may need to be allowed to write speciﬁc documents on
behalf of her manager, but neither role is a specialisation of the other.
The traditional concept of ownership may not apply any more: a user does not
necessarily own the objects she created when in a given role. User's identities
should not be forgotten. For example, a doctor may be allowed to specify
treatments and access ﬁles but she may be restricted to treatments and ﬁles for
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her own patients, where the doctor-patient relationship is deﬁned based on their
identities.
2.4.3 Attribute-Based Access Control
Traditional access control systems were based on the identity of the party re-
questing a resource. This mechanism is not eﬀective in open environment such as
the Internet. A more appropriate approach is where the access decision is based
on properties (attributes) of the requester and of the resource. Attribute-Based
Access Control (ABAC) is a next generation authorisation model that provide
dynamic, context-aware and risk-intelligent access control. ABAC diﬀers from
the traditional discretionary access control model by replacing the subject by a
set of attributes, and replacing the objects by descriptions in terms of available
properties associated with them. The basic idea is that not all access control
decisions are identity-based but rather based on digital credentials which are
more suitable for the open communication infrastructure.
A subject is an entity (e.g., a user, application, or process) that takes action
on a resource. Each subject has associated attributes which deﬁne the identity
and characteristics of the subject. Such attributes may include the subject's
identiﬁer, name, organisation, job title, and so on. A subject's role, naturally,
can also be viewed as an attribute. A resource is an entity (e.g., a web service,
data structure, or system component) that is acted upon by a subject. As with
subjects, resources have attributes that can be leveraged to make access control
decisions. Resource attributes can often be extracted from the metadata of
the resource. In particular, a variety of web service metadata attributes may
be relevant for access control purposes, such as ownership, service taxonomy, or
even Quality of Service (QoS) attributes. Environment attributes describe the
operational, technical, and even situational environment or context in which
the information access occurs. For example, attributes such as current date
and time, the current virus / hacker activities, and the network's security level
(e.g., Internet vs. Intranet), are not associated with a particular subject nor a
resource, but may nonetheless be relevant in applying an access control policy.
Attributes are often retrieved from diﬀerent information systems within the in-
frastructure. A policy can thus combine the state of data in many systems to
resolve an authorisation request. In the example, the user's department may be
retrieved from an HR system, the region from a CRM system and the document
type from a document management system. Authorisation thereby enables in-
tegration to support workﬂows that incorporate IT support from multiple IT
systems, something that is virtually impossible to handle with traditional access
control models.
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The main elements of the policy rules are the following.
 Subject. Each expression identiﬁes a set of subjects having speciﬁc prop-
erties. Each user is then associated with a proﬁle that deﬁnes names and
values of some properties that characterise the user.
 Object. The characterisation of the entities to be protected should be
speciﬁed through expressions. As for subjects, each object is associated
with a proﬁle which deﬁnes the names and values of their properties.
 Actions. Policies must be able to make distinctions based on the type of
actions being requested on objects.
 Purposes. Data access requests are made for a speciﬁc purpose, which
represents how the data is going to be used by the recipient.
 Conditions. Additional conditions such as conditions dictated by legisla-
tion, location-based conditions, and trust conditions.
 Obligations. To improve privacy, users can deﬁne some obligations at-
tached to the data. Therefore, when a certain access is allowed, the parties
involved must take some additional steps, following the deﬁned obligations.
Each access request results in an access decision that can take three diﬀerent
forms:
 yes: the access request is granted,
 no: the access request is denied, and
 undeﬁned : current information is insuﬃcient to determine whether the
request can be granted or denied.
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Part II
XACML 3.0 Abstraction

Chapter 3
XACML 3.0 in A Nutshell
When it comes to developing standards, you're either at
the table menu ... or you're on the menu.
OASIS
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is an approved OASIS1
Standard access control language [GM03,Mos05,Ris13]. XACML describes both
an access control policy language and a request/response language. The pol-
icy language is used to express access control policies (who can do what when)
while the request/response language expresses queries about whether a partic-
ular access should be allowed (requests) and describes answers to those queries
(responses). XACML has been under development for some time  in this thesis
we consider the newest version called XACML 3.0 [Ris13].
In this chapter we present a summary of XACML 3.0 as described in [Ris13].
For convenience, we use XACML as a reference to XACML 3.0 if nothing stated
otherwise. In Section 3.1 we introduce XACML model. Then, in Section 3.2
we explain components of XACML policies and XACML combining algorithms.
Finally, we explain algorithms used to combine XACML policies in Section 3.3.
1OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standard) is a non-
for-proﬁt, global consortium that drives the development, convergence, and adoption of e-
business standards. Information about OASIS can be found at http://www.oasis-open.org.
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Figure 3.1: The basic model of XACML.
3.1 The XACML Model
A typical XACML usage scenario is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Here a subject
(e.g. a human user or a program) wants to take some action on a particular
resource. The subject submits its query to the entity protecting the resource
(e.g. a ﬁle system or a Web server); this entity is called a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP). A PEP can come in many forms. For instance, a PEP may be a
part of a remote-access gateway, a part of a Web server or a part of an email
user-agent, etc. Multiple PEPs may have to enforce a particular policy. It would
be ineﬃcient to force a policy writer to write the same policy in several diﬀerent
ways in order to accommodate the format requirements for each PEP. Thus,
there is a need for a canonical form of the request. The Context Handler takes
care of the canonical XACML policy form.
The PEP forms a request to the Context Handler in its native request format,
optionally including attributes of the subject, resource, action, environment
3.1 The XACML Model 31
and other categories. Later, the Context Handler constructs a request (using
the XACML request language) based on the attributes of the subject, action,
resource, and other relevant information and sends it to the Policy Decision
Point (PDP). Optionally, the Context Handler includes the resource in the
context.
The Policy Administration Point (PAP) is in charge of writing access control
policies in XACML policy language and make them available to the PDP. The
PDP obtains the appropriate policies from the PAP and then it examines the
request, retrieves policies that are applicable to this request, and determines
whether or not access should be granted according to the XACML rules for
evaluating policies. The PDP returns a decision with one of these values:
 Permit: the requested access is granted.
 Deny: the requested access is denied.
 Indeterminate: the PDP cannot determine whether the requested access is
granted or denied because there is a computation error.
 NotApplicable: the PDP cannot ﬁnd an applicable policy for the requested
access.
The answer (expressed in the XACML response language) is returned to the
Context Handler, which can then allow or deny the access of the requester,
by translating the response context to the native response format into the PEP.
The response may be occupied by obligations that are mandatory to be fulﬁlled,
or by advice that may be bypassed. There are three schemes in PEP, namely
base PEP, deny-biased PEP and permit-biased PEP.
Base PEP
 If the decision is Permit, then the PEP shall permit access. If obliga-
tions accompany the decision, then the PEP shall permit access only if it
understands and it can and will discharge those obligations.
 If the decision is Deny, then the PEP shall deny access. If obligations
accompany the decision, then the PEP shall deny access only if it under-
stands and it can and will discharge those obligations.
 If the decision is NotApplicable, then the PEP's behaviour is undeﬁned.
 If the decision is Indeterminate, then the PEP's behaviour is undeﬁned.
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Deny-biased PEP
 If the decision is Permit, then the PEP shall permit access. If obliga-
tions accompany the decision, then the PEP shall permit access only if it
understands and it can and will discharge those obligations.
 All other decisions shall return in the denial of access.
Permit-biased PEP
 If the decision is Deny, then the PEP shall deny access. If obligations
accompany the decision, then the PEP shall deny access only if it under-
stands and it can and will discharge those obligations.
 All other decisions shall return in the permission of access.
3.2 The XACML Components
In order to obtain modularity in access control, XACML organises policies into
several components. There are three levels of policies in XACML, namely Pol-
icySet, Policy and Rule2. PolicySet or Policy can act as the root of a set of
access control policies. Throughout this thesis we consider that PolicySet is the
root of the set of access control policies.
A PolicySet is a collection of other PolicySets or Policies whereas a Policy con-
sists of one or more Rules. A Rule is the smallest component of an XACML
policy. Each Rule contains a Boolean expression which shows that the Rule
grants an access (denoted by Permit) or denies an access (denoted by Deny).
As an illustration (see Figure 3.2), suppose we consider access control policies
used within a National Health Care System. The system is composed of access
control policies for the individual local hospitals. Each local hospital has its own
policies such as patient policy, doctor policy, administration policy, etc. Each
policy contains one or more rules, for example, in the patient policy there may
be a rule saying that only the designated patient can read his or her record.
In this illustration, both the National Health Care System and local hospital
2Please note that Policy and Rule written with an initial capital letter are intended for
XACML components whereas policy and rule written in small letters are used as common
English terminologies.
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National Health Care
System
Hospital BHospital A ... Hospital Z
Patient PolicyAdministrator Policy ... Doctor Policy
Patient Record Policy
XACML PolicySets
XACML Policies
XACML Rules
Figure 3.2: An example of Access Control Policies for a National Health Care
System.
policies are PolicySet elements. However the patient policy is a Policy and one
of its rules is the patient record policy.
Every policy is only applicable to a certain target. The Rule's Target deﬁnes
the set of requests to which the Rule is intended to apply in the form of a logical
expression on attributes in the request. The Target element may be absent from
a Rule. In this case, the target of the Rule is the same as the parent Policy
element. The policy writer may declare speciﬁcally the Target of the PolicySet
(or Policy). Another option is that the Target of the PolicySet (or Policy)  we
call it as the outer component  may be calculated from the Target elements of
the PolicySet, Policy and Rule elements that it contains  we call it as the inner
components. XACML uses two methods to calculate Target element:
 Union evaluation. In this case, the Target of the outer component is appli-
cable if there is at least one of the Target element in the inner component
matches to the decision request.
 Intersection evaluation. In this case, the Target of the outer component is
applicable if every Target in the inner component matches to the decision
request.
A policy is applicable when a request matches its target; otherwise, it is not ap-
plicable. The evaluation of composite policies is based on a particular combining
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operator that combines decisions from multiple policies.
3.3 The XACML Policy Combining Algorithms
XACML deﬁnes a number of combining algorithms to deﬁne a procedure for
arriving at an authorisation decision given the individual results of evaluation of
a set of policies. Currently, XACML has twelve standard combining algorithms:
 (unordered- and ordered-) deny-overrides,
 (unordered- and ordered-) permit-overrides,
 deny-unless-permit,
 permit-unless-deny,
 ﬁrst-applicable,
 only-one-applicable,
 legacy (unordered- and ordered-) deny-overrides, and
 legacy (unordered- and ordered-) permit-overrides.
The behaviour of the ordered combining operators are identical to the unordered
combining operators with one exception, i.e., the order in which the collection
of Rules (or Policies) is evaluated shall match the order as listed in the policy.
The ordered combining operators might give diﬀerent result with the unordered
combining algorithms when the Obligations take place.
In the case of deny-overrides algorithm, if a single Rule or Policy is evaluated
to Deny, then the combined result is Deny regardless of the evaluation result
of the other Rule or Policy elements in the applicable policy. Likewise, in the
case of permit-overrides algorithm, the combined result is Permit if there is a
single Rule or Policy is evaluated to Permit. The legacy combining algorithms
are similar to the non legacy ones. The diﬀerence is in the treatment of the
Indeterminate value  which we will discuss the XACML decision values more
deeper in the Semantics of XACML in Section 5.
In the case of the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm, if there is a single
Rule, Policy, or PolicySet is evaluated to Permit, then the combined result is
Permit. Otherwise, the result is Deny. The permit-unless-deny combining algo-
rithm is the dual of the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm. In this case,
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the Deny takes precedence. The combined result is Deny whenever there is a
single Rule, Policy, or PolicySet is evaluated to Deny. Otherwise, it is Permit.
In the case of the ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm, the combined result is
the same as the result of evaluating the ﬁrst Rule, Policy or PolicySet element
in the list of policy which Target is applicable.
The only-one-applicable combining algorithm only applies to set of policies.
The result of this combining algorithm ensures that one and only one Policy
or PolicySet is applicable by virtue of its Target. If no Policy or PolicySet
applies, then the result is NotApplicable. If more than one Policies or PolicySets
are applicable, the the result is Indeterminate. When exactly one Policy or
PolicySet is applicable, then the result of the combining algorithm is the result
of evaluating the single applicable Policy or PolicySet.
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Chapter 4
XACML 3.0 Abstract
Syntax
If the syntax is good enough for the information, it
should be good enough for the meta-information.
Erik Naggum, a Norwegian computer programmer
The syntax of XACML is described verbosely in the XACML 3.0 speciﬁcation
[Ris13] since XACML 3.0 uses XML language to describe its syntax. We can
see below an example of XACML 3.0 policies.
Example 4.1 (Taken from [Ris13] Section 4.1.1) Suppose that a
corporation named Medi Corp (identiﬁed by its domain name: med.example.com
has an access control policy that states (in English):
Any user with an e-mail name in the med.example.com namespace
is allowed to perform any action on any resource.
The XACML policy for this example is as follows.
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1 <?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="utf -8"?>
2 <Policy
3 xmlns="urn:oasis:name:tc:xacml :3.0: core:wd -17"
4 xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance"
5 xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: core:schema:
wd -17
6 http :// docs.oasis -open.org/xacml /3.0/ xacml -core -v3-schema -wd
-17. xsd"
7 PolicyId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: example:SimplePolicy1"
8 Version="1.0"
9 RuleCombiningAlgId="identifier:rule -combining -algorithm:deny -
overrides">
10 <Description >
11 Medi Corp access control policy
12 </Description >
13 <Target/>
14 <Rule
15 RuleId= "urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: example:SimpleRule1"
16 Effect="Permit">
17 <Description >
18 Any subject with an e-mail name in the med.example.com
domain can perform any action on any resource.
19 </Description >
20 <Target >
21 <AnyOf >
22 <AllOf >
23 <Match
24 MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: function:
rfc822Name -match">
25 <AttributeValue DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#string">med.example.com </
AttributeValue >
26 <AttributeDesignator
27 MustBePresent="false"
28 Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: subject
-category:access -subject"
29 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0:
subject:subject -id"
30 DataType="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: data -
type:rfc822Name"/>
31 </Match>
32 </AllOf>
33 </AnyOf>
34 </Target >
35 </Rule>
36 </Policy >
The explanation of the code is as follows. (The number in front of the text
indicating the line number(s)).
1 It is a standard XML document tag indicating which XML version is being
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used and what the character encoding is.
2  9 <Policy> is a tag to start XACML Policy. It consists of XML namespace
declaration (line 3  4), URN for the XACML policy schema (line 5 
6), policy identiﬁer (line 7), version control (line 8), and rule combining
algorithm identiﬁer (line 9).
10  12 Description of the policy.
13 Description of the Target element of this policy. In this case, the Target
is empty.
14  38 The Rule element of this policy. It consists of Rule identiﬁer (line 15) and
its decision if the Rule is applicable (line 16). The Target of this Rule is
described in lines 21  37.
There are several attributes and expressions that are not signiﬁcantly describe
XACML. In order to allow a succinct treatment of the important aspects of
XACML we ﬁrst develop an abstract syntax in this chapter. We focus only on
the core aspects of XACML.
To summarise, some aspects that are not considered in this thesis are:
 Obligations and Advices. Since Obligations and Advices are not manda-
tory elements in XACML, and their actions do not play any role in the
evaluation procedure, thus, for simplicity we do not consider Obligations
and Advices in this thesis.
 AttributeDesignator and AttributeSelector. AttributeDesignator and At-
tributeSelector elements are used to identify one or more attribute values
in the request context, which comes from Context Handler. In this thesis,
we do not directly model these XACML elements, instead we assume the
attribute values are already obtained from their respective sources.
 Apply. The Apply element denotes application of a function to its argu-
ment. For the simplicity, in this thesis we do not consider Apply element,
instead the user freely to deﬁne any functions without any restriction that
the function should be encapsulated in Apply element.
 MultiRequests. We do not consider MultiRequests in this thesis since it is
optional. The MultiRequests element can be modelled by having Request
element repeatedly.
 Version. The Version entity is mandatory in XACML 3.0. However, in
this thesis we do not consider version control. Our main focus is to model
XACML policies, thus, we omit this entity.
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To make the notation clear we use:
 bold font to denote non-terminal symbols,
 typewriter font to denote terminal symbols,
 italic font to denote identiﬁers and values, and
 calligraphic font to denote XACML components.
We use the star symbol (*) to indicate that there is zero or more of the preceding
element and we use the plus symbol (+) to indicate that there is one or more of
the preceding element. In XACML it is required that each policy must have a
unique identiﬁer (id) but this is not captured by the abstract syntax.
We present in Table 4.1 a summary of XACML 3.0 abstract syntax that is
faithful to the more verbose syntax used in the standard [Ris13].
This chapter consists of three sections. In Section 4.1, we present the abstract
syntax for XACML policies components. We continue by presenting the abstract
syntax for XACML request component in Section 4.2. Finally, we present the
abstract syntax for XACML response component in Section 4.3. In each section,
we also present the original syntax of XACML 3.0 in order to show which aspects
that we take and which one that we omit.
4.1 Abstract Syntax for XACML Policy Compo-
nents
There are three main policy components in XACML, namely PolicySet, Policy
and Rule. PolicySets and Policies are containers for other policies while a Rule
is the most elementary unit of policy. The root of all XACML policies can be a
PolicySet or a Policy.
4.1.1 PolicySet Element
A PolicySet is a top-level element in the XACML policy schema. The syntax of
PolicySet is deﬁned in [Ris13] as follows.
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Table 4.1: Abstract syntax of XACML 3.0.
XACML Policy Components
PolicySet ::= policyset(id) : { combid ; Target ; 〈(PSid | Pid)∗〉 }
Policy ::= policy(id) : { combid ; Target ; 〈R+id 〉 }
Rule ::= rule(id) : {Eﬀect ; Target ; Condition }
Target ::= target(id) : { null }
| target(id) : {AnyOf+ }
AnyOf ::= anyof(id) : {AllOf+ }
AllOf ::= allof(id) : {Match+ }
Match ::= fMatchID(attribute value, AttrCat)
Condition ::= condition(id) : { true }
| condition(id) : { fbool(a1, . . . , an) }
combid ::= do | po | dup | pud | fa | ooa | ldo | lpo
Eﬀect ::= permit | deny
fMatchID ::= string− equal | date− equal | anyURI− equal | etc
AttrCat ::= subject | action | resource | environment| etc
XACML Request Components
Request ::= request: {Attribute+ }
Attribute ::= AttrCat( attribute value ) | external state
XACML Response Components
Result ::= decision: {Decision }
Decision ::= Permit | Deny | Indeterminate | NotApplicable
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Listing 4.1: Syntax of XACML 3.0: PolicySet Element
1 <xs:element name="PolicySet" type="xacml:PolicySetType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="PolicySetType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Description" minOccurs="0"/>
5 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicyIssuer" minOccurs="0"/>
6 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicySetDefaults" minOccurs="0"/>
7 <xs:element ref="xacml:Target"/>
8 <xs:choice minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
9 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicySet"/>
10 <xs:element ref="xacml:Policy"/>
11 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicySetIdReference"/>
12 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicyIdReference"/>
13 <xs:element ref="xacml:CombinerParameters"/>
14 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicyCombinerParameters"/>
15 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicySetCombinerParameters"/>
16 </xs:choice >
17 <xs:element ref="xacml:ObligationExpressions" minOccurs="0"
/>
18 <xs:element ref="xacml:AdviceExpressions" minOccurs="0"/>
19 </xs:sequence >
20 <xs:attribute name="PolicySetId" type="xs:anyURI" use="
required"/>
21 <xs:attribute name="Version" type="xacml:VersionType" use="
required"/>
22 <xs:attribute name="PolicyCombiningAlgId" type="xs:anyURI" use
="required"/>
23 <xs:attribute name="MaxDelegationDepth" type="xs:integer" use=
"optional"/>
24 </xs:complexType >
A PolicySet contains another PolicySet or Policy elements. XACML 3.0 provides
two ways to deﬁne the included PolicySet (or Policy) elements. The enclosed
PolicySet can be deﬁned directly as a part of the body of the top PolicySet.
Another way is to deﬁned it indirectly by only including a reference to the other
PolicySet element using its identiﬁer. In order to avoid a bulky deﬁnition, we
only accommodate the indirect way in this thesis. The same case applies to the
enclosed Policy elements. We only accommodate indirect deﬁnition by using
the Policy identiﬁer as a reference to the enclosed Policy element.
Based on XACML 3.0 speciﬁcation (see [Ris13] page 45), the CombinerParameter,
PolicyCombinerParameters, and PolicySetCombinerParameters are optional
entities. Thus, we omit this entities since they are not the core ones.
In this abstraction, we model a set of policies as a sequence. A PolicySet can
have empty sequence of policies or a sequence of other PolicySets or Policies.
The sequence of PolicySets (or Policies) is combined using a speciﬁc combining
algorithm.
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The abstract syntax of PolicySet is deﬁned as follows.
policyset(PSid) : { combid ; T ; 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉 } n ≥ 0
A PolicySet contains the following attributes and elements:
 a PolicySet identiﬁer PSid ,
 a policy combining algorithm identiﬁer combid,
 a Target element T , and
 a set of Policy or other PolicySet elements which is identiﬁed by a sequence
of policy's identiﬁers 〈p1, p2, . . . , pn〉, n ≥ 0.
4.1.2 Policy Element
The original syntax of Policy element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.2: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Policy Element
1 <xs:element name="Policy" type="xacml:PolicyType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="PolicyType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Description" minOccurs="0"/>
5 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicyIssuer" minOccurs="0"/>
6 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicyDefaults" minOccurs="0"/>
7 <xs:element ref="xacml:Target"/>
8 <xs:choice maxOccurs="unbounded">
9 <xs:element ref="xacml:CombinerParameters" minOccurs="0"/>
10 <xs:element ref="xacml:RuleCombinerParameters" minOccurs="
0"/>
11 <xs:element ref="xacml:VariableDefinition"/>
12 <xs:element ref="xacml:Rule"/>
13 </xs:choice >
14 <xs:element ref="xacml:ObligationExpressions" minOccurs="0"
/>
15 <xs:element ref="xacml:AdviceExpressions" minOccurs="0"/>
16 </xs:sequence >
17 <xs:attribute name="PolicyId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"
/>
18 <xs:attribute name="Version" type="xacml:VersionType" use="
required"/>
19 <xs:attribute name="RuleCombiningAlgId" type="xs:anyURI" use="
required"/>
20 <xs:attribute name="MaxDelegationDepth" type="xs:integer" use=
"optional"/>
21 </xs:complexType >
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A Policy is the second layer of policy model in XACML. Similar to PolicySet, we
model a set of Rules as a sequence. It is not allowed to have an empty sequence
of Rules (based on XACML speciﬁcation [Ris13] page 49). The sequence of
Rules is combined with a speciﬁc combining algorithm.
The abstract syntax of Policy is deﬁned as follows.
policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈r1, r2, . . . , rn〉 } n ≥ 1
A Policy element contains
 a Policy identiﬁer Pid ,
 a rule combining algorithm identiﬁer combid,
 a Target T , and
 a set of Rule elements which is identiﬁed by a sequence of Rule's identiﬁers
〈r1, r2, . . . , rn〉, n ≥ 1.
4.1.3 Rule Element
A Rule is the smallest policy entity in XACML and deﬁnes an individual rule
in the policy. A Rule has only one eﬀect: to Deny or to Permit an access. When
the Rule's Target matches the Request, the applicability of the Rule is reﬁned
by a set of propositional formulae as written in the Rule's Condition.
The original syntax of Rule element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.3: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Rule Element
1 <xs:element name="Rule" type="xacml:RuleType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="RuleType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Description" minOccurs="0"/>
5 <xs:element ref="xacml:Target" minOccurs="0"/>
6 <xs:element ref="xacml:Condition" minOccurs="0"/>
7 <xs:element ref="xacml:ObligationExpressions" minOccurs="0"
/>
8 <xs:element ref="xacml:AdviceExpressions" minOccurs="0"/>
9 </xs:sequence >
10 <xs:attribute name="RuleId" type="xs:string" use="required"/>
11 <xs:attribute name="Effect" type="xacml:EffectType" use="
required"/>
12 </xs:complexType >
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The abstract syntax of Rule is deﬁned as follows.
rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C }
A Rule element contains
 a Rule identiﬁer Rid ,
 an eﬀect E ∈ { permit, deny },
 a Target T , and
 a Condition C.
4.1.4 Target Element
A Target identiﬁes the set of decision requests that the parent element (that is,
either a PolicySet, a Policy or a Rule) is intended to evaluate.
The original syntax of Target element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.4: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Target Element
1 <xs:element name="Target" type="xacml:TargetType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="TargetType">
3 <xs:sequence minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded">
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:AnyOf"/>
5 </xs:sequence >
6 </xs:complexType >
XACML 3.0 allows Target element to not having AnyOf element. We call this
as an empty Target and it is denoted by null. An empty Target (indicated by
null) always matches any requests. The Target contains a conjunctive sequence
of AnyOf elements.
The abstract syntax of Target is deﬁned as follows.
target(Tid) : { null }
or
target(Tid) : { E1, E2, . . . , En } n ≥ 1
A Target element contains
 a Target identiﬁer Tid ,
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 an empty body indicated by null, or
 a conjunctive sequence of AnyOf elements E1, E2, . . . , En, n ≥ 1.
4.1.5 AnyOf Element
The original syntax of AnyOf element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.5: Syntax of XACML 3.0: AnyOf Element
1 <xs:element name="AnyOf" type="xacml:AnyOfType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="AnyOfType">
3 <xs:sequence minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:AllOf"/>
5 </xs:sequence >
6 </xs:complexType >
An AnyOf element contains a disjunctive sequence of AllOf elements The ab-
stract syntax of AnyOf is deﬁned as follows.
anyof(Eid) : {A1,A2, . . . ,An } n ≥ 1
An AnyOf element contains
 an AnyOf identiﬁer Eid and
 a disjunctive sequence of AllOf elements A1,A2, . . . ,An, n ≥ 1.
4.1.6 AllOf Element
The original syntax of AllOf element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.6: Syntax of XACML 3.0: AllOf Element
1 <xs:element name="AllOf" type="xacml:AllOfType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="AllOfType">
3 <xs:sequence minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Match"/>
5 </xs:sequence >
6 </xs:complexType >
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Each AllOf element contains a conjunctive sequence of Match elements. The
abstract syntax of AllOf is deﬁned as follows.
allof(Aid) : {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn } n ≥ 1
An AllOf element contains
 an AllOf identiﬁer Aid and
 a conjunctive sequence of Match elementsM1,M2, . . . ,Mn, n ≥ 1.
4.1.7 Match Element
AMatch is the smallest element in Target. The original syntax of Match element
deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.7: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Match Element
1 <xs:element name="Match" type="xacml:MatchType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="MatchType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:AttributeValue"/>
5 <xs:choice >
6 <xs:element ref="xacml:AttributeDesignator"/>
7 <xs:element ref="xacml:AttributeSelector"/>
8 </xs:choice >
9 </xs:sequence >
10 <xs:attribute name="MatchId" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
11 </xs:complexType >
AttributeDesignator and AttributeSelector elements are used to retrieve
a bag of attribute values in the request context, which comes from Context
Handler. The Context Handler chooses values which has the same category
deﬁned in the AttributeDesignator or AttributeSelector. In this thesis, we only
state the category which the Context Handler should ﬁnd its corresponding
values.
The abstract syntax of Match is deﬁned as follows.
fMatchID(attribute value, AttrCat)
A Match contains a fMatchID attribute that speciﬁes a function used in per-
forming the match evaluation. The function fMatchID takes two arguments and
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returns a result of type Boolean. The full list of fMatchID function can be seen
in [Ris13] Appendix A. The ﬁrst argument is an embedded value, provided by
the Match element, and the second argument is an attribute value obtained from
the Request element which has the same category as speciﬁed in attribute cat-
egory AttrCat. There are four common attributes categories used in XACML,
namely subject category, action category, resource category and environment
category. The full list of attribute categories can be seen in [Ris13] Appendix
B.
4.1.8 Condition Element
A Condition is a Boolean function over attributes or functions of attributes.
The original syntax of Condition element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.8: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Condition Element
1 <xs:element name="Condition" type="xacml:ConditionType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="ConditionType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Expression"/>
5 </xs:sequence >
6 </xs:complexType >
An empty Condition is always associated to true. In this abstraction, the user
is freely to deﬁne the Condition as long as its expression returns Boolean value,
i.e., either true or false.
The abstract syntax of Condition is deﬁned as follows.
condition(Cid) : { true }
or
condition(Cid) : { fbool(a1, . . . , an) } n ≥ 1
where each ai is an attribute value.
A Condition element contains
 a Condition identiﬁer Cid ,
 an empty body indicated by true, or
 a Boolean function fbool(a1, . . . , an), n ≥ 1, which its arguments are at-
tribute values.
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4.1.9 XACML Combining Algorithms.
Currently, XACML has twelve standard combining algorithms namely
 (unordered- and ordered-) deny-overrides (denoted by do in Table 4.1),
 (unordered- and ordered-) permit-overrides (po),
 deny-unless-permit (dup),
 permit-unless-deny (pud),
 ﬁrst-applicable (fa),
 only-one-applicable (ooa),
 legacy (unordered- and ordered-) deny-overrides (ldo), and
 legacy (unordered- and ordered-) permit-overrides (lpo).
As explained before in Section 3.3, the behaviour of the ordered combining al-
gorithms are identical to the unordered combining algorithms. The ordered
combining algorithms might give diﬀerent result with the unordered combining
algorithms when the Obligations take place. Since we do not consider Obli-
gations and Advices, we are safe to exclude ordered-deny-overrides combining
algorithm, ordered-permit-overrides combining algorithm, legacy ordered-deny-
overrides combining algorithm and legacy ordered-permit-overrides combining
algorithm.
4.1.10 Example
Example 4.2 (Patient Record Policies) This example shows how to
encode XACML components in our abstract syntax. The example is motivated
from [Ris13] Section 4.3.2. The following plain-language rules are to be enforced:
Rule 1: A person, identiﬁed by his or her patient number, may read any record
for which he or she is the designated patient.
Rule 2: A person may read any record for which he or she is the designated parent
or guardian, and for which the patient is under 16 years of age.
Rule 3: A physician may write to any medical element for which he or she is the
designated primary care physician, provided an email is sent to the patient.
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Rule 4: An administrator shall not be permitted to read or write to medical ele-
ments of a patient record.
Listing 4.9: Patient Record Policies Code
1 policy(p1):{ do; target(p1):{ null }; < r1 > }
2 rule(r1):{ permit;
3 target(r1): {
4 anyof(r1any):{
5 allof(r1all):{ string_equal(read , action), anyURI_equal(urn
:example:med:schemas:record , target_namespace),
string_equal(patient , subject_role) } } };
6 condition(r1):{ (patient_number(N) /\ patient_record(
patient_id , X) /\ equal(N, X) )} }
7
8 policy(p2):{ do; target(p2):{ null }; < r2 > }
9 rule(r2):{ permit;
10 target(r2):{
11 anyof(r2any):{
12 allof(r2all):{ string_equal(read , action), anyURI_equal(
urn:example:med:schemas:record , target_namespace),
string_equal(parent_guardian , subject_role) } } };
13 condition(r2):{ ( parent_guardian_id(P) /\ patient_record(
parent_guardian_id , R) /\ equal(P, R) /\ patient_record(
patient_dob , N) /\ current_date(T) /\ minus(T, N, Z) /\
less_than(Z , 16 ) )} }
14
15 policy(p3):{ do; target(p3):{ null }; < r3 > }
16 rule(r3):{ permit;
17 target(r3):{
18 anyof(r3any):{
19 allof(r3all):{ string_equal(physician , subject_role),
anyURI_equal(urn:example:med:schemas:record ,
target_namespace), string_equal(write , action) } } };
20 condition(r3): { ( physician_id(P) /\ patient_record(
patient_id , X) /\ patient_record(primaryCarePhysician , X,
R) /\ equal( P, R ) )} }
21
22 policy(p4):{do; target(p4):{ null }; < r4 >}
23 rule(r4):{ deny;
24 target(r4):{
25 anyof(r4any1):{
26 allof(r4all1):{ string_equal(administrator ,subject_role) }
},
27 anyof(r4any2):{
28 allof(r4all1):{ anyURI_equal(urn:example:med:schemas:
record , target_namespace) } },
29 anyof(r4any3):{
30 allof(r4all31):{ string_equal(read , action) },
31 allof(r4all32):{ string_equal(write , action) } } };
32 condition(r4):{ true } }
33
34 policyset(ps1):{ do;
35 target(ps1): {
36 anyof(ps1any): {
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37 allof(ps1all): { string_equal(urn:example:med:schemas:
record , resource) } } };
38 < p1, p2, p3, p4 >}
In this example, each Rule describes a single rule as required in the policy
speciﬁcation and each Rule is encapsulated by a Policy (see lines 1  32). Each
Policy has an empty Target (indicated by null). Therefore, the relevant Target
depends on the Target of each its inner Rule.
For the sake of clarity, we encode the and and or operators as binary operators
denoted by ∧ and ∨, respectively. Empty Condition, as shown in rule 4, line 32,
is always denoted by true.
We omit the Obligation in Rule 3 since we do not consider Obligations in this
thesis. At the end, there is a PolicySet, namely ps1 (line 34) which contains all
of those four Policies described in the rules.
4.2 Abstract Syntax for XACML Request Com-
ponents
A Request contains a set of Attributes giving further information about the
access request that should agree with the policy's Target.
The original syntax of Request element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.10: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Request Element
1 <xs:element name="Request" type="xacml:RequestType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="RequestType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:RequestDefaults" minOccurs="0"/>
5 <xs:element ref="xacml:Attributes" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
6 <xs:element ref="xacml:MultiRequests" minOccurs="0"/>
7 </xs:sequence >
8 <xs:attribute name="ReturnPolicyIdList" type="xs:boolean" use=
"required"/>
9 <xs:attribute name
The ReturnPolicyIdList entity is used to request the PDP to return a list
of all applicable Policy PolicySet elements that were in the decision as a part
of the decision response. This thesis focuses on modelling XACML policies
(included its request element). Thus, entity is not relevant and therefore we
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omit this entity. The CombinedDecision entity is used to request that the PDP
combines multiple decisions into a single decision. We omit this entity since we
only consider single request
Listing 4.11: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Attributes Element
1 <xs:element name="Attributes" type="xacml:AttributesType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="AttributesType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Content" minOccurs="0"/>
5 <xs:element ref="xacml:Attribute" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="
unbounded"/>
6 </xs:sequence >
7 <xs:attribute name="Category" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"
/>
8 <xs:attribute ref="xml:id" use="optional"/>
9 </xs:complexType ><xs:complexType name="SubjectType">
Listing 4.12: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Attribute Element
1 <xs:element name="Attribute" type="xacml:AttributeType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="AttributeType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:AttributeValue" maxOccurs="unbounded"
/>
5 </xs:sequence >
6 <xs:attribute name="AttributeId" type="xs:anyURI" use="
required"/>
7 <xs:attribute name="Issuer" type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
8 <xs:attribute name="IncludeInResult" type="xs:boolean" use="
required"/>
9 </xs:complexType >
XACML 3.0 separates the Attribute category into sub-category using AttributeId
entity. To simplify this model, we do not have this separations. Thus, the cate-
gory element is a combination of XACML category and its subcategory. For ex-
ample, in XACML 3.0, subject is a category and subject-id is AttributeId.
It is enough to model them as a single category, i.e., subject-id.
The IncludeInResult entity is used to include the attribute in the result. The
default value for this is false. This is useful to correlate requests with their
responses in case of multiple requests. We omit this entity since we do not
consider multi-request.
The set of attributes should not be empty since empty set means there is no
request. An Attribute is the central abstraction of the request context. In this
abstraction, there are two type of Attribute element. An Attribute can be an
element with attribute category and its value or information about external
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state, e.g., the current time, the temperature, etc. XACML 3.0 does not include
external state into its Request element. The external state can be obtained
as additional information that PEP provide to help the PDP makes decision,
especially when the evaluation of Condition element needs extra information.
Thus, for the simplicity, we add external state into our Request abstraction.
The abstract syntax of Request is deﬁned as follows.
request: {A1,A2, . . . ,An } n ≥ 1
where each Ai is an Attribute deﬁned as follows.
AttrCat(attribute value) or external state
Example 4.3 (Example of XACML Request) This example is based
on [Ris13] Section 4.2.2.
Suppose that there is a request by the physician Julius Hibbert to
read the patient date of birth in the record of Bartholomew Simpson.
When the context handler receives a request, ﬁrst of all it retrieves all related in-
formation regarding the request. In this example, the Context Handler provides
information regarding Julius' physical identiﬁer and Bartholomew Simpson's
record number. After all related information is gathered, the context handler
sends a request in XACML format to PDP. The encoding of XACML 3.0 Re-
quest is as follows.
Listing 4.13: Example of XACML 3.0 Request Element
1 <?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8"?>
2 <Request
3 xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: core:schema:wd -17"
4 xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance"
5 xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: core:schema:
wd -17
6 http :// docs.oasis -open.org/xacml /3.0/ xacml -core -v3-schema -wd
-17. xsd"
7 ReturnPolicyIdList="false">
8
9 <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: subject -
category:access -subject">
10 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false" AttributeId="urn:oasis:
names:tc:xacml :1.0: subject:subject -id" Issuer="med.
example.com">
11 <AttributeValue DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema
#string">
12 CN=Julius Hibbert
13 </AttributeValue >
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14 </Attribute >
15 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false" AttributeId="urn:oasis:
names:tc:xacml :3.0: example:attribute:role" Issuer="med.
example.com">
16 <AttributeValue DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema
#string">
17 physician
18 </AttributeValue >
19 </Attribute >
20 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false" AttributeId="urn:oasis:
names:tc:xacml :3.0: example:attribute:physician -id"
Issuer="med.example.com">
21 <AttributeValue DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema
#string">
22 jh1234
23 </AttributeValue >
24 </Attribute >
25 </Attributes >
26
27 <Attributes
28 Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: attribute -category:
resource">
29 <Content >
30 <md:record xmlns:md="urn:example:med:schemas:record"
31 xsi:schemaLocation="urn:example:med:schemas:record
32 http ://www.med.example.com/schemas/record.xsd">
33 <md:patient >
34 <md:patientDoB >1992 -03 -21 </md:patientDoB >
35 <md:patient -number >555555 </md:patient -number >
36 <md:patientContact >
37 <md:email >b.simpson@example.com </md:email >
38 </md:patientContact >
39 </md:patient >
40 </md:record >
41 </Content >
42 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false" AttributeId="urn:oasis:
names:tc:xacml :3.0: content -selector" >
43 <AttributeValue XPathCategory="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml
:3.0: attribute -category:resource" DataType=" urn:oasis
:names:tc:xacml :3.0:data -type:xpathExpression">
44 md:record/md:patient/md:patientDoB
45 </AttributeValue >
46 </Attribute >
47 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false" AttributeId="urn:oasis:
names:tc:xacml :2.0: resource:target -namespace" >
48 <AttributeValue DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema
#anyURI">
49 urn:example:med:schemas:record
50 </AttributeValue >
51 </Attribute >
52 </Attributes >
53
54 <Attributes
55 Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: attribute -category:
action">
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56 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false"
57 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: action:action -id
" >
58 <AttributeValue
59 DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema#string">read </
AttributeValue >
60 </Attribute >
61 </Attributes >
62
63 <Attributes
64 Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: attribute -category:
environment">
65 <Attribute IncludeInResult="false"
66 AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :1.0: environment:
current -date" >
67 <AttributeValue DataType="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema
#date"
68 >2010-01 -11</ AttributeValue >
69 </Attribute >
70 </Attributes >
71 </Request >
The encoding of Request element in our abstraction is as follows.
Listing 4.14: XACML Request Code
1 request :{
2 subject_id(julius_hilbbert),
3 subject_role(physician),
4 physician_id(jh1234),
5 patient_record(patient_dob , 1992 -03 -21),
6 patient_record(patient_number , 555555) ,
7 patient_record(patient_contact , b.simpson@example.com),
8 content_selector(patientDoB),
9 target_namespace(urn:example:med:schemas:record),
10 action(read),
11 current_date (2010 -01 -11)}
Lines 23 deﬁne the attribute category access-subject. Lines 57 deﬁne the
attribute category resource. Lines 89 in speciﬁc deﬁne the content selector.
Line 10 deﬁnes the action category and line 11 deﬁnes the environment category.
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4.3 Abstract Syntax for XACML Response Com-
ponent
A response element encapsulates the authorisation decision produced by the
PDP.
The original syntax of Response element deﬁned in [Ris13] is as follows.
Listing 4.15: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Response Element
1 <xs:element name="Response" type="xacml:ResponseType"/>
2 <xs:complexType name="ResponseType">
3 <xs:sequence >
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Result" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
5 </xs:sequence >
6 </xs:complexType >
Listing 4.16: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Result Element
1 <xs:complexType name="ResultType">
2 <xs:sequence >
3 <xs:element ref="xacml:Decision"/>
4 <xs:element ref="xacml:Status" minOccurs="0"/>
5 <xs:element ref="xacml:Obligations" minOccurs="0"/>
6 <xs:element ref="xacml:AssociatedAdvice" minOccurs="0"/>
7 <xs:element ref="xacml:Attributes" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="
unbounded"/>
8 <xs:element ref="xacml:PolicyIdentifierList" minOccurs="0"/>
9 </xs:sequence >
10 </xs:complexType >
Listing 4.17: Syntax of XACML 3.0: Decision Element
1 <xs:element name="Decision" type="xacml:DecisionType"/>
2 <xs:simpleType name="DecisionType">
3 <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
4 <xs:enumeration value="Permit"/>
5 <xs:enumeration value="Deny"/>
6 <xs:enumeration value="Indeterminate"/>
7 <xs:enumeration value="NotApplicable"/>
8 </xs:restriction >
9 </xs:simpleType >
The abstract syntax for Response is deﬁned as follows.
decision: {D }
The decision D can be either Permit, Deny, Indeterminate, or NotApplicable.
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Example 4.4 (Example of XACML Response) Previously, the PDP
got a request from physician Julius Hibbert to read Bartholomew Simpson's date
of birth from his patient record. Since there is no policy mentions about any
right to read patient record for a physician, hence, the PDP returned NotAppli-
cable.
Listing 4.18: Example of XACML 3.0 Response Element
1 <?xml version ="1.0" encoding ="UTF -8"?>
2 <Response xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: core:schema:wd -17"
3 xmlns:xsi="http ://www.w3.org /2001/ XMLSchema -instance"
4 xsi:schemaLocation="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml :3.0: core:schema:
wd -17
5 http :// docs.oasis -open.org/xacml /3.0/ xacml -core -v3-schema -wd
-17. xsd">
6 <Result >
7 <Decision >NotApplicable </Decision >
8 </Result >
9 </Response >
Listing 4.19: XACML Response Code
1 decision :{ not -applicable }
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Chapter 5
XACML 3.0 Semantics
Do you wish me a good morning, or mean that it is a
good morning whether I want it or not; or that you feel
good this morning; or that it is a morning to be good
on?
J.R.R. Tolkien, The Hobbit
In this chapter, we describe the semantics of XACML 3.0 elements. First, we
introduce component values of XACML in Section 5.1. Next, we explain the
semantics for each XACML element in Section 5.2 starting from the Match eval-
uation continued to PolicySet evaluation and ﬁnally, we present the evaluation
of XACML combining algorithms in Section 5.3. We present related work in
Section 5.4
XACML is an evolving standard that changes as need arises; this is clearly shown
by the evolution from XACML 2.0 into XACML 3.0. Hence further evolution is
conceivable in case new combining operators need to be dealt with. We present
two new combining algorithms in Section 5.5.
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V3 Match, AllOf, AnyOf, Target Condition Rule, Policy, PolicySet
> match true applicable
⊥ notmatch false notapplicable
I indeterminate indeterminate indeterminate
Table 5.1: Mapping V3 into XACML components.
5.1 Component Values of XACML
The result of evaluating the entities Match, AllOf, AnyOf and Target is one of
match, notmatch or indeterminate. The indeterminate value indicates that
the decision of whether or not a policy is applicable cannot be determined due
to an error during evaluation.
The Rule evaluation depends on the Target evaluation and the Condition eval-
uation. The Condition element is a Boolean function over a set of attribute
values or functions of attributes. This function returns either true, false or
indeterminate. An empty Condition is always evaluated to true. The result
of evaluating a Rule is either applicable, notapplicable or indeterminate.
An applicable Rule has an eﬀect that is either deny or permit.
Finally, the evaluation of the entities Policy and PolicySet are based on a com-
bining algorithm of which the result can be either applicable (with its eﬀect
being either deny or permit), notapplicable or indeterminate.
To give a formal semantics of these intentions we ﬁnd it helpful to introduce
partially ordered sets.
Definition 5.1 (Three-Valued lattice) We deﬁne L3 = 〈V3,≤〉 to
be the three-valued lattice where V3 is the set { ⊥, I,> } and the ordering is
given by ⊥ ≤ I ≤ >.
The set {⊥, I,>} are mapped to the informal explanations above as summarised
in Table 5.1.
Definition 5.2 Given a subset S of lattice L we denote the greatest lower
bound (glb) and the least upper bound (lub) of S by
d
S and
⊔
S, respectively.
Recall that
d ∅ = > and ⊔ ∅ = ⊥.
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So far our semantic treatment does not distinguish an applicable policy that
denies an access from an applicable policy that permits an access. To rectify
this shortcoming we shall write
 >d for an applicable policy denying access (noting that d denotes deny),
and
 >p for an applicable process permitting access (noting that p denotes
permit).
Similar considerations apply to indeterminate values where we now record the
permissions that potentially could have resulted if there had been no errors.
Definition 5.3 (Extended Indeterminate Values) The possible ex-
tended indeterminate values are [Ris13]:
 Indeterminate Deny (Id): an indeterminate value arising from a policy
which could have evaluated to deny but not permit, e.g., a Rule which
evaluates to indeterminate and its eﬀect is deny.
 Indeterminate Permit (Ip): an indeterminate value arising from a policy
which could have evaluated to permit but not deny, e.g., a Rule which
evaluates to indeterminate and its eﬀect is permit.
 Indeterminate Deny Permit (Idp): an indeterminate value arising from a
policy which could have eﬀect either deny or permit.
In situations where we ﬁnd that the set V3 oﬀers too little discerning power we
shall therefore make use of the set V6 =
{>d,>p, Id, Ip, Idp,⊥ }. It is convenient
to deﬁne a function σ : V3 × { d, p } → V6 to map a value in V3 and possible
eﬀects into a value in V6 given a particular Rule's eﬀect e ∈ { d, p } as follows1:
σ(X, e) =
{
X if X = ⊥
Xe otherwise
As an example, σ(>, d) = >d.
1For simplicity, we denote d for deny and p for permit.
62 XACML 3.0 Semantics
5.2 Evaluation of XACML Components
We now give a syntax directed deﬁnition of the semantics of the XACML com-
ponents, again leaving the challenging case of deﬁning the combining algorithms
to the next section. We use the J·K notation to map XACML elements into their
values in V3 or V6.
5.2.1 Evaluation of Match into V3
We assume that the way the system evaluates the request is captured by the
evalM/2 function. The system uses the evalM function to evaluate the re-
quest context in order to get attribute values in Request element that match
with attribute category in Match element. If an operational error occurs dur-
ing the evaluation process, then the result of the entire Match semantics is
indeterminate.
Let cat be an attribute category and let Q = request: {A1, . . . ,An } be a
Request element. The evaluation of the request context in order to get attribute
values in Request element that match with attribute category is as follows.
evalM (cat ,Q) =
{
error if an error occurs during the evaluation process
{ v1, . . . , vm } if cat(vi) ∈ { A1, . . . ,An } , 1 ≤ i ≤ m ≤ n
Let M = fMatchID(v, C) be a Match where fMatchID is an identiﬁer of Match
evaluation function, v is the embedded attribute value and C is an attribute
category. Let Q be a Request element. The evaluation of Match is as follows.
JfMatchID(v, cat)K(Q) =

> if evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and
∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = >
⊥ if evalM (cat ,Q) = { } or
(evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and
∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = ⊥)
I if evalM (cat ,Q) = error or
((∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) 6= >) and
(∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = I))
(5.1)
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Remark : In the previous equation, there are two appearances of fMatchID . The
ﬁrst one indicates the syntax element of Match component and the latter in-
dicates the evaluation of fMatchID function in order to determine the value of
Match semantics.
Example 5.1 (Example of Match Evaluation) Let us continue from
the previous example on the request ordered by the physician Julius Hibbert.
Recall that the XACML Request Q sent by the context handler is as follows.
1 request :{
2 subject -id(julius_hilbbert),
3 subject -role(physician),
4 physician_id(jh1234),
5 patient_record(patient_dob , 1992 -03 -21),
6 patient_record(patient_number , 555555) ,
7 patient_record(patient_contact , b.simpson@example.com),
8 content_selector(patientDoB),
9 target_namespace(urn:example:med:schemas:record),
10 action(read),
11 current -date (2010 -01 -11)}
The result of evalM (action,Q) is { read } because action(read) is in Request Q.
Consider that the evaluation of string − equal(read, read) returns true (>), then
the result of Jstring − equal(read, action)K(Q) is >.
Suppose we have a diﬀerent scenario. There is an error, e.g., a connection failure
when PDP is evaluating the request context. Consequently, the evalM (action,Q)
returns error and the result of Jstring − equal(read, action)K(Q) is I.
5.2.2 Evaluation of AllOf, AnyOf and Target into V3
Let M be a Match, let A be an AllOf, let E be an AnyOf, let T be a Target
and let Q be a Request.
Suppose that allof(Aid) : {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn }, n ≥ 1 be a AllOf elements and
eachMi is a Match element. The evaluation of AllOf Aid over Request Q is as
follows.
JAidK(Q) =

> if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JMiK = >
⊥ if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JMiK = ⊥
I otherwise
(5.2)
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Suppose that anyof(Eid) : {A1,A2, . . . ,An }, n ≥ 1 be a AnyOf elements and
each Ai is an AllOf element. The evaluation of AnyOf Eid over Request Q is as
follows.
JEidK(Q) =

> if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JAiK = >
⊥ if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JAiK = ⊥
I otherwise
(5.3)
Suppose that allof(Tid) : { E1, E2, . . . , En }, n ≥ 1 be a Target elements and
each Ei is an AnyOf element. The evaluation of Target Tid over Request Q is
as follows.
JTidK(Q) =

> if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JEiK = >
⊥ if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JEiK = ⊥
I otherwise
(5.4)
An empty Target indicated by null  is always evaluated to >.
Example 5.2 (Example of Target Evaluation) Let us use the pre-
vious Patient Record Policies from Example 4.2 to show the evaluation of Target
based on Request Q from previous example. In this example, we only show the
evaluation of Target from Rule r4. Let us recall this Rule as follows.
1 rule(r4):{ deny;
2 target(r4):{
3 anyof(r4any1):{
4 allof(r4all1):{ string_equal(administrator ,subject -role) }
},
5 anyof(r4any2):{
6 allof(r4all1):{ anyURI_equal(urn:example:med:schemas:
record , target_namespace) }},
7 anyof(r4any3):{
8 allof(r4all31):{ string_equal(read , action },
9 allof(r4all32):{ string_equal(write , action }}};
10 condition(r4):{ true }}
We have shown that the evaluation of Jstring_equal(read, action)K(Q) is equal
to >. Thus the evaluation of Jallof(r4all32K(Q) is equal to > too. Hence the
evaluation of Jr4any3K(Q) is equal to >.
The evaluation of Match anyURI_equal(patient_record, target_namespace). The
result of JanyURI_equal(patient_record, target_namespace)K(Q) is > because
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target_namespace(patient_record) is in Q and we assume the evaluation of
anyURI_equal(patient_record, patient_record is equal to >. Hence, the evalu-
ation of Jr4any2K(Q) is >.
The evaluation of Match string − equal(administrator, subject− role). We get
that the evaluation of string − equal(administrator, physician) returns false (⊥).
Thus, the result of Jstring − equal(administrator, subject− role)K(Q) is ⊥. Hence,
the evaluation of Jr4all1K(Q) is ⊥. Moreover, the evaluation of Jr4any1K(Q) is ⊥
too. Finally, the evaluation of Jr4K(Q) is ⊥.
5.2.3 Evaluation of Condition into V3
We deﬁne the conditional evaluation function evalC as an unspeciﬁed function
used to evaluate Condition to a value in V3, given a Request component Q. The
evaluation of Condition is then deﬁned as follows:
JCidK(Q) = evalC(C,Q) (5.5)
Example 5.3 (Example of Condition Evaluation) Suppose we have
a Request from Bartholomew Simpson to read his own patient record. Following
is the Request component.
1 request :{
2 subject(bartholomew_simpson),
3 subject -role(patient),
4 patient_id (5555) ,
5 resource_target(patient_record),
6 patient_record(patient_id , 5555) ,
7 action(read) }
By evaluating the Target element of each Rule in the previous example, we ﬁnd
out that only the Target of Rule r1matches with the Request component. Recall
that the Condition of r1 is as follows.
1 condition(r1):{
2 patient_number(N) /\ patient_record(patient_id , X) /\ N = X }
By substituting the variables N and X with 5555 that we get from the Request
component, the evalC(C,Q) returns >.
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5.2.4 Evaluation of Rule into V6
Let rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C } be a Rule where E is the Rule's eﬀect, E ∈
{ permit, deny }, T is a Target and C is a Condition. Let Q be a Request.
Then, the evaluation of Rule Rid is determined as follows:
JRidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = > and E = deny
>p if JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = > and E = permit
Id if
(
(JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = I) or JT K(Q) = I) and
E = permit
Ip if
(
(JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = I) or JT K(Q) = I) and
E = deny
⊥ if (JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = ⊥) or JT K(Q) = ⊥
(5.6)
To increase our conﬁdence in the semantics deﬁned above it may be useful
to deﬁne the evaluation of Rule in a diﬀerent way using a new operator ;:
V3 × V3 → V3. Let F and G be two values in V3 and deﬁne:
F ; G =
{
G if F = >
F otherwise
Proposition 5.4 Let rule(R) : {E ; T ; C } be a Rule and let Q be a Re-
quest. Let e be p when the eﬀect E is permit and e be d when the eﬀect E is
deny. Then, the following equation holds
JRK(Q) = σ ( JT K(Q); JCK(Q), e )
Proof. The table below tabulates all nine possibilities for JRK(Q), JT K(Q)
and JCK(Q) and calculates these combinations. The equivalence of the last two
columns constitutes the proof of Proposition 5.4.
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JT K(Q) JCK(Q) JT K(Q); JCK(Q) σ (JT K(Q); JCK(Q), e) JRK(Q)
> > > >e >e
> ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
> I I Ie Ie
⊥ > ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
⊥ I ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
I > I Ie Ie
I ⊥ I Ie Ie
I I I Ie Ie
5.2.5 Evaluation of Policy into V6
The standard evaluation of a Policy element is described in [Ris13] as follows.
Target Combining Algorithm Value Evaluation of Policy
Match Any value Speciﬁed by the combining algorithm
No-match Don't care Not Applicable
Indeterminate
Not Applicable Not Applicable
Permit Indeterminate Permit
Deny Indeterminate Deny
Indeterminate Indeterminate Deny Permit
Indeterminate Deny Permit Indeterminate Deny Permit
Indeterminate Permit Indeterminate Permit
Indeterminate Deny Indeterminate Deny
To formalise this, let policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
where T is a Target and 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 is a sequence of Rules, and let Q be a
Request. Then, the evaluation of Policy Pid is deﬁned as follows (using abbre-
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viations explained below):
JPidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = >d
>p if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = >p
Idp if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Idp) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (I or Idp))
Id if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Id) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (>d or Id))
Ip if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Ip) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (>p or Ip))
⊥ if JT K(Q) = ⊥ or(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = ⊥) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = ⊥)
(5.7)
where R = 〈JR1K(Q), . . . , JRnK(Q)〉.
Remark: The second equation: Idp if JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = I will
never happen. It is revised by the deﬁnition of combining algorithms. All
combining algorithms never return I.
5.2.6 Evaluation of PolicySet into V6
The evaluation of a PolicySet is similar to that of a Policy evaluation. However,
the input of the combining algorithm is a sequence of either PolicySets or Poli-
cies. For the formal deﬁnition, let policyset(PSid) : { combid ; T ; 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 }
be a PolicySet where T is a Target and 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 is a sequence of PolicySets
(or Policies), and let Q be a Request. Then, the evaluation of PolicySet PSid is
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deﬁned as follows:
JPSidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = >d
>p if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = >p
Idp if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = Idp) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P) = (I or Idp))
Id if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = Id) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P = (>d or Id))
Ip if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P = Ip) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P = (>p or Ip))
⊥ if JT K(Q) = ⊥ or(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P = ⊥) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P = ⊥)
(5.8)
where P = 〈JP1K(Q), . . . , JPnK(Q)〉.
5.3 Semantics of XACML Combining Algorithms
As mentioned before, there are twelve combining algorithms in XACML 3.0,
namely (i) (unordered- and ordered-) deny-overrides (do), (ii) (unordered- and
ordered-) permit-overrides (po), (iii) deny-unless-permit (dup), (iv) permit-unless-
deny (pud), (v) ﬁrst-applicable (fa), (vi) only-one-applicable (ooa), (vii) legacy
(unordered- and ordered-) deny-overrides (ldo) and (viii) legacy (unordered- and
ordered-) permit-overrides (lpo). In this thesis we do not consider ordered-deny-
overrides combining algorithm, ordered-permit-overrides combining algorithm,
legacy ordered-deny-overrides combining algorithm and legacy ordered-permit-
overrides combining algorithm since we do not take into account Obligations
and Advices. Hence, we only cover eight combining algorithms in this section.
The input for each combining algorithm is a sequence of PolicySet, Policy, or
Rule values. There are some combining algorithms that keep track the set of
extended indeterminate values while others do not. The combining algorithms
which use the extended indeterminate values are: deny-overrides and permit-
overrides while the combining algorithms which do not use the extended inde-
terminate values are: deny-unless-permit, permit-unless-deny, ﬁrst-applicable,
only-one-applicable, legacy deny-overrides, and legacy permit-overrides. The
output of those combining algorithms which do not track the extended set of
indeterminate values must be treated as Idp when those combining algorithms
return indeterminate value. On the other hand, each value of extended inde-
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terminate value shall be mapped to Idp when they come as an input of those
combining algorithms.
To guard against modelling artefacts we also provide an alternative way of char-
acterising the combining algorithms and we formally prove the equivalence of
these approaches.
5.3.1 Pairwise Policy Values
Our main semantic domain for expressing the combining algorithms is built
around V6. It is to be equipped with a partial order, in much the same way that
V3 became L3 = 〈V3,≤〉, and the intended partial order is displayed in Figure
5.1. However, explanations on operations on the partially ordered set become
more amenable by giving an isomorphic representation of the elements of V6.
The isomorphic representation makes use of pairs where component values are
chosen as follows. The value 1 represents an applicable value (either deny or
permit), 12 represents an indeterminate value and 0 means that there is no
applicable value. In each pair, the ﬁrst component represents the deny value
amount of deny and the second component represents permit value amount of
permit. We deﬁne [0, 0] for not applicable (⊥) because neither deny nor permit
is applicable, [1, 0] for applicable with deny eﬀect (>d) because only deny value
is applicable, [ 12 , 0] for Id because the deny part is indeterminate, [
1
2 ,
1
2 ] for Idp
because both deny and permit have indeterminate values. A similar encoding
works for permit. This is summarised in Figure 5.1.
Definition 5.5 (Pairwise Policy Values) Formally, the set of pair-
wise policy values is P =
{
[1, 0], [0, 1], [ 12 , 0], [0,
1
2 ], [
1
2 ,
1
2 ], [0, 0]
}
We write [D,P ] for a typical element on P and denote d([D,P ]) = D and
p([D,P ]) = P for the function that returns the deny value (ﬁrst component)
and permit value (second component), respectively. The relationship between
V6 and P can then be summarised by deﬁning a function δ : V6 → P as a
mapping function that maps V6 into P as follows:
δ(X) =

[1, 0] X = >d
[0, 1] X = >p
[ 12 , 0] X = Id
[0, 12 ] X = Ip
[ 12 ,
1
2 ] X = Idp
[0, 0] X = ⊥
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[0, 0] = ⊥
[ 12 , 0] = Id [0,
1
2 ] = Ip
[1, 0] = >deny [ 12 , 12 ] = Idp [0, 1] = >permit
Figure 5.1: The partially ordered set PP (isomorphic to V6) for pairwise policy
values.
We set δ(〈s1, . . . , sn〉) = 〈δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn)〉 to extend δ to operate over sequences.
It is now straightforward to formally deﬁne the partial order vP on P. We
deﬁne [D1, P1] vP [D2, P2] if and only if D1 ≤ D2 and P1 ≤ P2 with 0 ≤ 12 ≤ 1.
We write PP for the partial ordered set (poset) (P,vP) illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The partial ordered set PP is not a lattice as many subsets have no least upper
bound. However, to express those least upper bounds and greatest lower bounds
that do exist we introduce the following functions. Let max : 2{ 1, 12 ,0 } →{
1, 12 , 0
}
be the function that returns the maximum value of a non-empty
subset of
{
1, 12 , 0
}
and let min : 2{ 1, 12 ,0 } → { 1, 12 , 0 } be the function that
returns the minimum value of a non-empty subset of
{
1, 12 , 0
}
.
This allows us to deﬁne MaxvP : 2
P → P as a function that returns the maxi-
mum pairwise policy value deﬁned as follows:
MaxvP(S) = [max ({ 0 } ∪ { d(X) | X ∈ S }),max ({ 0 } ∪ { p(X) | X ∈ S })]
and MinvP : 2
P → P as a function that return the minimum pairwise policy
value which is deﬁned as follows:
MinvP(S) = [min({ 1 } ∪ { d(X) | X ∈ S }),min({ 1 } ∪ { p(X) | X ∈ S })]
One may observe that MaxvP(S) and MinvP(S) as constructed above are not
necessarily elements of PP. However, if they are then MaxvP(S) denotes the
least upper bound of S in the partially ordered set PP, and MinvP(S) denotes
the greatest lower bound of S in the partially ordered set PP. Remark: In
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⊥
Lpo
Ip Id
>d
Idp
>p
⊥
Ldo
Ip
>p
Id
Idp
>d
Figure 5.2: The lattice Lpo for the Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm
(left); the lattice Ldo for the Deny-Overrides Combining Algorithm
(right).
fact, there are three values that may be constructed by these functions that fall
outside of PP: the values [1, 12 ], [
1
2 , 1] and [1, 1] denoting some form of conﬂict
as we shall return to in Section 8.5.
5.3.2 The Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm
We are now ready to deal with the ﬁrst combining algorithm. The permit-
overrides combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a permit decision
should take priority over a deny decision. The behaviour of this algorithm is
described in [Ris13] as follows:
1. If any decision is >p, then the result is >p,
2. otherwise, if any decision is Idp, then the result is Idp,
3. otherwise, if any decision is Ip and another decision is Id or >d, then the
result is Idp,
4. otherwise, if any decision is Ip, then the result is Ip,
5. otherwise, if any decision is >d, then the result is >d,
6. otherwise, if any decision is Id, then the result is Id,
7. otherwise, the result is ⊥.
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As our ﬁrst and most intuitive attempt at formalising this explanation we shall
equip V6 with a special partial order vpo and deﬁne the permit-overrides com-
bining algorithm as the least upper bound operator over the resulting lattice
Lpo = (V6,vpo). The partial order vpo is deﬁned by the leftmost Hasse diagram
in Figure 5.2 and it is immediate to verify that all pairs have a least upper
bound and there is a least element and hence that Lpo = (V6,vpo) is a lattice.2
The least upper bound operator for Lpo is denoted by
⊔
po.
To argue for this choice of Lpo = (V6,vpo) note that in the permit-overrides
combining algorithm, the permit value takes the highest priority (see item 1 of
the above description). Hence, the permit value (denoted by >p) should be the
top element. Whenever permit does not exists, we return Idp if there is Idp (see
item 2). Hence, Idp is bellow >p. Idp is also the join of Ip and >d or Ip and Id
(see item 3). However, >d is more favourable than Id (see item 5 and 6), thus,
>d should be on top of Id. The least element of this lattice is ⊥ (see item 6).
We are now ready to deﬁne the permit-overrides combining algorithm using the
least upper bound operation
⊔
po.
Definition 5.6 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6 and let S = { s1, . . . , sn } be a set of policy values from S. We deﬁne the
permit-overrides combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
po
(S) =
⊔
po
S (5.9)
Alternative Characterisation While we have argued that the previous con-
struction is correct it is somewhat unsatisfactory in that the partial order vpo is
so heavily dependent on the policy combining algorithm. This motivates giving
a deﬁnition directly in terms of the pairwise policy values P. The idea is that
we inspect the maximum value of deny and permit in the set of pairwise pol-
icy values. We conclude that the decision is permit if the permit is applicable
(i.e. it has value 1). If the permit is indeterminate (i.e. it has value 12 ) then the
decision is Idp when the deny is either indeterminate (i.e. it has value 12 ) or ap-
plicable (i.e. it has value 1). Otherwise we take the maximum value of deny and
permit from the set of pairwise policy values as the result of permit-overrides
combining algorithm.
2It is well known that a partially ordered set is a complete lattice if and only if all least
upper bounds exist, as the greatest lower bounds can then be constructed from the least upper
bounds; in a similar manner, a ﬁnite partially ordered set is a lattice if and only if all binary
least upper bounds exist and there is a least element, as the greatest lower bounds and greatest
element can then be constructed from the binary least upper bounds and the least element.
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Definition 5.7 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy values
from P and let S = { s1, . . . , sn } be a set of pairwise policy values from S. We
deﬁne the permit-overrides combining algorithm under pairwise policy values P
as follows:
P⊕
po
(S) =

[0, 1] if MaxvP(S) = [D, 1], D ≥ 0
[ 12 ,
1
2 ] if MaxvP(S) = [D,
1
2 ], D ≥ 12
MaxvP(S) otherwise
(5.10)
One may check that
⊕P
po only produces values that are in pairwise policy values
P.
We have now given two independent formalisations of the permit-overrides com-
bining algorithm. The following result establishes their equivalence and thereby
increases our faith in either one.
Proposition 5.8 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6. Then
δ(
V6⊕
po
(S)) =
P⊕
po
(δ(S))
We refer to the Appendix A for the proof.
5.3.3 The Legacy Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm
The legacy permit-overrides combining algorithm is intended for those cases
where a permit decision should have priority over a deny decision. The be-
haviour of the legacy permit-overrides combining algorithm is similar to the
permit-overrides combining algorithm except that the legacy permit-overrides
combining algorithm treats all extended indeterminate values as Idp. The algo-
rithm has the following behaviour.
1. If any rule evaluates to >p, then the result is >p.
2. Otherwise, if any rule having eﬀect Ip or Idp, then the result is Idp.
3. Otherwise, if any rule evaluate to >d, then the result is >d.
4. Otherwise, if any rule evaluate to Id, then the result is Idp.
5. Otherwise, the result is ⊥.
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We simply model the legacy permit-overrides combining algorithm based on the
permit-overrides combining algorithm since it behaves similarly to the permit-
overrides combining algorithm. We add additional condition that all extended
indeterminate values are mapped to Idp. The same case is applied for our alter-
native characteristic using pairwise policy values.
Definition 5.9 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from V6.
We deﬁne the legacy permit-overrides combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
lpo
(S) =
{
Idp if
⊕V6
po (S) ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
}⊕V6
po (S) otherwise
(5.11)
Definition 5.10 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy val-
ues from P. We deﬁne the legacy permit-overrides combining algorithm under
pairwise policy values P as follows:
P⊕
lpo
(S) =
{
[ 12 ,
1
2 ] if
⊕P
po(S) ∈
{
[ 12 , 0], [0,
1
2 ], [
1
2 ,
1
2 ]
}⊕P
po(S) otherwise
(5.12)
In this case the two deﬁnitions are so similar that we hardly gain any extra
assurances by providing both sets of characterisation; however, we decided to
do so for completeness sake.
5.3.4 The Deny-Overrides Combining Algorithm
The deny-overrides combining algorithm is largely dual to that of the permit-
overrides combining algorithm. It is intended for those cases where a deny
decision should have priority over a permit decision. In [Ris13] the behaviour
of this algorithm is described by:
1. If any decision is >d then the result is >d,
2. otherwise, if any decision is Idp then the result is Idp,
3. otherwise, if any decision is Id and another decision is Ip or >p, then the
result is Idp,
4. otherwise, if any decision is Id, then the result is Id,
5. otherwise, if any decision is >p, then the result is >p,
6. otherwise, if any decision is Ip, then the result is Ip,
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7. otherwise, the result is ⊥.
Formally, we write Ldo = (V6,vdo) for the lattice with vdo being the partial
ordering depicted in the middle Hasse diagram of Figure 5.2. The least upper
bound operator for Ldo is denoted by
⊔
do.
Definition 5.11 Let 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from V6. We
deﬁne the deny-overrides combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
do
(〈s1, . . . , sn〉) =
⊔
do
{ s1, . . . , sn } (5.13)
Alternative Characterisation The deny-overrides combining algorithm can
be expressed using pairwise policy values P in much the same way as was done
for the permit-overrides combining algorithm by symmetry.
Definition 5.12 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy values
from P let S = { s1, . . . , sn } be a set of pairwise policy values from S. We
deﬁne the deny-overrides combining algorithm under pairwise policy values P
as follows:
P⊕
do
(S) =

[1, 0] if MaxvP(S) = [1, P ], P ≥ 0
[ 12 ,
1
2 ] if MaxvP(S) = [
1
2 , P ], P ≥ 12
MaxvP(S) otherwise
(5.14)
As before we can show that the two characterisations agree thereby increasing
our faith in either one.
Proposition 5.13 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6. Then
δ(
V6⊕
do
(S)) =
P⊕
do
(δ(S))
The proof of Proposition 5.13 is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.8 as should
not be surprising given the symmetry between the permit-overrides combining
algorithm and the deny-overrides combining algorithm.
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5.3.5 The Legacy Deny-Overrides Combining Algorithm
As likely the deny-overrides combining algorithm, the legacy deny-overrides
combining algorithm is a dual of the legacy permit-overrides combining algo-
rithm. The behaviour of this algorithm is as follows.
1. If any rule evaluates to >d, then the result is >d.
2. Otherwise, if any rule having eﬀect Id or Idp, then the result is Idp.
3. Otherwise, if any rule evaluate to >p, then the result is >p.
4. Otherwise, if any rule evaluate to Ip or Idp, then the result is Idp.
5. Otherwise, the result is ⊥.
Definition 5.14 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from V6.
We deﬁne the legacy deny-overrides combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
ldo
(S) =
{
Idp if
⊕V6
do (S) ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
}⊕V6
do (S) otherwise
(5.15)
Definition 5.15 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy values
fromP. We deﬁne the legacy deny-overrides combining algorithm under pairwise
policy values P as follows:
P⊕
ldo
(S) =
{
[ 12 ,
1
2 ] if
⊕P
do(S) ∈
{
[ 12 , 0], [0,
1
2 ], [
1
2 ,
1
2 ]
}⊕P
do(S) otherwise
(5.16)
5.3.6 The Deny-Unless-Permit Combining Algorithm
The deny-unless-permit combining algorithm is intended for those cases where a
permit decision should have priority over a deny decision and an indeterminate
or not-applicable values must never be the result. It is useful at the top level
in a policy structure to ensure that a PDP will always return a deﬁnite answer,
i.e., either permit or deny decision. The algorithm has the following behaviour:
1. If any decision is >p, then the result is >p.
2. Otherwise, the result is >d.
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Definition 5.16 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6. We deﬁne the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
dup
(
S
){>p if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si = >p
>d otherwise
(5.17)
Definition 5.17 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy values
from policyvalues. We deﬁne the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm under
pairwise policy values P as follows:
P⊕
dup
(
S
)
=
{
[0, 1] if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si = [0, 1]
[1, 0] otherwise
5.3.7 The Permit-Unless-Deny Combining Algorithm
The permit-unless-deny combining algorithm has the same behaviour as the
deny-unless-permit combining algorithm. The diﬀerent is only that that the
deny decision has higher priority than the permit one. The behaviour of the
permit-unless-deny combining algorithm is as follows.
1. If any decision is >d, then the result is >d.
2. Otherwise, the result is >p.
Definition 5.18 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6. We deﬁne the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
pud
(S) =
{
>d if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si = >d
>p otherwise
(5.18)
Definition 5.19 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from P.
We deﬁne the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
P⊕
pud
(S) =
{
[1, 0] if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si = [1, 0]
[0, 1] otherwise
(5.19)
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5.3.8 The First-Applicable Combining Algorithm
The result of the ﬁrst-applicable algorithm is described as the ﬁrst Rule, Policy
or PolicySet element in the sequence whose Target and Condition is applicable.
The pseudo-code of the ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm in XACML 3.0
[Ris13] makes it clear that the result of this algorithm is the ﬁrst Rule, Policy
or PolicySet that does not give the value not applicable. This reﬂects the
idea that an indeterminate policy could turn out to be an applicable policy and
hence be the one to be chosen. The ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm does
not use extended indeterminate values. Hence, all of extended indeterminate
values (i.e., Id, Ip and Idp) are treated equivalently as Idp.
The ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm under policy values from V6 and pair-
wise policy values from P are deﬁned below.
Definition 5.20 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6. We deﬁne the ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
fa
(S) =

Idp if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
} ∧ ∀j : (j < i)⇒ (sj = ⊥)
si if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈
{>p,>d } ∧ ∀j : (j < i)⇒ (sj = ⊥)
⊥ otherwise
(5.20)
Definition 5.21 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy values
from P. We deﬁne the ﬁrst applicable combining algorithm under P as follows:
P⊕
fa
(S) =

[ 12 ,
1
2 ] if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈
{
[ 12 , 0], [0,
1
2 ], [
1
2 ,
1
2 ]
}∧
∀j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : (j < i)⇒ (sj = [0, 0])
si if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈ { [1, 0], [0, 1] }∧
∀j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : (j < i)⇒ (sj = [0, 0])
[0, 0] otherwise
(5.21)
5.3.9 The Only-One-Applicable Combining Algorithm
The only-one-applicable combining algorithm is described in [Ris13] in the fol-
lowing manner:
In the entire set of policies in the policy set, if no policy is consid-
ered applicable by virtue of its target, then the result of the policy-
combination algorithm shall be Not Applicable. If more than one
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policy is considered applicable by virtue of its target, then the result
of the policy-combination algorithm shall be Indeterminate.
If only one policy is considered applicable by evaluation of its target,
then the result of the policy-combining algorithm shall be the result
of evaluating the policy. If an error occurs while evaluating the
target of a policy, or a reference to a policy is considered invalid or
the policy evaluation results in Indeterminate, then the policy set
shall evaluate to Indeterminate, with the appropriate error status.
Inspecting the pseudo-code provided in [Ris13] allows us to conclude that:
 If there are at least two applicable policies, then the result is indeterminate,
 otherwise, if there is the only one policy that is applicable, the result is
its policy value,
 otherwise, the result is not applicable.
Please remember that the only-one-applicable combining algorithm does not
track the set of extended indeterminate values. Hence, all of extended indeter-
minate values are mapped to Idp.
Definition 5.22 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6. We deﬁne the only-one-applicable combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
ooa
(S) =

si if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈ {>d,>p }∧
∀j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : j 6= i⇒ sj = ⊥
Idp if
(∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈ { Id, Ip, Idp } )∨(∃i, j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : i 6= j ∧ si, sj ∈ {>d,>p } )
⊥ otherwise
(5.22)
Alternative Characterisation In line with our previous developments we
are also going to show how to express the only-one-applicable combining algo-
rithm directly using pairwise policy values P. The idea is that we inspect the
maximum value of deny and permit returned from the given set of pairwise
policy values. By inspecting the maximum value for each element, we know
exactly the combination of pairwise policy values i.e., if we ﬁnd that both deny
and permit are not 0, it means that the deny value and the permit value are
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either applicable (i.e. it has value 1) or indeterminate (i.e. it has value 12 ).
Thus, the result of this algorithm is Idp (based on the only-one-combining al-
gorithm description above). However if only one element is not 0 then there
is a possibility that many policies have the same applicable (or indeterminate)
values. If there are at least two policies with the amount of deny (or permit)
are either applicable or indeterminate value, then the result is Idp. Otherwise
we take the maximum value of deny and permit from the given set of pairwise
policy values as the result of only-one-applicable combining algorithm.
Definition 5.23 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy values
from P and let S = { s1, . . . , sn } be a set of pairwise policy values from S. We
deﬁne the only-one-applicable combining algorithm under pairwise policy values
P as follows
P⊕
ooa
(S) =

[ 12 ,
1
2 ] if
(
MaxvP(S) = [D,P ],
(D = 12 ∨ P = 12 ) ∨ (D = P = 1)
) ∨(∃i, j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : i 6= j,
MinvP({ si, sj }) = [D,P ],
max ({D,P }) ≥ 12
)
MaxvP(S) otherwise
(5.23)
We conclude our treatment of policy combining algorithms by showing that also
in the case of the only-one-applicable combining algorithm do we achieve a full
agreement between the two developments.
Proposition 5.24 Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from
V6. Then
δ(
V6⊕
ooa
(S)) =
P⊕
ooa
(δ(S))
We refer to the Appendix A for the proof.
5.4 Related Work
A formalisation of XACML 2.0 using a multi-valued approach is done by Bruns
et al. and Ni et al. using the Belnap 4-valued logic [BDH07, BH08] and D-
algebra 8-valued logic [NBL09], respectively. We consider analysing more detail
Belnap 4-valued logic and D-Algebra 8-valued logic [NBL09] as these are the
formalisations closest in spirit to ours as well as being the ones closest to the
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ff
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knowledge ordering truth ordering
Figure 5.3: The bi-lattice of Belnap 4-Valued Logic.
current version of XACML. There are some mistakes in both cases and hence,
they are not adequate to model XACML semantics.
5.4.1 XACML Semantics under Belnap 4-Valued Logic
Belnap [Bel77] deﬁnes a four-valued logic over the logical values
Four = { >>, tt, ff ,⊥⊥ }. The idea is that tt denotes true, ff denotes false, ⊥⊥
denotes a missing truth value, and that >> denotes a conﬂicting truth value.
The four-valued logic is given the structure of a bi-lattice by equipping it with
two partial orderings. One is the truth ordering (≤t) that may be viewed as
extending the ordering given by 2-valued implication to operate over the new
logical values. The other is the knowledge ordering (≤k) under which true and
false are incomparable. We dispense with a formal deﬁnition and simply refer
to the Hasse diagrams displayed in Figure 5.3. It is straightforward to check
that Four is a lattice under both orderings. We use the familiar ∨ to denote
least upper bound with respect to the truth ordering (≤t) and ∧ to denote the
greatest lower bound. For the knowledge ordering (≤k) we use ⊕B to denote
least upper bound and ⊗B to denote greatest lower bound. To express the de-
sired functions over Four one may deﬁne auxiliary operations and we mention
three deﬁned in [BH08]:
 An overwriting operator [y 7→ z] with y, z ∈ Four; here x[y 7→ z] yields x
if x 6= y, and z otherwise.
 A priority operator x > y; this is merely syntactic sugar for x[⊥⊥ 7→ y].
Several papers have considered using Belnap 4-valued logic to formalise the
meaning of operators on access control policies. A key study is that of Bruns
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et al. considering the policy language PBel [BDH07, BH08] whereas that of
Hankin et al. consider the design of an aspect oriented policy language AspectKB
[HNN09]. In these approaches the value tt is interpreted as permitting the
access, the value ff is interpreted as denying the access, ⊥⊥ is interpreted as
missing information, and >> is interpreted as conﬂicting information. The
approaches diﬀer in their way of determining whether or not to permit access
in case of the new logical values ⊥⊥ and >>; this is connected to how the
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) interprets the new logical values but this is
not discussed3 in [BDH07,BH08,HNN09].
Bruns et al. attempt to formalise XACML 2.0 using their PBel approach. They
consider three XACML policy combining operators and formalise them as follows
[BH08]:
 permit-overrides(x, y) is modelled as (x⊕B y)[>> 7→ ff ].
 ﬁrst-applicable(x, y) is modelled as x > y.
 only-one-applicable(x, y) is modelled as (x ⊕B y) ⊕B ((x ⊕B ¬y) ⊗B
(y ⊕B ¬y))4.
Further, they suggested that the indeterminate value is treated as >> whereas
the inapplicable value is treated as ⊥⊥.
However, modelling indeterminate as >> has as a consequence that the permit-
overrides combining operator is not deﬁned correctly. Suppose we have two
policies P1 and P2 where P1 evaluates to permit (tt) and P2 evaluates to inde-
terminate (>>). The result of the permit-overrides combining operator then is
as follows:
(P1 ⊕B P2)[>> 7→ ff ] = (tt⊕B >>)[>> 7→ ff ]
= >>[>> 7→ ff ]
= ff
In other words, based on Bruns et al. deﬁnition using Belnap 4-valued logic, the
result is deny (ff). This conﬂicts with the intentions of both XACML 2.0 and
XACML 3.0 where the result of the permit-overrides combining operator should
be permit (tt).
The problems stem from the fact that Bruns et al. deﬁne an indeterminate value
as a conﬂict by formalising it as >>. However, they also say that sometimes
indeterminate should be treated as ⊥⊥ and sometimes as >> [BH08], but they
3It would seem that Bruns et al. favour a so-called deny-based PEP whereas Hankin et al.
favour a so-called permit-based PEP.
4¬p returns permit if and only if p is deny (and vice versa).
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give no further explanation about the circumstances under which indeterminate
is treated as >> or as ⊥⊥. Treating indeterminate as >> is too strong because
an indeterminate value does not always contain information about deny and
permit at the same time. Only Idp contains information about both deny and
permit, whereas Id and Ip only contain information only about either deny or
permit. On the other hand, treating indeterminate as ⊥⊥ is too weak because
an indeterminate value is treated as not applicable despite the fact that there
is information contained inside an indeterminate value.
We conclude that the Belnap 4-valued logic has no explicit deﬁnition of indeter-
minate. However, the Belnap 4-valued logic has a conﬂict value (i.e. >>) which
is not a part of the XACML standard. Thus the match between XACML and
Belnap 4-valued logic is rather imperfect.
5.4.2 XACML Semantics under D-Algebra
Another approach to the formalisation of XACML was performed by Ni et al.
in [NBL09] using a D-algebra and operations over it. The carrier of the D-
algebra of interest consists of three kinds of decision values. The deterministic
decisions are permit ({p}), deny ({d}) and not applicable ({na }), corresponding
to our >p, >d and ⊥. The non-deterministic decisions are
{
d, na
}
,
{
p, na
}
, and{
d,p, na
}
, corresponding to our Id, Ip and Idp. Finally, there are the special
values ∅ and { p,d }; here ∅ is deﬁned for an empty policy (or the absence of
a policy) and { p,d } for a conﬂict. We call the D-algebra an 8-valued logic
because the cardinality of the decisions D is |P({ p,d, na })| = 8.
A D-algebra is a carrier D (as explained above) equipped with an interpretation
of the following operations [NBL09]:
 a constant 0 interpreted as ∅
 an unary operator ¬ interpreted as { p,d, na } \ x (where x ∈ D)
 a binary operator ⊕D interpreted as x ∪ y (where x, y ∈ D)
 a binary operator ⊗D interpreted as x⊗D y =
{
¬0 : x = y
0 : x 6= y (where x, y ∈
D)
To express the functions of interest one may deﬁne derived operations as for
example xD y = ¬(¬x⊕D ¬y) and x	D y = xD ¬y (for x, y ∈ D).
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Focusing again on the combining operator permit-overrides the D-algebra se-
mantics is as follows [NBL09]:
fpo(x, y) = (x⊕D y)
	D(((x⊗D { p })⊕D (y ⊗D { p }))D { d, na })	D(¬((xD y)⊗D { na })D { na }D ¬((x⊗D ∅)⊕D (y ⊗D ∅)))
For a concrete example, let us consider two policies P1 and P2 where P1 evalu-
ates to indeterminate permit (Ip in our notation and
{
p, na
}
in the D-algebra)
and where P2 evaluates to deny ( deny in our notation and { d } in the D-
algebra). The evaluation of fpo(P1, P2) then gives fpo(
{
p, na
}
, { d }) which
equals { p,d }. As mentioned above this denotes a conﬂict and does not corre-
spond to any of the values considered in neither XACML 3.0 [Ris13] nor XACML
2.0 [Mos05].
We conclude that the match between D-algebras and XACML is imperfect. It is
interesting to note that the D-algebra as well as the Belnap approach discussed
above are able to model conﬂict  which is not part of the XACML standard.
5.4.3 Summary
For completeness, we summarise in Table 5.2 the results of all the approaches
considered in the present paper. The result of the permit-overrides combining
operator under Belnap logic is ff and in the approach of Bruns et al. , the
access is denied. The result of the permit-overrides combining operator under
D-algebra is { p,d } and in the approach of Ni et al. approach using D-algebra,
a conﬂict occurs. This may be contrasted with Bruns et al. and Ni et al. that
both claim that their approaches ﬁt with XACML 2.0 and with Ni et al. that
claim that their approach ﬁts with XACML 3.0. In our view, the XACML
2.0 standard calls for the result to be indeterminate whereas the XACML 3.0
standard calls for the result to be indeterminate deny permit. We conclude that
neither Belnap logic nor D-algebra is compliant with XACML 2.0 or XACML
3.0 whereas our formulations in terms of V6 and pairwise policy values P are in
agreement with XACML 3.0.
5.5 Extension of XACML
XACML is an evolving standard that changes as need arises; this is clearly
shown by the evolution from XACML 2.0 into XACML 3.0. Hence further
evolution is conceivable in case new combining operators need to be dealt with.
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Logic P1 P2 Permit-Overrides Function Result
Belnap logic >> ff (>>⊕B ff)[>> 7→ ff ] ff
D-algebra { p, na } { d } fpo({ p, na } , { d }) { p,d }
V6 Ip >d
⊕V6
po (〈Ip,>d〉) Idp
P [0, 12 ] [1, 0]
⊕P
po(〈[0, 12 ], [1, 0]〉) [ 12 , 12 ]
Table 5.2: Results of the Permit-Overrides combining operator for composing
two policies P1 (Indeterminate Permit) and P2 (Deny) under various
approaches.
We believe that our formalisation of XACML provides a good starting point for
discussing such extensions and will illustrate this point of view in the present
section. It should be stressed that the explanations in the current section are not
necessarily in agreement with the decisions that might be adopted by OASIS.
In this section we ﬁrst consider an All-Permit combining operator which can
easily be dealt with in our formalisation. We next consider a Consensus-Based-
Vote Combining Operator that can be dealt with in our formalisation although
one could argue that it would be more appropriate to extend XACML to model
conﬂict in the manner of Belnap 4-valued logic and D-algebra.
5.5.1 All-Permit Combining Operator
In critical systems, usually an access is granted only if all of the components
agree to grant it. In other words, the access is denied even if there is just one
component that does not grant it. Let us introduce the all-permit combining
operator to capture this.
We can formalise this in V6 as follows. Let 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy
values from V6. The all-permit combining operator under V6 is deﬁned as follows:
V6⊕
all_permit
(〈s1, . . . , sn〉) =
{
>p ∀i : si = >p
>d otherwise
An equivalent formalisation can be performed in pairwise policy values P. Let
〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of pairwise policy values from P. The all-permit
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combining operator under pairwise policy values P is deﬁned as follows:
P⊕
all_permit
(〈s1, . . . , sn〉) =

[0, 1] MaxvP({ s1, . . . , sn }) = MinvP({ s1, . . . , sn })
= [0, 1]
[1, 0] otherwise
It is immediate to show the equivalence of these formalisations.
5.5.2 Consensus-Based-Vote Combining Operator
A consensus decision is reached when the majority of the policies agree to grant
(or deny) an access; this can be described as follows:
1. the decision is permit if the number of permit values is higher than the
number of deny values,
2. the decision is deny if the number of deny values is higher than the number
of permit values,
3. the decision is not applicable if all of the policies are not applicable,
4. the decision is both deny and permit if the number of deny values is equal
to the number of permit values.
In our ﬁrst approach we shall stay within the possibilities oﬀered by XACML
3.0. We shall only give the formalisation in terms of the pairwise policy values
P. First we deﬁne the function sum over
{
0, 12 , 1
}
to count the eﬀect values
by setting
sum(〈s1, . . . , sn〉) =
n∑
i=1
si
where 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 is a sequence of 0's, 12 's or 1's, and we then extend it to
pairwise policy values by setting
SumvP(S) = [sum(〈d(X)|X ∈ S〉), sum(〈p(X)|X ∈ S〉)]
where now S is a sequence of pairwise policy values in P.
Taking the view that an indeterminate value is worth half of that of an applicable
value we then deﬁne the consensus-based-vote combining operator as follows
P⊕
consensus_voting
(S) =

[1, 0] if SumvP(S) = [D,P ], D > P
[0, 1] if SumvP(S) = [D,P ], P > D
[0, 0] if SumvP(S) = [0, 0]
[ 12 ,
1
2 ] if SumvP(S) = [D,P ], D = P
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where S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 is a sequence of pairwise policy values from P.
Example 5.4 Suppose we have 10 policies such as 4 policies evaluate to per-
mit, 2 policies evaluate to deny, 3 policies evaluate to indeterminate deny Id
value and 1 policy evaluates to not applicable. This is captured by the sequence
P = 〈[0, 1], [0, 1], [0, 1], [0, 1], [1, 0], [1, 0], [ 1
2
, 0], [
1
2
, 0], [
1
2
, 0], [0, 0]〉
of policy values (note that in this case the order does not matter). The result
of evaluating P with consensus-based-vote combining operator is [0, 1] (i.e., it
returns permit value) because SumvP(P) = [3 12 , 4] and the permit value is
greater than the deny value.
Part III
A Tool

Chapter 6
Logic Programming
Preliminaries
There are ﬁxed points throughout time where things
must stay exactly the way they are. This is not one of
them. This is an opportunity! Whatever happens here
will create its own timeline, its own reality, a temporal
tipping point. The future revolves around you, here,
now, so do good!
The Doctor, Doctor Who
Logic programming oﬀers useful methods and techniques to software engineers.
Several research and industrial projects have either successfully applied logic
programming languages during the software development life cycle, or have de-
veloped useful software engineering tools exploiting some feature of logic pro-
gramming. Ciancarini and Levi [CS95] showed a survey on software development
tools based on logic programming.
In this chapter, we introduce general notation and terminology for logic pro-
gramming. The chapter starts with the introduction of the syntax of well-formed
formulae of a ﬁrst order theory. Then it introduces the more speciﬁc syntax of
logic programs and continues with the description of a declarative semantics for
logic programs.
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6.1 Logic Programs
We recall basic notation and terminology that we use throughout this thesis. It
is based on [Llo84] with some extensions. We start with the introduction of the
syntax of well-formed formulae of a ﬁrst order theory. Then we introduce the
more speciﬁc syntax of logic programs.
6.1.1 First-Order Language.
We consider an alphabet consisting of (ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite) disjoint
sets of variables, constants, function symbols, predicate symbols, connectives
{ not,∧,←}, punctuation symbols { (, ,, ), . }. Additionally, the alpha-
bet also contains the special symbols > denoting a valid formula.
Next we turn to the deﬁnition of the ﬁrst order language given by an alphabet.
Definition 6.1 (Term) The set of terms is the smallest set deﬁned by the
following rules:
1. A variable is a term.
2. A constant is a term.
3. If f is an n-ary function symbol (n ≥ 1) and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then
f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term.
A ground term is a term not containing variables.
We will use upper case letters to denote variables and lower case letters to denote
constants, function- and predicate symbols.
Definition 6.2 (Formula) The set of (well-formed) formulae is the small-
est set deﬁned by the following rules:
1. If p is an n-ary predicate symbol and t1, . . . , tn are terms, then p(t1, . . . , tn)
is a formula (called an atomic formula or simply an atom).
2. If F and G are formulae, then so are (not F ), (F ∧G), and (F ← G).
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A propositional formula is a formula where all predicate symbols are of arity 0.
A ground formula is a formula with every term grounded.
We are now ready to deﬁne a language as follows:
Definition 6.3 (Language) A language L given by an alphabet A con-
sists of the set of all formulae constructed from the symbols of A.
6.1.2 Syntax of Logic Programs
A logic program is a declarative, relational style of programming based on ﬁrst-
order logic. In this section, we deﬁne the syntax of logic programs.
Definition 6.4 (Clause) A (program) clause is a formula of the form
H ← B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm ∧ not Bm+1 ∧ · · · ∧ not Bn.
where n ≥ m ≥ 1, H is an atom, and each Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is either an atom or
>. H is called the head and B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm ∧ not Bm+1 ∧ · · · ∧ not Bn the body
of the clause. We usually write B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm ∧ not Bm+1 ∧ · · · ∧ not Bn simply
as B1, · · · , Bm,not Bm+1, · · · ,not Bn and we ﬁnish each clause with a dot as
in Prolog.
We deﬁne a deﬁnite clause as a clause where every Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is either an
atom or >.
One should observe that the body of a clause must not be empty. A fact is a
clause of the form
H ← >.
Definition 6.5 (General Logic Program) A (general logic) program
Π is a ﬁnite set of clauses. A deﬁnite (logic) program Π as a program where
every clause is deﬁnite clause.
We denote ground(Π) for the set of all ground instances of rules in the program
Π.
We assume that each non-propositional program contains at least one constant
symbol. Moreover, the language L underlying a program Π shall contain pre-
cisely the predicate, function and constant symbols occurring in Π, and no
others.
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6.2 Semantics of Logic Programs
6.2.1 Basic Terminologies
The declarative semantics of a logic program is given by a model-theoretic se-
mantics of formulae in the underlying language. This sections discusses in-
terpretations and models, concentrating particularly on the important class of
Herbrand interpretations.
Definition 6.6 (Herbrand Universe) The Herbrand universe UL for
a language L is the set of all ground terms that can be formed from the constants
and function symbols appearing in L. By UΠ we denote the Herbrand universe
for the language underlying the program Π.
Definition 6.7 (Ground Instance) A ground instance of a formula F
is any ground formula that results from F by substituting all variables by terms
in UL. We denote by ground(Π) the set of all ground instances of clauses in
program Π.
In many cases, ground(Π) is inﬁnite. In the sequel, we will consider ground(Π)
as a substitute for Π, thus ignoring uniﬁcation issues.
Definition 6.8 (Herbrand Base) TheHerbrand base BL for a language
L is the set of all ground atoms that can be formed by using predicate symbols
from L and ground terms from UL as arguments. By BΠ we denote the Herbrand
base for the language underlying the program Π.
Since in this work we only use Herbrand interpretations, we drop the qualiﬁca-
tion Herbrand.
Definition 6.9 (Interpretation) An interpretation I of a program Π
is a mapping from the Herbrand base BΠ to the set of truth values: true and
false ({ >,⊥ }). All atoms belong to interpretation I are mapped to >. All
atoms which does not occur in I are mapped to ⊥.
The truth value of arbitrary formulae under some interpretation can be deter-
mined from a truth table as usual (see Table 6.1).
Definition 6.10 (Truth Value of a Formula) The logical value of
ground formulae can be derived from Table 6.1 in the usual way. A formula φ is
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Table 6.1: Truth Values for Formulae
φ ψ not φ φ ∧ ψ φ← ψ
> > ⊥ > >
> ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ >
⊥ > > ⊥ ⊥
⊥ ⊥ > ⊥ >
then true under interpretation I, denoted by I(φ) = >, if all its ground instances
are true in I; it is false under interpretation I, denoted by I(φ) = ⊥, if there is
a ground instance of φ that is false in I.
Definition 6.11 (Model) An interpretation I is a model of formula φ if
I(φ) = >. For a program Π, we say I is a model of Π if I is a model for every
clause in Π.
6.2.2 Minimal Model Semantics
The idea of the canonical model approach is that a declarative semantics for
a class of logic programs can be deﬁned by selecting one of its models as the
canonical model. It is also called the meaning of the program. This model
determines which answer to a given query is considered correct, i.e., a query
without variables should be answer yes if it is true in the canonical model, and
no otherwise. The canonical model is usually selected among the Herbrand
models of the program.
Definition 6.12 (Ordering Among Interpretations) Let I be a
collection of interpretations. Then an interpretation I is called minimal in I if
and only if there is no interpretation J in I such that J ( I. An interpretation
I is called least in I if and only if I ⊆ J for any interpretation J in I. A
model M of a program Π is called minimal (respectively least) if it is minimal
(respectively least) among all models of Π.
Example 6.1 (Beverage 1) Consider a situation where an agent Pretty
drinks either tea or coﬀee. This situation can be represented by a program Π
as follows.
Πdrink :
drink ← tea.
drink ← coffee.
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All of possible interpretation for Πdrink is as follows.
I1 = ∅, I5 = { tea, coffee } ,
I2 = { drink } , I6 = { drink , tea } ,
I3 = { tea } , I7 = { drink , coffee } , and
I4 = { coffee } , I8 = { drink , tea, coffee } .
From those 8 interpretations, only 5 are models, i.e., I1, I2, I6, I7, I8.
Every program can have many diﬀerent models. For example, the models of the
program Πdrink consists of an empty set and four nonempty sets. From those
models, the empty set is a minimal model among all models of Πdrink and also
the least model.
There is a guarantee that every deﬁnite program has a single minimal model and
it is the least model. To compute the least model of a deﬁnite program, M. H. van
Emden and R. A. Kowalski in [VEK76] introduced an consequence operator for
logic program  an operator to express the consequences of the program when
the bodies of its clauses are interpreted under the input interpretation. The
operator is based on the Knaster-Tarski Operator. The least model can be
obtained by applying the Knaster-Tarski Operator starting with an empty set
until a ﬁxed point is found. The proof of this claim is based on Knaster-Tarski
Fixed Point Theorem and was published for the theory of logic programming
area by K. R. Apt and M. H. van Emden in [AvE82].
Definition 6.13 (The Knaster-Tarski Operator) Let Π be a pro-
gram and let I be an interpretation. The Knaster-Tarski operator is deﬁned as
follows.
TΠ(I) = {A | A← B1, . . . , Bm ∈ ground(Π) and {B1, . . . , Bm } ⊆ I} (6.1)
We deﬁne T 0Π = ∅, and T i+1Π = TΠ(T iΠ), i ≥ 0.
Programs with negation may have several minimal Herbrand model. Unfortu-
nately, the Knaster-Tarski operator cannot be used to compute a minimal model
of a program with negation. See the example below.
Example 6.2 (Beverage 2) Let us continue our Beverage example. Con-
sider that agent Pretty only can choose one drink. She only can drink either
tea or coﬀee, but not both. We model this situation by adding new clauses to
Πdrink as follows.
tea ← not coffee.
coffee ← not tea.
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Thus, the revised program for Πdrink is as follows.
Πdrink :
drink ← tea.
drink ← coffee.
tea ← not coffee.
coffee ← not tea.
In this situation, Πdrink has two minimal models, i.e.,
M1 = { drink , tea } ,
M2 = { drink , coffee } .
We show that the Knaster-Tarski Operator cannot reach ﬁxed point for this
example.
Note: TnΠ(I) denotes the n-th iteration of the Knaster-Tarski Operator applied
to program Π with the input interpretation I.
T 1Πdrink (∅) = { tea, coffee }
T 2Πdrink (∅) = { drink }
T 3Πdrink (∅) = { tea, coffee } = T 1Πdrink (∅)
T 4Πdrink (∅) = { drink } = T 2Πdrink (∅)
...
For n ≥ 2 :
T 2n−1Πdrink (∅) = T 1Πdrink (∅)
T 2nΠdrink (∅) = T 2Πdrink (∅)
6.2.3 Stable Model Semantics
The intuition behind stable model semantics is to treat negated atoms in a
special way. Intuitively, given an interpretation I, if a ∈ I, then, a clause's
body with the negative atom not a cannot be true. On the other hand, if a /∈ I,
then not a can be assumed true and we are safe to remove it from any body
where it occurs. We say that the interpretation I as an assumption about which
negated atoms are true and what are false.
Definition 6.14 (Reduct) Let I be an interpretation of program Π. Then,
the Gelfond-Liftschitz reduct [GL88](or simply reduct) of Π with respect to an
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interpretation I, denoted by ΠI , is as follows.
ΠI = {A← B1, . . . , Bm| A← B1, . . . , Bm,not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn ∈ Π and
I(not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn) = >}
One should consider that ΠI is a deﬁnite program, and thus has a least model,
i.e., lfp(TΠI ), the least ﬁxed point of the Knaster-Tarski Operator applied to
ΠI . If ΠI does not contradict I, one should expect that lfp(ΠI) = I. If this
happens to be the case, then I can be regarded as being stable.
Example 6.3 (Beverage 3) We have shown from previous example that
Πdrink has two minimal models, i.e.,M1 = { drink , tea } andM2 = { drink , coffee }.
In this example, we show that both models are the stable models for Πdrink .
ΠM1drink :
drink ← >.
tea ← >.
The lfp(TΠdrink ) = { drink , tea } = M1.
ΠM2drink :
drink ← >.
coffee ← >.
The lfp(TΠdrink ) = { drink , coffee } = M2.
Definition 6.15 (Answer Set) An interpretation I of program Π is an
answer set of Π if I is the stable model of ΠI . For a program with variables, an
interpretation I of Π is an answer set of Π if I is an answer set of ground(Π).
Chapter 7
XACML Transformation
into Logic Programs
Algorithm = Logic + Control
Robert Kowalski, a logician and computer scientist
In this chapter, we lay down the formal framework for transforming the XACML
abstract syntax presented in Chapter 5 into logic programs. The transformation
of XACML components is based on the semantics of each component explained
in Section 5.2. The transformation of combining algorithms is based on the
semantics of XACML combining algorithms explained in Section 5.3.
We show step by step how to transform XACML components into logic programs
in Section 7.1 and in Section 7.2 we present the transformation of XACML
combining algorithms.
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7.1 XACML Policy Components Transformation
The evaluation of XACML components depends on the given Request element.
Hence, before we move forward, we show how the transformation of Request
element into a logic program. We transform all members of Request element
into facts.
Request syntax: Let Q = request: {At1, . . . ,Atn } be a Request compo-
nent.
Request transformation: The transformation of Request Q into the logic
program ΠQ is as follows.
Ati ← >. 1 ≤ i ≤ n
The transformation of XACML policy components is based on its semantics. We
begin by showing the semantics semantics evaluation of XACML components
explained in Section 5.2 then we show how the transformation into logic pro-
grams. Please note that the calligraphic font in each transformation indicates
the XACML component's name, that is, it does not represent a variable in logic
program.
We use a two-place function val/2 to indicate the semantics of XACML com-
ponents where the ﬁrst argument is the name of XACML component and the
second argument is its value. Given a semantic equation of the form
JXK(Q) = v if condition1 and . . . and conditionn
we produce a rule of the form val(X, v)← condition1, . . . , conditionn.
Given a semantic equation of the form
JXK(Q) = v if condition1 or . . . or conditionn
we produce a rule of the form val(X, v)← conditioni. 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
7.1.1 Transformation of Match Component
The evaluation of Target component starts from the very basic component,
i.e., the evaluation of Match component, and it continues to the evaluation
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of AnyOf component, AllOf component, and ﬁnally the evaluation of Target
component. Therefore, we start from the transformation of Match component,
AnyOf component, AllOf component, and ﬁnally Target component.
Match syntax: LetM = fMatchID(v, cat) be a Match component where v
is an attribute value and cat is an attribute category.
evalM evaluation: The evaluation of Match component over Request ele-
ment Q = request: {A1, . . . ,An } is as follows.
evalM (cat ,Q) =
{
error if an error occurs during the evaluation process
{ v1, . . . , vm } if cat(vi) ∈ { A1, . . . ,An } , 1 ≤ i ≤ m ≤ n
evalM transformation: Let Q be a Request component. The transforma-
tion for evalM (cat ,Q) is as follows.
ΠevalM :
evalM (cat , error) ← error.
evalM (cat , V ) ← cat(V ).
Match evaluation:
JfMatchID(v, cat)K(Q) =

> if evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and
∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = >
⊥ if evalM (cat ,Q) = { } or
(evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and
∀v′ ∈ evalM (C,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = ⊥)
I if evalM (cat ,Q) = error or
((∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) 6= >) and
(∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = I))
Match transformation: First, we need to model the notion of empty set in
logic program. The transformation of empty set w.r.t. the evaluation of Match
component is as follows.
not_emptybag(cat) ← cat(V ).
evalM (cat , emptybag) ← not not_emptybag(cat).
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The ﬁrst encoding ensures that the bag as a collector for attribute values of
category cat in the Request element is not empty whenever the program ﬁnds
the attribute value matched with the category cat . The second encoding models
that an empty bag obtained if the program cannot ﬁnd not empty bag by default.
LetM = fMatchID(v, c) be a Match component and Q be a Request component.
The transformation of MatchM into logic program ΠM is as follows.
ΠM :
val(M,m) ← evalM (cat , V ), V 6= error, fMatchID(v, V, true).
val(M, nm) ← evalM (cat , emptybag).
val(M, nm) ← evalM (cat , V ), V 6= error,
← not not_falsenot_false(fMatchID(v, cat)).
not_false(fMatchID(v, cat)) ← evalM (cat , V ),not fMatchID(v, V, false).
val(M, idt) ← evalM (cat , error).
val(M, idt) ← evalM (cat , V ), fMatchID(v, V, idt),
not true(fMatchID(v, cat)).
true(fMatchID(v, cat)) ← evalM (cat , v), fMatchID(v, V, true).
Example 7.1 (Example of Match Transformation) The transfor-
mation forM = string_equal(read, action) is as follows.
ΠM :
evalM (action, error) ← error.
evalM (action, V ) ← action(V ).
not_emptybag(action) ← action(V ).
evalM (action, emptybag) ← not not_emptybag(action).
val(string_equal(read, action),m) ← evalM (action, V ), V 6= error,
string_equal(read, V, true).
val(string_equal(read, action), nm) ← evalM (action, emptybag).
val(string_equal(read, action), nm) ← evalM (action, V ), V 6= error,
string_equal(read, V, false),
not not_false(string_equal(read, action)).
not_false(string_equal(read, action)) ← evalM (action, V ), string_equal(read, V, true).
not_false(string_equal(read, action)) ← evalM (action, V ), string_equal(read, V, idt).
val(string_equal(read, action), idt) ← evalM (action, V ), string_equal(v, V, idt),
evalM (action, V ′), string_equal(v, V ′, idt)
Example 7.2 (Example of fMatchID/2 Transformation) Let we de-
ﬁne string_equal as follows.
string_equal(X,Y ) =

> if X = Y and there are no errors
⊥ if X 6= Y and there are no errors
I if an error occurs during the evaluation process
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The transformation for string_equal/2 is as follows.
string_equal(X,X, true) ← not error.
string_equal(X,Y, false) ← X 6= Y,not error.
string_equal(X,Y, idt) ← error.
7.1.2 Transformation of AnyOf, AllOf and Target Com-
ponents
AllOf syntax: Let allof(Aid) : {M1,M2, . . . ,Mn }, n ≥ 1 be an AllOf
component where eachMi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is a Match component.
AllOf semantics:
JAidK(Q) =

> if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JMiK = >
⊥ if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JMiK = ⊥
I otherwise
AllOf transformation: The transformation of AllOf Aid into logic program
ΠAid is as follows.
ΠAid :
val(Aid ,m) ← val(M1,m), . . . , val(Mn,m).
val(Aid , nm) ← val(Mi, nm). (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
val(Aid , idt) ← not val(Aid ,m),not val(Aid , nm).
AnyOf syntax: Let anyof(Eid) : {A1,A2, . . . ,An }, n ≥ 1 be a AnyOf
elements and each Ai is an AllOf element.
AnyOf semantics:
JEidK(Q) =

> if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JAiK = >
⊥ if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JAiK = ⊥
I otherwise
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AnyOf transformation: The transformation of AnyOf Eid into logic pro-
gram ΠEid is as follows.
ΠEid :
val(Eid ,m) ← val(Ai,m). (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
val(Eid , nm) ← val(A1, nm), . . . , val(An, nm).
val(Eid , idt) ← not val(Eid ,m),not val(Eid , nm).
Target syntax: Let allof(Tid) : { E1, E2, . . . , En }, n ≥ 1 be a Target ele-
ments and each Ei is an AnyOf element.
Target semantics:
JTidK(Q) =

> if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JEiK = >
⊥ if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JEiK = ⊥
I otherwise
Target transformation: The transformation of Target Tid into logic pro-
gram ΠTid is as follows.
ΠTid :
val(null,m) ← >.
val(Tid ,m) ← val(E1,m), . . . , val(En,m).
val(Tid , nm) ← val(Ei, nm). (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
val(Tid , idt) ← not val(Tid ,m),not val(Tid , nm).
7.1.3 Transformation of Condition Component.
The transformation of Condition C into logic program ΠC is as follows
val(C, V ) ← eval(C, V ).
Moreover, the transformation of Condition also depends on the transformation
of eval function into logic program. Since we do not describe speciﬁc eval
functions, we leave this transformation to the user.
Example 7.3 (Example of Condition Transformation) Suppose
we would like to transform the Condition of r1 from previous example. Recall
that the Condition of r1 is as follows.
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1 condition(r1):{ patient_number(N) /\ patient_record(patient_id ,
X) /\ N = X }
A possible eval function for "rule r1: patient only can see his or her patient
record" is
Πcondition(r1) :
val(condition(r1), V ) ← evalC (condition(r1), V ).
evalC (condition(r1), t) ← patient_number(X), patient_record(patient_id,X),
not error(patient_number(X)),
not error(patient_record(patient_id,X)).
evalC (condition(r1), f) ← patient_number(X), patient_record(patient_id,X),
X 6= Y, not error(patient_number(X)),
not error(patient_record(patient_id, Y )).
evalC (condition(r1), idt) ← not evalC (condition(r1), t), not evalC (condition(r1), f).
The error(patient_number(X)) and error(patient_record(patient_id,X) in-
dicate possible errors that might occur, e.g., the system could not connect to
the database so that the system does not know the identiﬁer of the patient.
7.1.4 Transformation of Rule Component.
Rule syntax: Let R = rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C } be a Rule component
where E is the Rule's eﬀect, E ∈ { permit, deny }, T is a Target and C is a
Condition.
Rule evaluation:
JRidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = > and E = deny
>p if JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = > and E = permit
Id if
(
(JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = I) or JT K(Q) = I) and
E = permit
Ip if
(
(JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = I) or JT K(Q) = I) and
E = deny
⊥ if (JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = ⊥) or JT K(Q) = ⊥
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Rule transformation: The transformation of Rule Rid into logic program
ΠRid is as follows.
ΠRid :
rule(Rid , E) ← >.
val(Rid , E) ← val(T ,m), val(C, t).
val(Rid , id) ← val(T ,m), val(C, idt), rule(Rid , E), E = deny.
val(Rid , id) ← val(T , idt), rule(Rid , E), E = deny.
val(Rid , ip) ← val(T ,m), val(C, idt), rule(Rid , E), E = permit.
val(Rid , ip) ← val(T , idt), rule(Rid , E), E = permit.
val(Rid , na) ← val(T ,m), val(C, f).
val(Rid , na) ← val(T , nm).
In this transformation, the E is not a variable because we should change E
based on what is written in the Rule's eﬀect.
7.1.5 Transformation of Policy and PolicySet Components.
Policy syntax: Let policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component where T is a Target, 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 is a sequence of Rule elements
and combid is a combining algorithm identiﬁer.
Policy evaluation:
JPidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = >d
>p if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = >p
Idp if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Idp) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (I or Idp))
Id if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Id) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (>d or Id))
Ip if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Ip) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (>p or Ip))
⊥ if JT K(Q) = ⊥ or(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = ⊥) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = ⊥)
where R = 〈JR1K(Q), . . . , JRnK(Q)〉.
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Policy transformation: In order to indicate that the Policy contains Rule
Ri, for every Rule Ri ∈ 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉, ΠPid contains:
decision_of (Pid ,Ri, V ) ← val(Ri, V ). (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
The transformation for Policy Pid into logic program ΠPid is as follows.
ΠPid :
val(Pid , permit) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , permit).
val(Pid , deny) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , deny).
val(Pid , idp) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , idp).
val(Pid , idp) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , idt).
val(Pid , idp) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , idp).
val(Pid , id) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , id).
val(Pid , id) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , deny).
val(Pid , id) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , id).
val(Pid , ip) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , ip).
val(Pid , ip) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , permit).
val(Pid , ip) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , ip).
val(Pid , na) ← val(T , nm).
val(Pid , na) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , na).
val(Pid , na) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , na).
The transformation of PolicySet is similar to the transformation of Policy com-
ponent.
PolicySet syntax: Let policyset(PSid) : { combid ; T ; 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 } be
a PolicySet component where T is a Target, 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 is a sequence of Policy
elements and combid is a combining algorithm identiﬁer.
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PolicySet evaluation:
JPSidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = >d
>p if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = >p
Idp if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = Idp) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P) = (I or Idp))
Id if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P) = Id) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P = (>d or Id))
Ip if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P = Ip) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P = (>p or Ip))
⊥ if JT K(Q) = ⊥ or(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(P = ⊥) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(P = ⊥)
where P = 〈JP1K(Q), . . . , JPnK(Q)〉.
PolicySet transformation: In order to indicate that the PolicySet contains
Policy Pi, for every Policy Pi ∈ 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉, ΠPSid contains:
decision_of (PSid ,Pi, V ) ← val(Pi, V ). (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
The transformation for PolicySet PSid into logic program ΠPSid is as follows.
ΠPSid :
val(PSid , permit) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,PSid , permit).
val(PSid , deny) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,PSid , deny).
val(PSid , idp) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,PSid , idp).
val(PSid , idp) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,PSid , idt).
val(PSid , idp) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,PSid , idp).
val(PSid , id) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,PSid , id).
val(PSid , id) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,PSid , deny).
val(PSid , id) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,PSid , id).
val(PSid , ip) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,PSid , ip).
val(PSid , ip) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,PSid , permit).
val(PSid , ip) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,PSid , ip).
val(PSid , na) ← val(T , nm).
val(PSid , na) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,PSid , na).
val(PSid , na) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,PSid , na).
7.2 Combining Algorithms Transformation 109
7.2 Combining Algorithms Transformation
We deﬁne generic logic programs for permit-overrides combining algorithm and
only-one-applicable combining algorithm. Therefore, we use a variable P to
indicate a variable over Policy identiﬁer and R, R1 and R2 to indicate variables
over Rule identiﬁers. In case the evaluation of PolicySet, the input P is for
PolicySet identiﬁer, R,R1 and R2 are for Policy (or PolicySet) identiﬁers.
7.2.1 Permit-Overrides Transformation.
Permit-Overrides evaluation: Let 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy
values from V6 and let S = { s1, . . . , sn } be a set of policy values from S. We
deﬁne the permit-overrides combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
po
(S) =
⊔
po
S
Permit-Overrides transformation: Let Πpo be a logic program obtained
by permit-overrides combining algorithm transformation for the permit-overrides
combining algorithm semantics). Πpo contains:
Πpo :
algo(po, P, permit) ← decision_of (P,R, permit).
algo(po, P, idp) ← not algo(po, P, permit), decision_of (P,R, idp).
algo(po, P, idp) ← not algo(po, P, permit),
decision_of (P,R1, ip), decision_of (P,R2, deny).
algo(po, P, idp) ← not algo(po, P, permit),
decision_of (P,R1, ip), decision_of (P,R2, id).
algo(po, P, ip) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
decision_of (P,R, ip).
algo(po, P, deny) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
not algo(po, P, ip), decision_of (P,R, deny).
algo(po, P, id) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
not algo(po, P, ip),not algo(po, P, deny),
decision_of (P,R, id).
algo(po, P, na) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
not algo(po, P, ip),not algo(po, P, deny),
not algo(po, P, id).
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7.2.2 Legacy Permit-Overrides Transformation
Legacy Permit-Overrides evaluation: Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence
of policy values from V6. We deﬁne the legacy permit-overrides combining algo-
rithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
lpo
(S) =
{
Idp if
⊕V6
po (S) ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
}⊕V6
po (S) otherwise
Legacy Permit-Overrides transformation: Let Πlpo be a logic program
obtained by permit-overrides combining algorithm transformation. Πlpo con-
tains:
algo(lpo, P, idp) ← algo(po, P, ip)
algo(lpo, P, idp) ← algo(po, P, id)
algo(lpo, P, idp) ← algo(po, P, idp)
algo(lpo, P, permit) ← algo(po, P, permit)
algo(lpo, P, deny) ← algo(po, P, deny)
algo(lpo, P, na) ← algo(po, P, na)
Let we deﬁne a new predicate idt_value/1 to characterise all indeterminate
values, i.e., indeterminate permit, indeterminate deny, and indeterminate deny
permit.
idt_value(id) ← >.
idt_value(ip) ← >.
idt_value(idp) ← >.
Thus, we can simplify the logic program Πlpo as follows.
Πlpo :
algo(lpo, P, idp) ← algo(po, P, V ), idt_value(V ).
algo(lpo, P, V ) ← not algo(po, P, idp), algo(po, P, V )
7.2.3 Deny-Overrides Transformation.
Deny-Overrides evaluation: Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy
values from V6 and let S = { s1, . . . , sn } be a set of policy values from S. We
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deﬁne the deny-overrides combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
do
(S) =
⊔
do
S
Deny-Overrides transformation: Let Πdo be a logic program obtained by
permit-overrides combining algorithm transformation. Πdo contains:
algo(do, P, deny) ← decision_of (P,R, deny).
algo(do, P, idp) ← not algo(do, P, deny), decision_of (P,R, idp).
algo(do, P, idp) ← not algo(do, P, deny), decision_of (P,R1, id),
decision_of (P,R2, permit).
algo(do, P, idp) ← not algo(do, P, deny),
decision_of (P,R1, ip), decision_of (P,R2, id).
algo(do, P, id) ← not algo(do, P, deny),not algo(do, P, idp),
decision_of (P,R, id).
algo(do, P, permit) ← not algo(do, P, deny),not algo(do, P, idp),
not algo(do, P, id), decision_of (P,R, permit).
algo(do, P, ip) ← not algo(do, P, deny),not algo(do, P, idp),
not algo(do, P, id),not algo(do, P, id),
not algo(do, P, permit), decision_of (P,R, ip).
algo(do, P, na) ← not algo(do, P, deny),not algo(do, P, idp),
not algo(do, P, id),not algo(do, P, permit),
not algo(do, P, ip).
7.2.4 Legacy Deny-Overrides Transformation
Legacy Deny-Overrides evaluation: Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of
policy values from V6. We deﬁne the legacy deny-overrides combining algorithm
under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
ldo
(S) =
{
Idp if
⊕V6
do (S) ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
}⊕V6
do (S) otherwise
Legacy Deny-Overrides transformation: Let Πldo be a logic program
obtained by permit-overrides combining algorithm transformation. Πldo con-
tains:
algo(ldo, P, idp) ← algo(do, P, V ), idt_value(V ).
algo(ldo, P, V ) ← not algo(do, P, idp), algo(do, P, V )
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7.2.5 Deny-Unless-Permit Transformation
Deny-Unless-Permit evaluation: Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of
policy values from V6. We deﬁne the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm
under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
dup
(
S
){>p if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si = >p
>d otherwise
Deny-Unless-Permit transformation: Let Πdup be a logic program ob-
tained by deny-unless-permit combining algorithm transformation. Πdup con-
tains:
Πdup : algo(dup, P, permit) ← decision_of (P,R, permit).
algo(dup, P, deny) ← not algo(dup, P, permit).
7.2.6 Permit-Unless-Deny Transformation
Permit-Unless-Deny evaluation: Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of
policy values from V6. We deﬁne the deny-unless-permit combining algorithm
under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
pud
(S) =
{
>d if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si = >d
>p otherwise
Permit-Unless-Deny transformation: Let Πpud be a logic program ob-
tained by deny-unless-permit combining algorithm transformation. Πpud con-
tains:
Πpud :
algo(pud, P, deny) ← decision_of (P,R, deny).
algo(pud, P, permit) ← not algo(dup, P, deny).
7.2.7 First-Applicable Transformation.
First-Applicable evaluation: Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy
values from V6. We deﬁne the ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm under V6 as
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follows:
V6⊕
fa
(S) =

Idp if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
} ∧ ∀j : (j < i)⇒ (sj = ⊥)
si if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈
{>p,>d } ∧ ∀j : (j < i)⇒ (sj = ⊥)
⊥ otherwise
Let Πfa be a logic program obtained by ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm
transformation. For each Policy (or PolicySet) that uses this combining algo-
rithm, P = policy(Pid) : { T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 ; fa }, ΠPid contains:
Πfa :
algo(fa,Pid , V ) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, V ), V 6= na.
algo(fa,Pid , V ) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, na), decision_of (Pid ,R2, V ), V 6= na.
...
algo(fa,Pid , V ) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, na), . . . , decision_of (Pid ,Rn−1, na),
decision_of (Pid , Rn, V ).
7.2.8 Only-One-Applicable Transformation.
Only-One-Applicable evaluation: Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of
policy values from V6. We deﬁne the only-one-applicable combining algorithm
under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
ooa
(S) =

si if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈ {>d,>p }∧
∀j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : j 6= i⇒ sj = ⊥
Idp if
(∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈ { Id, Ip, Idp } )∨(∃i, j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : i 6= j ∧ si, sj ∈ {>d,>p } )
⊥ otherwise
Only-One-Application transformation: Let we deﬁne a new predicate
applicable_value/1 to characterise all applicable values, i.e., deny and permit.
applicable_value(deny) ← >.
applicable_value(permit) ← >.
Let Πooa be a logic program obtained by only-one-applicable combining algo-
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rithm transformation. Πooa contains:
Πooa :
algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, V1), decision_of (Pid ,R2, V2),R1 6= R2,
applicable_value(V1), applicable_value(V2).
algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ← decision_of (Pid ,R, V ), idt_value(V ).
algo(ooa,Pid , V ) ← not algo(ooa,Pid , idp),
decision_of (Pid ,R, applicable_value), applicable_value(V ).
algo(ooa,Pid , na) ← not algo(ooa,Pid , idp),not algo(ooa,Pid , deny),
not algo(ooa,Pid , permit).
7.3 Semantics Relation between XACML and ΠXACML
We have discussed in Section 6.2 that in general, logic programs may have none,
one, or many answer sets. Deﬁnite logic programs have a guarantee that always
have a unique answer set, but it is not always the case for general logic programs.
However, acyclic programs are guaranteed to have a unique answer set [Bar03].
We say that a program is acyclic when there is no cycle in the program. The
acyclicity in the program is guaranteed by the existence of a certain ﬁxed as-
signment of natural numbers to atoms that is called a level mapping.
Definition 7.1 (Level Mapping) A level mapping for a program Π is
a function
λ : BΠ → N
where N is the set of natural numbers and BΠ is the Herbrand base for Π.
We extend the deﬁnition of level mapping to a mapping from ground literals to
natural numbers by setting λ(not A) = λ(A).
Definition 7.2 (Acyclic Programs) Let Π be a logic program and l
be a level mapping for Π. Π is acyclic with respect to l if for every clause
A← B1, . . . , Bm,not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn in ground(Π) we ﬁnd
λ(A) > λ(Bi) for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Π is acyclic if it is acyclic with respect to some degree of level mapping.
Example 7.4 Suppose we have program Π1 as following.
a ← b.
b ← a.
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Program Π1 is cyclic since we cannot fulﬁl λ(a) > λ(b) and λ(b) > λ(a) in the
same time. However program Π2 is deﬁnite program. Hence, there is a unique
answer set, i.e., ∅.
Suppose we have program Π2 as following.
a ← not b.
b ← not a.
For the same reason as program Π1, program Π2 is also cyclic. There are two
answer sets for Π2, i.e., { a } and { b }.
We can see from Section 7.1 and Section 7.2 that all of the XACML 3.0 transfor-
mation programs are acyclic. Thus, it is guaranteed that ΠXACML has a unique
answer set.
Proposition 7.3 Let ΠXACML be a program obtained from XACML 3.0 el-
ement transformations and let ΠQ be a program transformation of Request Q.
Let M be the answer set of ΠXACML ∪ΠQ. Then the following equation holds
JXK(Q) = V if and only if val(X,V ) ∈M .
where X is an XACML component.
The transformation of each component into a logic program is based on exactly
the deﬁnition of its XACML evaluation. The proof of this proposition can be
seen in Appendix B.
7.4 Related Work
Our approach is inspired by the work of Ahn et al. [AHLM10a, AHLM10b].
There are three main diﬀerences between our approach and the work of Ahn et
al.
First, while they consider XACML version 2.0 [Mos05], we address the newer
version, XACML 3.0. The main diﬀerence between XACML 3.0 and XACML
2.0 is the treatment of indeterminate values. As a consequence, the combin-
ing algorithms in XACML 3.0 are more complex than the ones in XACML 2.0.
XACML 2.0 only has a single indeterminate value while XACML 3.0 distin-
guishes between the following three types of indeterminate values:
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i. Indeterminate permit (Ip)  an indeterminate value arising from a policy
which could have been evaluated to permit but not deny;
ii. Indeterminate deny (Id)  an indeterminate value arising from a policy
which could have been evaluated to deny but not permit;
iii. Indeterminate deny permit (Idp)  an indeterminate value arising from a
policy which could have been evaluated as both deny and permit.
Second, Ahn et al. produce a monolithic logic program that can be used for
the analysis of XACML policies while we take a more modular approach by
ﬁrst modelling an XACML Policy Decision Point as a logic program and then
using this encoding within a larger program for property analysis. While Ahn,
et al. only emphasize the indeterminate value in the combining algorithms, we
deal with the indeterminate value in all XACML components, i.e., in Match,
AnyOf, AllOf, Target, Condition, Rule, Policy and PolicySet components.
Finally, Ahn et al. translate the XACML speciﬁcation directly into logic pro-
gramming, so the ambiguities in the natural language speciﬁcation of XACML
are also reﬂected in their encodings. To avoid this, we base our encodings on
our formalisation of XACML from Chapter 5.
Part IV
Application

Chapter 8
Access Control Property
Analysis
"Logic is everywhere ... "
Prof. Steﬀen Hölldobler  International Center for
Computational Logic, TUD, Dresden
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a declarative programming language which
one of its roots is Prolog (Programming in Logic). Although, Prolog grew out
of programming with Horn clauses  a subset of ﬁrst order logic, several non
declarative features were included in Prolog in order to make it programmer
friendly. The Prolog systems is viewed as a top-down query answering systems
that the positioning of literals in the body of a clause and the ordering of clauses
in the program matters in Prolog. From the perspective of ASP, a program is
a set of ASP clauses and each ASP body of an ASP clause is a set of literals.
Thus, the ordering of clauses and the positioning of literals in a clause do not
matter in ASP.
ASP is completely diﬀerent from traditional procedural programming paradigm.
Instead of writing algorithms to solve a problem in hand, the programmer de-
scribes the problem using a formal language and an underlying engine ﬁnds a
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solution to the problem. We illustrate the way how ASP solves problems in
Figure 8.1.
Modelling
logic program
Grounding
e.g., lparse, gringo
Solving
e.g., smodels, clasp
Answer
answer set(s)
Figure 8.1: ASP System
The ﬁrst step is modelling phase. The result of this phase is a representation
of the given problem in terms of logic program clauses. Usually, the result-
ing program is formulated in ﬁrs-order variables. Thus, in the next phase, the
grounding phase, all the ﬁrst-order variables are systematically replaced by ele-
ments in the Herbrand Universe. This yields a ﬁnite propositional program that
is then fed into the actual ASP solver. The output of the solver often consists
of a textual representation of a sequence of answer sets. The modelling phase
can be repeated again to reﬁne the last version of the problem representation.
ASP has its roots in Knowledge Representation and (Nonmonotonic) Reasoning,
Logic Programming (with negation), Database, and Boolean Constraint Solving.
ASP allows for solving all search problems in NP (and NPNP ) in a uniform
way, oﬀering more succinct problem representations than propositional logic
[LR06]. Meanwhile, ASP has been used in many application areas, among them,
product conﬁguration [SN98], decision support for NASA shuttle controllers
[NBG+01], composition of Renaissance music [BBDVf08,BBDvF11], synthesis
of multiprocessor system [IMB+09], reasoning tools in system biology [ET08,
GST+08], team-building [GIL+10], and many more. The success story of ASP
has its roots in the early availability of ASP solvers, beginning with the smodels
system1, followed by dlv2, SAT-based ASP solvers, like assat3 and cmodels4,
and the conﬂict-driven ASP solver clasp5.
Implementation. The transformation of XACML components and the an-
alysis of access control properties in this chapter have been implemented using:
1http://www.tcs.hut.fi/Software/smodels/
2http://www.dlvsystem.com/
3http://assat.cs.ust.hk/
4http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cmodels/
5http://potassco.sourceforge.net/
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 ANTLR6 for the parser generator from the grammar presented in Chap-
ter 4,
 Java7 for transforming XACML components into LPs presented in Chap-
ter 7 automatically, and
 clasp as the ASP solver.
The implementation is available at https://sites.google.com/site/xacmlasp/
tool.
In this chapter we show how to use ASP for analysing access control security
properties through ΠXACML. In most cases, ASP solver can solve combinatorial
problems eﬃciently [DFP09,ABGG12]. There are several combinatorial prob-
lems in analysis access control policies, e.g., gap-free property and conﬂict-free
property8 [SD01,BH08].
Section 8.1 presents additional background that we will need later. Section 8.2
presents a mechanism to generate all possible queries which we will use for
analysing access control properties in Section 8.3. Section 8.4 and Section 8.5
present analysis on incompleteness policies (gap-free analysis) and analysis on
conﬂict, respectively. We present irrelevant policies analysis in Section 8.6.
8.1 Preliminaries
8.1.1 Integrity Constraints
Integrity constraints play an important role in database. Integrity constraints
provide a powerful and simple to use constraint programming technique for
pruning unwanted stable models as they cannot introduce new stable models
but only can eliminate them.
Definition 8.1 (Constraint) An (integrity) constraint is a clause in the
form
⊥ ← B1 ∧ · · · ∧Bm (m ≥ 1)
6http://www.antlr.org/
7https://www.java.com/
8A conﬂict decision never occurs when we strictly use the standard combining algorithms
deﬁned in XACML 3.0, since every combining algorithm always returns one value.
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Theorem 8.2 For any program Π and formula F , a set of M of atoms is an
answer set for Π ∪ { ⊥ ← F } iﬀ M is an answer set for Π and M(F ) = ⊥.
The proof can be seen in [LTT99].
For any program Π and formula F , the answer sets for the program
Π ∪ { ⊥ ← not F. }
are the sets of atoms thatM(F ) = >. This fact gives a reduction of satisﬁability
problem for propositional formulae to the problem of computing answer sets.
Example 8.1 (Beverage 4) This example is a continuation from Exam-
ple 6.3. Consider a situation where agent Pretty drinks either tea or coﬀee (but
not both). She does not expect to have coﬀee if she has high blood pressure.
We model this situation as follows..
Πdrink :
drink ← tea.
drink ← coffee.
tea ← not coffee.
coffee ← not tea.
⊥ ← coffee, high_blood_pressure.
We add an integrity constraint at the end of the program. By adding this
integrity constraint, all models that have both coffee and high_blood_pressure
will be eliminated. Thus, whenever agent Pretty knows that she has high blood
pressure, she will have coﬀee as her option.
8.1.2 Cardinality Constraints
In answer set programming, a problem is solved by devising a logic program
such that the stable models of the program provide the answers to the problem
and by using an implementation of the stable model semantics to compute an
answer, i.e., a stable model of the resulting program. General logic program pro-
vides a framework where a variety of combinatorial, constraint satisfaction, and
planning problems can be handled (see [Nie99] as reference.) These problems
are typically related to choices with cardinality, costs and resources.
Consider the Beverage Example (Example 6.2). We model the choice of agent
Pretty by modelling the situation as follows.
tea ← not coffee.
coffee ← not tea.
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Consider that there are more available beverages, such as, soft drink, juice,
water. The situation still the same that agent Pretty only can pick one beverage
for her. Thus, we modify our program as follows.
tea ← not coffee,not softdrink ,not juice,not water .
coffee ← not tea,not softdrink ,not juice,not water .
softdrink ← not coffee,not tea,not juice,not water .
juice ← not coffee,not tea,not softdrink ,not water .
water ← not coffee,not tea,not softdrink ,not juice.
The general logic programs can represent the combinatorial problem, however
it is not user friendly. In order to avoid this, we introduce cardinality constraint
[NSS99,NS00]. The idea is that such a constraint is satisﬁed by a model for which
the cardinality of the subset of the literals satisﬁed by the model is between the
integers lower and upper bounds.
Definition 8.3 (Cardinality Constraint) A cardinality constraint
C is an expression in the form
L { a1, . . . , am,not b1, . . . ,not bn }U (8.1)
where L and U are two integers giving the lower and upper bound of the con-
straint, respectively. In the case a missing lower bound is to be taken as −∞
and an upper bound as ∞.
We denote lit(C) for the corresponding set of literals { a1, . . . , am,not b1, . . . ,not bn }.
A cardinality constraint clause is a clause in the form
C0 ← C1, . . . , Cn. (8.2)
where C0 is either a cardinality constraint or ⊥ and each Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is either
a cardinality constraint or >. We allow integrity constraint by setting the head
of the clause with ⊥.
Note that cardinality constraint clause can be seen as a generalisation of general
logic clause which are a special case with cardinality constrains of the form
1 { L } 1 where L is a literal. For example, a clause { a← not b. } can be written
as { 1 { a } 1← 1 { not b } 1. }.
Definition 8.4 A set of atoms S satisﬁes a cardinality constraint C of
the form L { a1, . . . , am,not b1, . . . ,not bn }U , denoted by S(C) = > iﬀ L ≤
W (C, S) ≤ U where
W (C, S) = | { l =∈ lit(S) : S(l) = > } |
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is the number of literals in C satisﬁed by S.
A clause C0 ← C1, . . . , Cn. is satisﬁed by S iﬀ S satisﬁes C0 whenever it satisﬁes
each of C1, . . . , Cn.
The Beverage program can be represented using cardinal constraint clauses as
follows.
1 { tea, coffee, softdrink , juice,water . } 1 ← >.
It is also useful to allow both local and global variables in a clause. The scope
of a local variable is one constraint, whereas the scope of a global variable is the
whole rule. Here is the example of vertex colouring problem.
1 { coloured(V ,C ) } 1 : colour(C)1← vertex (X ).
⊥ ← edge(V ,U ), coloured(V ,C ), coloured(U ,C ).
In this example, V is a global variable in the ﬁrst clause stating the requirement
that for each vertex v exactly one instance of coloured(v , c) should be chosen
such that colour(c) holds for the term c. The set of facts colour(c) provides the
available colours.
8.2 Query Generator
In order to analyse access control property, sometimes we need to inspect all
possible queries that might occur.
We use cardinality constraint to generate all possible values restored in the
database for each attribute.
We encode 1{category(X) : category_db(X)}1 ← >. to generate one and only
one attribute value for category category which obtained from its database. This
is suﬃcient since we only consider only one request might occur. For example,
we have the following generator:
Pgenerator :
(1) 1{subject(X) : subject_db(X)}1 ← >.
(2) 1{action(X) : action_db(X)}1 ← >.
(3) 1{resource(X) : resource_db(X)}1 ← >.
(4) 1{environment(X) : environment_db(X)}1 ← >.
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The ﬁrst line of the encoding means that we only consider one and only one
subject attribute value obtained from the subject database. The rest of the
encoding means the same as the subject attribute.
Beside we generate attribute values, we might generate external condition that
might happen. For example, we add our previous example following.
Πgenerator :
(5) 1{age(X) : possible_age(X)}1 ← >.
8.3 Property Analysis
The problem of verifying a security property Φ on XACML policies is not only
to show that the property Φ holds on ΠXACML but also that we want to see
the witnesses whenever the property Φ does not hold in order to help the policy
developer reﬁne the policies. Thus, we can see this problem as ﬁnding models for
ΠXACML∪Πgenerator ∪Π¬Φ. The founded model is the witness that the XACML
policies cannot satisfy the property Φ.
Example 8.2 Suppose we have a security property:
Φ: An anonymous person cannot read any patient records.
Thus, the negation of property Φ is as follows
¬Φ: An anonymous person can read any patient records.
We deﬁne that anonymous persons are those who are neither patients, nor
guardians, nor doctors, nor nurses. We encode P¬Φ as follows
(1) anonymous ← not subject(patient),not subject(guardian),
not subject(doctor),not subject(nurse).
(2) ⊥ ← not anonymous.
(3) action(read) ← >.
(4) resource(patient_record) ← >.
(5) ⊥ ← not val(PShospital, p).
We list all of the requirements (lines 1  4). We force the program to ﬁnd an
anonymous person (line 2). Later we force that the returned decision should
be to permit (line 5). When the program ΠXACML ∪ Πgenerator ∪ Π¬Φ returns
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models, we conclude that the property Φ does not hold and the returned models
are the ﬂaws in the policies. On the other hand, we conclude that the property
Φ is satisﬁed if no model is found.
The implementation of ASP for security analysis can be used more broader not
only for analysis security properties. The idea is that all information is encoded
as a set of facts. The property Φ that we want to check is encoded as an integrity
constraint
⊥ ← not Φ.
By doing so, we force ASP to ﬁnd models that satisfy Φ.
Here are some examples.
1. Answering question.
For example: What can user x access?.
subject(x ) ← >.
⊥ ← not val(PSroot , p).
2. Finding AC policies.
For example, Find all AC policies regarding patient_record .
resource(patient_record) ← >.
⊥ ← not val(PSroot , p).
⊥ ← not val(PSroot , d).
8.4 Analysis on Incompleteness Policies
A set of policies is gap-free if there is no access request for which there is an
absence of decision. XACML deﬁnes that there is one PolicySet as the root of a
set of policies. Hence, we say that there is a gap whenever we can ﬁnd a request
that makes the semantics of the PSroot is assigned to na. Formally, we deﬁne a
gap as follows
gap: ∃Q : JPSrootK(Q) = na. (8.3)
We force ASP solver to ﬁnd the gap by the following encoding.
Πgap :
gap ← val(PSroot , na).
⊥ ← not gap.
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In order to make sure that a set of policies is gap-free we should generate all
possible requests and test whether at least one request is not captured by the
set of policies. Thus, the answer sets of program P = ΠXACML∪Πgenerator ∪Πgap
are witnesses that the set of policies encoded in ΠXACML is incomplete. When
there is no model that satisﬁes the program then we are sure that the set of
policies captures all of possible cases.
8.5 Analysis on Conﬂicting Policies
We deﬁne a conﬂicted policy as a policy which has two diﬀerent decision, i.e.,
deny and permit, in the same time. A conﬂict never occurs in XACML because
the structure of policies where there is only one PolicySet as the root of all of
policies and all of others policies are combined by combining algorithm. Each
combining algorithm returns a single decision either permit or deny and never
return both decisions in the same time.
Even a conﬂict never occurs, it may be interesting to analyse conﬂict. Here is
a scenario. Suppose that a new company is established as a merge from two
diﬀerent companies and as a consequence, all access control policies for the new
company come from merging all policies from diﬀerent companies. Suppose we
have following policies.
P1: An employee is allowed to access a company's document only during work-
ing hours (8:00 - 17:00), otherwise, the access is denied.
P2: An employee is allowed to access a company's document as long as he or
she in the oﬃce, otherwise, the access is denied.
Suppose there is a request from an employee at 7:00 from his oﬃce. Here we see
a conﬂicted decision, i.e., the access is denied based on policy P1 and based on
policy P2 the access is granted. The ﬁnal decision depends on the combining
algorithm used. If the policy administrator used permit-overrides, then the
access is granted, the same case follows for deny-overrides. However, if the only-
one-applicable is used, then, the ﬁnal decision is undecidable (indeterminate).
The purpose of this section is to show an analysis tool to detect possible con-
ﬂicted policies in XACML policies. We show how to detect conﬂicted Rules
in Section 8.5.1. The same method can be applied for Policy and PolicySet
elements.
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In addition, in Section 8.5.2 we propose an extension of XACML semantics that
can handle conﬂicts in case OASIS ﬁnds it useful to evolve XACML in this
direction.
8.5.1 Analysing Conﬂict Between Rules
We consider conﬂicted policies from the smallest entity, i.e., Rule element. Here,
we formally deﬁne a conﬂict is as follows:
conﬂict: ∃Q : JRK(Q) = permit ∧ JR′K(Q) = deny (8.4)
In order to compute whether there is a conﬂict in the set of policies, we encode
a logic program for conﬂict property as follows:
Pconflict :
conflict ← val(R, permit), val(R′, deny), R 6= R′.
⊥ ← not conflict .
The same as gap condition, we force ASP solver to ﬁnd a conﬂict by putting a
constraint ⊥ ← not conflict .
A conﬂict can be analysis whenever P = PXACML ∪ Pgenerate_one ∪ Pconflict
returns answer sets. The returning models are evidences where the conﬂict
between Rule occurs. We conclude that a set of policies is conﬂict-free if and
only if program P is unsatisﬁed, i.e., there is no returned model.
8.5.2 Introducing Conﬂict In XACML
To this end we add the three pairwise policy values to P that were brieﬂy
mentioned in Subsection 5.3.1: deny with indeterminate permit ([1, 12 ]), permit
with indeterminate deny ([ 12 , 1]) and conﬂict ([1, 1]) and we write P9 = P ∪{
[1, 12 ], [
1
2 , 1], [1, 1]
}
for the extended pairwise policy values obtained in this
way. The ordering deﬁned on P9 is shown in Figure 8.2 and it is easy to see
that P9 forms a lattice (which we may also denote L9) where the top element
is [1, 1] and the bottom element is [0, 0]. The ordering of this lattice is the same
as vP where the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for S ⊆ P9
are deﬁned as follows:⊔
L9
S = MaxvP(S)
l
L9
S = MinvP(S)
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[0, 0]
[ 12 , 0] [0,
1
2 ]
[1, 0] [ 12 ,
1
2 ] [0, 1]
[ 12 , 1][1,
1
2 ]
[1, 1]
Figure 8.2: The partially ordered set P9 for extended pairwise policy values.
In this way we capture the conﬂicts that can be dealt with using the approaches
of Belnap 4-valued logic [BDH07,BH08] and D-Algebra 8-valued logic [NBL09]
but retain the advantage that our formalization of the conﬂict-free fragment is
consistent with the current XACML 3.0 standard.
8.6 Analysis on Relevant Policies
A policy is relevant if there is a request such that the decision is made based
on this policy. Usually in a big set of policies, there is a policy that is irrele-
vant. This happens because policies are built based on several components and
combined together. We formally deﬁne a relevant property as follows:
relevant(R): ∃Q : JRK(Q) 6= na (8.5)
where Q is Request element and R is Rule element.
The encoding of relevant property in logic program is as follows:
Prelevant :
relevant(R) ← val(R,E), E 6= na.
Logically, we can say a Rule is irrelevant as the opposite of 8.5. Formally, we
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say that a Rule is irrelevant
irrelevant(R): ∀Q : JRK(Q) = na (8.6)
where Q is Request element and R is Rule element.
The encoding is as follows.
Pirrelevant :
irrelevant(R) ← not relevant(R).
Suppose we have following policies.
R1: All programmers can assess source code during oﬃce hours, otherwise, the
access is denied.
R2: All programmers can access source code 24 hours.
Either R1 or R2 could be irrelevant depends on the combining algorithm that
is used to combine them.
 Permit-overrides and legacy-permit-overrides. We can say that R1 is irrel-
evant since for every Request whenever R1 is applicable, R2 is applicable.
Moreover, for the Request outside oﬃce hours, R1 gives deny and R2 gives
permit. However, since the permit-overrides combining algorithm is used,
thus, the ﬁnal decision is permit which comes from R2. Hence, we are safe
to remove R1.
 Deny-unless-permit. The same reason as permit-overrides, we can say that
R1 is irrelevant.
 Deny-overrides and legacy-deny-overrides. We can say this time that R2 is
irrelevant. The same reason as above. The diﬀerence is that since we use
the deny-overrides combining algorithm, thus, the deny takes precedence.
For the case that an access request outside oﬃce hours, the ﬁnal decision
comes from R1 which gives deny decision.
 Permit-unless-deny. The same reason as deny-overrides, we can say that
R2 is irrelevant.
 First-applicable. We can say that R2 is irrelevant since the ﬁrst policy
which is applicable is always R1.
Here we extend our deﬁnition of irrelevant policies as follows.
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Definition 8.5 (irrelevant Policy) We deﬁne that a policy is irrele-
vant if for every Request Q:
1. It always return na.
irrelevant(R): ∀Q : JRK(Q) = na
2. In case of permit-overrides combining algorithm and deny-unless-permit
combining algorithm, a policy is irrelevant if its decision is deny but the
ﬁnal decision of the root policy is permit.
irrelevant(R): ∀Q : (JRK(Q) = d) ∧ (JP K(Q) = p)
where P = [po;T ; 〈. . . , R, . . .〉] or P = [dup;T ; 〈. . . , R, . . .〉]
3. In case of deny-overrides combining algorithm and permit-unless-deny
combining algorithm, a policy is irrelevant if its decision is permit but
the ﬁnal decision of the root policy is deny.
irrelevant(R): ∀Q : (JRK(Q) = p) ∧ (JP K(Q) = d)
where P = [do;T ; 〈. . . , R, . . .〉] or P = [pud;T ; 〈. . . , R, . . .〉]
4. In case of only-one-applicable combining algorithm, a policy is irrelevant
if it is applicable but the ﬁnal decision of the root policy is Indeterminate.
This indicates that there is another policy that is also applicable.
irrelevant(R): ∀Q : (JRK(Q) 6= na) ∧ (JP K(Q) = idt)
where P = [ooa;T ; 〈. . . , R, . . .〉]
5. In case of ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm, a policy is irrelevant if it
is applicable but there is another policy in the same collection that is in
the earlier of the sequence that is also applicable.
irrelevant(Rj): ∀Q : JRjK 6= na ∧ JRiK(Q) 6= na ∧ i < j
where P = [fa;T ; 〈. . . , Ri, . . . , Rj , . . .〉]
Deleting Irrelevant Policies. We show that deleting irrelevant policies
does not give diﬀerent result from original PolicySet.
Definition 8.6 (Policy Equivalent) Let P1 and P2 be XACML Poli-
cies. We deﬁne that P1 is equivalent with P2 (denoted by P1 == P2) as follows:
P1 == P2⇔ ∀Q : JP1K(Q) = JP2K(Q)
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Definition 8.7 (Adding A New Rule) Let P = [combid;T ; 〈R1, . . . , Rn〉]
be an XACML Policy and R be an XACML Rule. We deﬁne that P adds R in
index i (denoted by P ∪i R) as follows:
P ∪i R = [combid;T ; 〈R1, . . . , Ri−1, R,Ri, . . . , Rn〉] 1 ≤ i ≤ (n+ 1)
Definition 8.8 (Strong Policy Equivalent) Let P1 and P2 be XACML
Policies and R be an XACML Rule. We deﬁne that P1 is strong equivalent with
P2 (denoted by P1 ==S P2) as follows:
P1 ==S P2⇔ ∀R : JP1 ∪∗ RK(Q) == JP2 ∪∗ RK(Q)
Proposition 8.9 Let P be an XACML Policy. If R be a set of irrelevant
Rules, then
P ==S P\R
where \ is a notation to remove all Rules in R
Discussion on the implementation. Kolovski et al. [KH07] presented an
analysis on policy redundancy which similar to the irrelevant policies. One way
to implement this analysis is by performing change impact analysis for each
policy. Pick one policy and check whether removing the policy does or does not
give impact to the whole policy set. This way is too verbose. However they also
presented a more optimal way how to check impact analysis. This method is
in imperative way which is diﬀerent from our approach in declarative way. A
proper solution of implementing this analysis would be our future work.
Chapter 9
Access Control Policies in
Smart Grid from Smart
Meter Perspective
To invent, you need a good imagination and a pile of
junk.
Thomas A. Edison
Denmark has a long tradition for the promotion of energy eﬃciency improve-
ment. In future, energy must be used more eﬃciently and eﬀectively as well as
more intelligently so that the increase share of wind energy and emerging growth
in solar energy can be used to the widest possible extend to cover the new energy
consumption. In 2020, wind power will cover half of Danish electricity consump-
tion and it is expected that a relatively large percentage of overall Danish energy
consumption, including for transport and heating, will be electricity-based up
to 2020. Therefore, the parties to the agreement decided to draw up a strat-
egy for the smart electricity grid. In autumn 2010 a Smart Grid Network was
set up with a number of important players who were to make recommendation
for how the electricity sector and the authorities could promote Smart Grid
development.
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Firstly we introduce a glance of Smart Grid and its components in Section 9.1
and Section 9.2, respectively. In Section 9.3 describe communication in a Smart
Grid. Then, in Section 9.4 we present an architecture for access control in
Smart Grid from the point of view of Smart Meter  a electric measurement
device installed at an energy consumer's house or facility. Finally we present
examples of access control policies in Section 9.5.
9.1 Smart Grid in A Nutshell
Electricity is the fundamental and the crème-de-la-crème (the best) of energy
resource in our economy and social life. Without electricity, life will be uncom-
fortable, our industry will ﬁnd diﬃculty and the production will be slow.
The history of commercialisation of electric power began in the early 20th cen-
tury. The demand of electric power rocketed due to light bulb revolution and the
promise of the electric motor. At ﬁrst, small utility companies provided power
to local industrial plants and private communities. Some larger businesses even
generated their own power. Seeking greater eﬃciency and distribution, utility
companies pooled their resources, sharing transmission lines and quickly forming
electrical networks called grids.
A Smart Grid is the electricity grid of the future: it is expected to be more
reliable, more economical, more eﬃcient, and more secure than the standard
grid of today. It uses communication technology and information technology
(IT) to link all components to the power grid, including generating stations,
distribution facilities, transformers, businesses and households. It is a system
intended to enable the stable supply and eﬃcient usage of electrical power.
The latest technology is used to give intelligent functions to the entire power
distribution grid, making it a smart grid capable of reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases and boosting energy eﬃciency.
Due to its inherent importance for society, its dimension, and to the fact that
massive deployment is expected in the near future, the Smart Grid is the most
popular example of Cyber-Physical System (CPS). Such systems aim at mon-
itoring physical processes by means of an interconnected network of sensors.
Measurements made by these sensors are used to act on the sensed environ-
ment in order to optimise an operational goal. The physical layer of the Smart
Grid consists of the existing grid infrastructure that is enhanced with intelli-
gent devices (e.g. smart meters) which are able to exchange messages across a
communication layer.
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Figure 9.1: A Smart Grid Schema in A Nutshell [LLL+12].
One of the most interesting security-related characteristics of CPS such as the
Smart Grid, is in the clear distinction between the physical layer and the cyber
layer. There are two control ﬂows in a Smart Grid, i.e., power ﬂow (or electric
ﬂow) and information ﬂow (or data ﬂow) [NIS12]. Figure 9.1 illustrates control
ﬂows in Smart Grid.
Power Flow. Energy providers such as power plants and wind turbines gen-
erates electric power. Later, the power is transported via the transmission
network (high-voltage) into a distribution grid. The Distribution Service Op-
erator (DSO) transports power from the transmission network to its customers
(businesses and households). In Smart Grid, each customer has Smart Meter
(SM) installed on site which can (dis-) connect power supply or load limitation.
When it is low-season, SM can send electricity from Solar Panel, or from the
grid to Rechargeable Battery (RB) in order to save some electricity. When the
RB is full, the SM can either use the electricity for fulﬁlling energy usage at
home or release the power to the grid.
Information Flow. The information ﬂow always occurs both direction between
parties. In particular in areas with high risk of overloading, the grid companies
may utilise the existing grid more eﬀectively and closer to the fullest of its ca-
pacity by installing SM, which will allow them to receive real-time data about
the status of and load on the grid. In combination with eﬀorts to move con-
sumption to oﬀ-peak hours, this may prevent or postpone the need for further
grid investments. There are two kinds of data i.e., aggregated data  data is pre-
sented in a summary form, and detailed data  data contains detail information
regarding time, kind of appliance, who has used, etc. Only the owner of SM,
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i.e., the customer where the SM is installed who can access the detailed data
due to privacy reason. The SM only send data aggregation to DSO.
Converting the electricity grid into a CPS enables more eﬃcient and reliable
grid operations, and thus leads to a great many beneﬁts, ranging from energy
savings to a high degree of home automation. Despite the many beneﬁts of
the Smart Grid, it exposes the system to many new threats. First, numerous
malicious parties have an interest in compromising such a system, due to the
value of the information ﬂowing in the cyber layer and the impact on physical
components. Secondly, due to the complexity of the system, also the number of
elements that need protection increases: in the standard grid only the physical
layer is subject to attack, while in the Smart Grid also the cyber layer is under
threat. What is more, the two layers constantly interact, therefore an attack
on one level may in fact grant to the adversary control over the whole system.
One way to protect the system is by controlling the access. We believe access
control can be used as a ﬁrst step of security to protect the whole smart grid
system.
Access control is a simple technique to prevent unauthorised use by mediating
how an access to the resource is granted or denied. Controlling who is on the
grid is a vital element to the overall security strategy. There are many user
groups that are interested to be on the network such as employees, contractors,
guests, and even customers. The access should only be granted based on related
assets. For example, a customer who has Internet-enabled access is allowed to
view energy consumption and bills online.
9.2 Smart Grid Components
According to [NGE11], a conceptual scheme of the Smart Grid consists of the
following related components.
The Distribution Service Operator (DSO) is in charge of managing the power dis-
tribution within the Smart Grid, regulating power consumption through Smart
Meters; for instance, the DSO can request a Smart Meter to reduce the overall
power consumption in peak hours.
Consumers (C) are the ﬁnal users of the electricity provided by the DSO, with
which a consumer has a supply agreement. A consumer enters into a contract
with the DSO simply in order to secure power for his Electric Household Ap-
pliances (EHAs), i.e., electrical devices for speciﬁc household functions, such as
cooking or cleaning. An EHA can be a smart device (SEHA), or a legacy device
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(LEHA): the former can be programmed by a consumer or a Smart Meter, and
it informs them about the energy usage, while the latter can simply be turned
on or oﬀ.
Smart Meters (SM) are the physical point-of-contact between the DSO and a
consumer: the energy provided by the DSO to a consumer in order to oper-
ate EHAs is physically managed by a Smart Meter located on the consumer's
premises. For this reason, each EHA is connected to the SM, which can ter-
minate or re-connect power supply to any EHA remotely, in order to limit
electricity consumption. Moreover, a SM can be programmed to maintain a
schedule for operation of EHAs, and thus has two sources for input: the DSO,
which are global, and the consumer requirements, which are local. The require-
ments set by the consumer can be violated in order to obey the instructions
issued by the DSO; these can be interpreted as hard constraints. It is worth
noting, however, that the DSO always issues global instructions, and the SM is
in charge of ﬁnding the best strategy to comply with this instruction through an
intelligent schedule. Finally, similar to a regular meter, it collects information
about consumption and forwards it to the DSO.
A consumer may enter into a contract with Service Providers (SP) for the
maintenance of his EHAs. For instance, a mechanic could provide a remote
service for repairing electric vehicles, or a weather forecasting service could
compute the expected irradiation of a solar panel, and this information could be
exploited to estimate future energy requirements. The communication between
a SP and the related EHA(s) relies on the SM, which is in charge of receiving
messages from the former and subsequently relaying them to the latter. A
Service Provider thus needs to register the EHA and obtain digital certiﬁcates
for the communication. The validity of such certiﬁcates is checked by the Smart
Meter when it is asked to contact an EHA on behalf of a Service Provider.
9.3 Communication in Smart Grid
From a high level perspective, the distinguishing trait of the Smart Grid when
compared to the regular power grid, is in the information ﬂow that aims at
optimising the operational goals of the system. The communication can be
partitioned into intra-HAN and extra-HAN links, and the Smart Meter is the
gateway that connects these separate worlds. In particular, diﬀerent technolo-
gies can be leveraged to implement the connections between the system's various
entities [BBA07,PKS10].
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9.3.1 Intra-HAN
Intra-HAN exchange involves communication between the EHAs (they might
be connected to each other), and between a single EHA and the Smart Me-
ter.Examples of communication links at this level are the following.
SM-EHA: according to the instructions received from the Electric Utility or
the HAN administrator, a Smart Meter can decide to start, shut down, or limit
the use of any EHA. The restrictions that can be enforced other than putting the
device in 'on' or 'oﬀ' state depend on the capabilities and the interface oﬀered
by the EHA: a smart washing machine, for example, could oﬀer the Smart Meter
the possibility to set the temperature of the water for a washing cycle, with a
consequent impact on the energy consumption.
EHA-EHA: in some applications various EHAs need to cooperate in order
to provide a service or in order to optimise their eﬃciency. For example, dish
washer is turned on after the washing machine is done its job. This commu-
nication exchange can be channeled through the Smart Meter, or the involved
EHAs communicate directly with another one.
C-SM/EHA: the consumer is also part of this intra-HAN scenario, as he can
act directly on the Smart Meter or on the appliance in question. A consumer can
pass a list of activities that need to be accomplished to the Smart Meter, which
then computes a schedule so that all of the activities are fulﬁlled in the optimal
way with respect to the consumer's preferences (e.g. minimal total energy cost,
percentage of green energy used, less noisy level during the night). In this case,
the Smart Meter acts as an intelligent device and not only as a metering device.
9.3.2 Extra-HAN
Extra-HAN exchange involves communication via a Smart Meter between a
HAN and the external world, consisting in Service Providers and the Elec-
tric Utility. Various Wide Area Network (WAN) technologies such as PLC,
Broadband Power Line, GPRS, IEEE 802.16 WiMaX can be used here. PLC
is mentioned as the most eﬃcient data transmission scheme on electric power
transmission in [DWD11], and this is also the approach taken by the dominant
Italian electric utility (Enel SpA), which deployed more than 30 million Smart
Meters in the early 2000s. Finally, in [YZN+12] a real case is studied in which
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the communication along the high-voltage lines of the grid relies on a Wireless
Sensor Network, proving that electromagnetic interference can be dealt with.
At this level we notice the following links.
SP-SM-EHA: a Smart Meter registers and pairs a Service Provider with the
correct EHAs, thus establishing a bidirectional communication path between a
Service Provider and an EHA.
DSO-SM: the Distribution Service Operator sends consumption related in-
structions to a Smart Meter, and collects consumption reports and other no-
tiﬁcations from it. The periodicity of this exchange can vary from 500ms to
some minutes. It is important to note that a Smart Meter should only convey
aggregated information to the external world, for the sake of privacy.
9.4 Access Control Architecture
There are two main parties that interact in SM, i.e., SM and DSO. The inter-
action between parties is depicted in Figure 9.2.
Service Interface. The Service Interface functions as a Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP). Each party has its own PEP, PEP for SM side and PEP for DSO
side. There should be a mechanism that both PEPs can communicate thus, i.e.,
send access requests and receive decision answers. Each PEP has a connection
to their Attribute Service and Policy Authority.
Each PEP can receive an access request using diﬀerence languages. For example,
the human user can send an access request through browser application or rich
client application such as using tablet or smart phone as an interface for PEP
in SM side. When a PEP receive an access requests, it transforms the request
into XACML form and sends it to Access Control Service in order to get an
authorisation answer.
Access Control Service. The Access Control Service functions as Policy
Decision Point. It decides whether an access request should be granted or denied
based on the access control policies that it has.
140 Access Control Policies in Smart Grid from Smart Meter Perspective
!"#$%&'()
*(#+$,())
-./.0)
.12$,3)
!&'41#$'3)
-.!.0)
!"#$%&'()
*(#+$,())
-./.0)
.12$,3)
!&'41#$'3)
-.!.0)
*(#+$,()/5'(#67,()
-.8.0))
*97#'):('(#)))))
!,,(;;)<15'#12)
*(#+$,())
-.=.0)
*(#+$,()/5'(#67,()
-.8.0)))
=*>))))
!,,(;;)<15'#12)
*(#+$,())
-.=.0)
?$,4)
<2$(5')!@@)
>#)
A#1B;(#)
!@@)
Figure 9.2: Access Control Architecture
Attribute Service. The Attribute Service functions as a Policy Information
Point (PIP). The Attribute Service has access to attribute information such
as location, purpose of use, object preferences, consent directives and other
privacy conditions (object masking, object ﬁltering, user, role, purpose, etc.)
that constrain enforcement.
Policy Authority The Policy Authority function as a Policy Administration
Point (PAP). The Policy Authority has access to security policies that include
rules regarding authorisations required to access a protected resource and addi-
tional security conditions (location, time of day, cardinality, separation of duty
purpose, etc.) that constrain enforcement.
9.5 Access Control Policies Examples
In this section, we describe a scenario of access control policies in a Smart Grid
from Smart Meter perspective. As depicted in Figure 9.3, every object has a
connection to the Smart Meter as the central point of view.
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Figure 9.3: Access Control in Smart Grid from Smart Meter Perspective
Scenario from Smart Meter (SM) In this scenario, a Smart Meter can re-
quest connection (or disconnection) to (or from) power line from a Distribution
Service Operation (DSO). Moreover, the SM has an access to the data (detailed
consumption and aggregated consumption) and can update the data periodi-
cally. The SM also has an access to the price list from the DSO in order to
make a plan how the usage of EHAs. The SM can connect or disconnect EHAs
and it is mandatory to write a log about the connection or disconnection time.
Scenario from Human Customer (HC) In this scenario, a Human Cus-
tomer (HC) can can access detailed data consumption and price list which are
stored in the SM. HC can pay the billing statement directly to the Financial
Institute (FI). The SM accommodates HC to plan the usage of EHAs.
Scenario from Electric Household Appliances (EHAs) Each Electric
Household Appliance (EHA) can connect to the electricity through the SM and
it is mandatory that the SM writes a log when the EHA is started. Next,
when the EHA stops using the electricity, the SM should write a log again the
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disconnection time.
Scenario from Distribution Service Operator (DSO) In this scenario,
a Distribution Service Operator (DSO) can see the payment detail from FI. In
order to keep the customers' privacy, the DSO is only able to read aggregated
data consumption from the SM. The DSO can connect SM to the power line
and also can disconnect SM from the power line if the customer has not paid
the bill or if there is a technical safety reason.
Scenario from Service Provider (SP) A Service Provider (SP) can read
any information of a particular EHA related to its service. The SP can perform
a speciﬁc action to a particular EHA related to its service.
The ﬁrst step in developing an access control system is to identify the objects
that needs protection, the subjects which initiate the access requests to the
objects and execute activities and the actions that can be executed on the
objects and must be controlled [SD01]. Thus, we organise the policies based on
the resources (objects) that need protection (see Table 9.1).
Table 9.1: Access Control Policies: Objects, Subjects and Actions
Objects Electric Household Appliance (EHA), Data (Aggregated Data, Detailed
Data, and Particular Data), Power Line, Billing Statement, Price List
Subjects Smart Meter (SM), Human Customer (HC), Distribution Service Oper-
ator (DSO), Service Provider (SP), EHA
Actions read, write, turn on, turn oﬀ, connect, disconnect, pay, send, update
9.5.1 Access Control Policies for EHA
1. SM can turn on an EHA and it is mandatory to write a log when the EHA
is started.
2. SM can turn oﬀ an EHA and it is mandatory to write a log when the
EHA is ended.
3. Through SM, the SP can do a particular action to the corresponding EHA,
for example, update a new software, and it is mandatory to write the
description on the action in the log.
9.5 Access Control Policies Examples 143
We assume that there is only one request that is allowed each time. However,
there might be possibility two policies are applicable, for example, SM received
an request from SP in order to turn oﬀ a particular EHA. Thus, policy 1 and
policy 3 are both applicable. Hence, in this policy set, we prefer to set ﬁrst-
applicable combining operator.
9.5.2 Access Control Policies for Data
1. SM can write the aggregated data consumption and technical data.
2. DSO can read the aggregated data consumption from SM.
3. HC can read the detailed consumption data from SM.
4. SP can read the data about a particular EHA.
In order to protect data secrecy, we prefer to deny all access request unless we
are sure that the requestor has access to it. Hence, we use deny-unless-permit
combining algorithm.
9.5.3 Access Control Policies for Power Line
1. SM can connect to the power line.
2. SM can disconnect from the power line.
3. DSO can connect SM to the power line.
4. DSO can disconnect SM from the power line if the customer has not paid
the bill or there is a technical safety reason.
5. EHA can connect the electricity through SM and it is mandatory to write
a log when the EHA is started.
6. EHA can disconnect the electricity through SM and it is mandatory to
write a log when the EHA is ended.
In order to make sure that the supply power is always available, any permitted
access to the power system should be allowed. In this case, we use permit-
unless-deny combining operator.
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9.5.4 Access Control Policies for Billing Statement
1. HC can read the billing statement from the FI.
2. HC can pay the billing to the FI.
3. DSO can send bill to the FI.
4. DSO can read the payment bill from FI.
5. FI can update the payment status after the payment transaction succeed
We would like that the bill is always paid and the access to the billing statement
is always granted. However, since secrecy is important, we only give permission
to the trustworthy requestor. Thus, we use permit-overrides combining oper-
ator.
9.5.5 Access Control Policies for Price List
1. DSO can update the price list to the SM.
2. HC through SM can see the price list.
3. SM can access the price list in order to make a plan.
The price list is available to public and not secret. Thus, we use permit-unless-
deny combining operator.
Part V
Conclusion

Chapter 10
Conclusion and Future
Work
Education never ends, Watson. It is a series of lessons,
with the greatest for the last.
Sherlock Holmes, His Last Bow
This ﬁnal chapter contains a summary of our main contributions, viewing them
from a broader perspective, and discusses interesting lines of future research.
In the previous parts of the thesis we presented a number of results that bring
insights regarding modelling and analysing access control policies in XACML
3.0. Part II introduces an abstract syntax and formal semantics of XACML 3.0.
Part III presents a systematic technique for transforming XACML 3.0 policies
in Answer Set Programming (ASP). We show that the resulting logic program
has a unique answer set that directly corresponds to our formalisation of the
standard semantics of XACML 3.0 presented in Part II. Part IV demonstrates
how the results from Part III make it possible to use oﬀ-the-shelf ASP solvers
to formally verify properties of access control policies represented in XACML.
In the following sections we take a closer look at the conclusions drawn from
our results. Then we point at desirable future developments.
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10.1 Conclusion
Abstraction XACML 3.0. We have introduced XACML 3.0 and distilled
the core ingredients of the XACML policy components in the form of an abstract
syntax much less verbose than the standard XML based notation. This has
allowed us to develop a six valued logic for describing the semantics of the overall
policy evaluation as well as the semantics of the eight combining operators
that are key components of XACML. Such formalisation is always tricky  the
usual imprecision of standards apply to formalisation attempts as well and there
always is the risk of incorporating modelling artefacts into the formalisation. We
have addressed this challenge by providing two diﬀerent types of formalisation
(one based on V6 and one based on pairwise policy values P) and shown them to
be equivalent (see Figure 5.1). To guard against modelling artefacts we provide
an alternative lattice based way of characterising the policy combining operators
and we formally prove the equivalence of these approaches thereby increasing
our faith in either one.
XACML 3.0 Transformation. We propose a logic-based XACML analysis
framework using Answer Set Programming (ASP). With ASP we model an
XACML Policy Decision Point (PDP) that loads XACML policies and evaluates
XACML requests against these policies. We have modelled the XACML PDP
in a declarative way using the ASP technique by transforming XACML 3.0
elements into logic programs. Our transformation of XACML 3.0 elements is
directly based on XACML 3.0 semantics and we have shown that the answer set
of each program transformation is unique and that it agrees with the semantics
of XACML 3.0.
Application. We show how to use ASP for analysing access control security
properties. We can help policy developers analyse their access control policies
such as checking policies' completeness and verifying policy properties by in-
specting the answer set of ΠXACML ∪ Πgenerator ∪ Πconfiguration  the program
obtained by transforming XACML 3.0 elements into logic programs joined with
a query generator program and a conﬁguration program.
We have discussed how to extend XACML with considerations of conﬂict. This
is a notion that is absent from XACML 3.0 but is present in both of the earlier
formalisation mentioned above. This paves the way for extending XACML in a
sound way should OASIS decide to incorporate such features. We believe that
some of the policy combining operators that one might want to incorporate into
an XACML setting, in particular Consensus-Based-Vote, would beneﬁt from
such a choice.
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We present access control security policies in a Smart Grid from Smart Meter
perspective.
10.2 Future Work
As mentioned earlier, there are several aspects of XACML components that we
do not consider in this thesis (see Chapter 4). We do not consider Obligations
and Advices since they are not mandatory elements in XACML. However, Obli-
gations and Advices are used to enrich the authorisation ﬂow. Studying their
behaviour and adding them into our work would bring the modelling of XACML
3.0 more complete.
There is still a lot of room for improvement in the application of ASP to model
XACML 3.0. ASP has been successfully applied to solve combinatorial optimi-
sation problems. However, ASP is not directly suitable for modelling problems
with continuous domains. In the implementation of XACML 3.0, such problems
may occur in may access control policies. For example, the access to an object
depends on the time when the request arrived. There are approaches to handle
continuous domains such as [VNDCV06,MGZ08,LM13].
The implementation of case study is far from complete. We would like to have
more real case studies which we have real access control policies scenarios that
we can model.
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Appendix A
Proofs: Semantics of
XACML Combining
Algorithms
It is at this point that normal language gives up, and
goes and has a drink.
Terry Pratchet, The Color of Magic
In the following we present proofs of results from Chapter 5, in particular Propo-
sition 5.8 and Proposition 5.24.
A.1 Proof: Proposition 5.8
Proposition 5.8 Let 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values in V6. Then
δ(
V6⊕
po
(〈s1, . . . , sn〉)) =
P⊕
po
(δ(〈s1, . . . , sn〉))
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Proof. Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 and S′ = { s1, . . . , sn }.
There are six possible outcomes for δ(
⊕V6
po (S)) =
⊕P
po(δ(S)):
1. δ(
⊕V6
po (S)) = [1, 0] iﬀ
⊕V6
po (S) = >d =
⊔
po S
′ (by deﬁnition of
⊕V6
po ).
Based on vpo we get that ∃i : si = >d and ∀j : i 6= j ⇒ sj ∈ { >d, Id,⊥ }.
Thus, using the deﬁnition of δ we get that δ(si) = [1, 0] and ∀j : i 6= j →
δ(sj) ∈
{
[1, 0], [ 12 , 0], [0, 0]
}
.
Furthermore we get that MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) }) = [1, 0].
Hence, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get that
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [1, 0].
2. δ(
⊕V6
po (S)) = [0, 1] iﬀ
⊕V6
po (S) = >p =
⊔
po S
′ (by deﬁnition of
⊕V6
po ).
Based on vpo we get that ∃i : si = >p.
Thus, by the deﬁnition of δ we get that δ(si) = [0, 1].
Furthermore we get MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) } = [_, 1]).
Hence, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [0, 1].
3. δ(
⊕V6
po (S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ] iﬀ
⊕V6
po (S) = Idp =
⊔
po S
′ (by deﬁnition of
⊕V6
po ).
Based on vpo there are three cases:
(a) ∃i : si = Idp and ∀j : j 6= i⇒ sj ∈
{
Idp, Ip,>d, Id,⊥
}
.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of δ we get that δ(si) = [12 ,
1
2 ] and ∀sj :
δ(sj) ∈
{
[ 12 ,
1
2 ], [0,
1
2 ], [1, 0], [
1
2 , 0], [0, 0]
}
.
Furthermore we get MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) }) = [D, 12 ] where D ≥
1
2 .
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get that
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
(b) ∃i, j : si = Ip, sj ∈ >d and ∀k : k 6= i, k 6= j, sk ∈
{
Ip,>d, Id,⊥
}
.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of δ we get that δ(si) = [0, 12 ] and δ(sj) =
[1, 0] and ∀k : δ(sk) ∈
{
[0, 12 ], [1, 0], [
1
2 , 0], [0, 0]
}
.
Therefore, we get MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) } = [D, 12 ]) where D ≥ 12 .
Moreover, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get that
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
(c) ∃i, j : si = Ip, sj ∈ Id and ∀k : k 6= i, k 6= j, sk ∈
{
Ip, Id,⊥
}
.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of δ we get that δ(si) = [0, 12 ] and δ(sj) =
[1, 0] and ∀k : δ(sk) ∈
{
[0, 12 ], [
1
2 , 0], [0, 0]
}
.
Hence, we get MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) } = [D, 1]) where D ≥ 12 .
Moreover, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get that
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
4. δ(
⊕V6
po (S)) = [
1
2 , 0] iﬀ
⊕V6
po (S) = Id =
⊔
po S
′ (by deﬁnition of
⊕V6
po ).
Based on vpo we get that ∃i : si = Id and ∀j : j 6= i, sj ∈ { Id,⊥ }.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of δ we get that δ(si) = [ 12 , 0] and ∀j : δ(sj) ∈
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{
[ 12 , 0], [0, 0]
}
.
Furthermore we get MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) } = [ 12 , 0]).
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get that
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [
1
2 , 0].
5. δ(
⊕V6
po (S)) = [0,
1
2 ] iﬀ
⊕V6
po (S) = Ip =
⊔
po S
′ (by deﬁnition of
⊕V6
po ).
Based on vpo we get that ∃i : si = Ip and ∀j : j 6= i, sj ∈
{
Ip,⊥
}
.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of δ we get that δ(si) = [0, 12 ] and ∀j : δ(sj) ∈{
[0, 12 ], [0, 0]
}
.
Furthermore we get MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) } = [0, 12 ]).
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get that
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [0,
1
2 ].
6. δ(
⊕V6
po (S)) = [0, 0] iﬀ
⊕V6
po (S) = ⊥ =
⊔
po S
′ (by deﬁnition of
⊕V6
po ).
Based on vpo we get that ∀i : si = ⊥.
Hence, by the deﬁnition of δ we get that ∀i : δ(si) = [0, 0].
Furthermore we get MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) } = [0, 0]).
Therefore, by the deﬁnition of
⊕P
po we get that
⊕P
po(δ(S)) = [0, 0]. 
A.2 Proof: Proposition 5.24
Proposition 5.24 Let 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values in V6. Then
δ(
V6⊕
ooa
(〈s1, . . . , sn〉)) =
P⊕
ooa
(δ(〈s1, . . . , sn〉))
Proof. Let S = 〈s1, . . . , sn〉.
There are four possible outcomes for δ(
⊕V6
ooa(S)) =
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)):
1. δ(
⊕V6
ooa(S)) = [1, 0] iﬀ
⊕V6
ooa(S) = >d.
We get that ∃i : si = >d and ∀j : i 6= j ⇒ sj = ⊥ based on the deﬁnition
of
⊕V6
ooa(S).
Thus, ∃i : δ(si) = [1, 0] and ∀j : i 6= j ⇒ δ(sj) = [0, 0].
Hence, MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) }) = [1, 0] and
∀j : i 6= j ⇒ MinvP({ δ(si), δ(sj) }) = [0, 0].
Therefore, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [1, 0].
2. δ(
⊕V6
ooa(S)) = [0, 1] iﬀ
⊕V6
ooa(S) = >p.
We get that ∃i : si = >p and ∀j : i 6= j ⇒ sj = ⊥ based on the deﬁnition
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of
⊕V6
ooa(S) .
Thus, ∃i : δ(si) = [0, 1] and ∀j : i 6= j ⇒ δ(sj) = [0, 0].
Hence, MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) }) = [0, 1] and
∀j : i 6= j ⇒ MinvP({ δ(si), δ(sj) }) = [0, 0].
Therefore, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [0, 1].
3. δ(
⊕V6
ooa(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ] iﬀ
⊕V6
ooa(S) = Idp.
Based on the deﬁnition of
⊕V6
ooa(S), there are two possibilities:
(a) ∃i : si ∈ { Id, Ip, Idp }. Thus, ∃i : δ(si) ∈ { [ 12 , 0], [0, 12 ], [ 12 , 12 ] }.
Therefore, MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) }) = [D,P ], D ≥ 12 ∨ P ≥ 12 .
There are four possibilities:
i. D = 12 .
Hence, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
ii. D = 1.
Hence, there is δ(sj) = [1, 0]. Moreover,
 for δ(si) = [ 12 , 0] ∨ [ 12 , 12 ], MinvP({ δ(si), δ(sj) }) = [1, 0] and
max ({ 1, 0 }) ≥ 12 .
Thus, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
 for δ(si) = [0, 12 ], MaxvP({ δ(s1 } , . . . , δ(sn)) = [D,P ], D =
1 ∧ P ≥ 12 .
There are two possibilities:
 P = 12 .
Hence, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
 P = 1.
SinceD = P = 1, thus, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) =
[ 12 ,
1
2 ].
iii. P = 12 .
Hence, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
iv. P = 1.
Hence, there is δ(sj) = [0, 1]. Moreover,
 for δ(si) = [0, 12 ] ∨ [ 12 , 12 ], MinvP({ δ(si), δ(sj) }) = [0, 1] and
max ({ 1, 0 }) ≥ 12 . Thus, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) =
[ 12 ,
1
2 ].
 for δ(si) = [ 12 , 0], MaxvP({ δ(s1 } , . . . , δ(sn)) = [D,P ], D ≥
1
2 ∧ P = 1. There are two possibilities:
 D = 12 . Hence, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) =
[ 12 ,
1
2 ].
 D = 1. Since D = P = 1, thus, based on the deﬁnition,⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
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(b) ∃i, j : i 6= j and si, sj ∈ {>d,>p }.
Thus, ∃i, j : 1 6= j and δ(si), δ(sj) ∈ { [1, 0], [0, 1] }.
Therefore, there are three possibilities:
i. δ(si) = [1, 0] and δ(sj) = [1, 0].
Moreover, MinvP({ δ(si), δ(sj) }) = [1, 0] and max ({ 1, 0 }) ≥ 12 .
Hence, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
ii. δ(si) = [1, 0] and δ(sj) = [0, 1].
Moreover, MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) }) = [D,P ], D = P = 1.
Hence, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
iii. δ(si) = [0, 1] and δ(sj) = [0, 1].
Moreover, MinvP({ δ(si), δ(sj) }) = [0, 1] and max ({ 1, 0 }) ≥ 12 .
Hence, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ].
4. δ(
⊕V6
ooa(S)) = [0, 0] iﬀ
⊕V6
ooa(S) = ⊥.
Based on the deﬁnition of
⊕V6
ooa(S) we get that ∀i : si = ⊥.
Thus, ∀i : δ(si) = [0, 0]. Therefore, MaxvP({ δ(s1), . . . , δ(sn) }) = [0, 0].
Therefore, based on the deﬁnition,
⊕P
ooa(δ(S)) = [0, 0].
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Appendix B
Proof of Semantics
Correlation Between
XACML-ASP And XACML
3.0
Eliminate all other factors, and the one which remains
must be the truth.
Sherlock Holmes, The Sign of Four
In the following we present proofs of results from Chapter 7. Recall that an
answer set (AS) M of program Π is a a stable model of ΠM and it is a minimal
model. Hence, all atoms in M are true with respect to M and all atoms not in
M are false with respect to M .
Lemma B.1 Let M be an AS of program Π and let H ← Body be a clause in
Π. Then, H ∈M if M(Body) = >.
Proof. Let Body = B1, . . . , Bm,not Bm+1, . . . ,not Bn. To show the lemma
holds, suppose M(Body) = >. Then we ﬁnd that {B1, . . . , Bm } ⊆ M and
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M ∩ {Bm+1, . . . , Bn } = ∅. Since M is a stable model of ΠM then we ﬁnd that
H ← B1, . . . , Bn is in ΠM . Since M is a model of ΠM and {B1, . . . , Bm } ⊆M
then M(H) = >. Thus H ∈M . 
The Lemma B.1 only ensures that if the body of a clause is true under an AS
M then the head is also in M . However, in general, if the head of a clause is
in an AS M then there is no guarantee that the body is always true under M .
For example, suppose we have a program { p← >., p← q. }. In this example
the only AS is M = { p }. We can see that p is in M . However, q is not in M ,
thus, M(q) is false.
Lemma B.2 Let M be an AS of program Π and let H be in M . Then, there
is a clause in Π where H as the head.
Proof. Suppose thatM is an AS of program Π. Then we ﬁnd thatM is model
of ΠM . Suppose H ∈M and there is no clause in ΠM such that H as the head.
Then, we ﬁnd that M ′ = M/ {H } and M ′ is a model of ΠM . Since M is a
minimal model of ΠM but we have M ′ ⊂M . Therefore we ﬁnd a contradiction.
Thus, there should be a clause in ΠM such that H as the head. Hence, there is
a clause in Π such that H as the head. 
Lemma B.3 Let M be an AS of program Π and let H be in M . Then, there
exists a clause where H as the head and the body is true under M .
Proof. Suppose that M is an AS of program Π and H ∈ M . By Lemma
B.2, we ﬁnd that there is a clause in Π in a form H ← Body. Suppose that
M(Body) 6= >. Therefore, H ← Body is not in ΠM . Moreover, we can ﬁnd
another interpretation M ′ such that M/ {H } and M ′ is also a model of ΠM .
However, we know that M is a minimal model for ΠM but we have M ′ ⊂ M .
Thus, there is a contradiction. 
Lemma B.4 Let M be an AS of program Π and let H be a head of a clause
in Π. Then,
M(H) = ⊥ if and only if ∀i : M(Bodyi) = ⊥
where Bodyi is a body of a clause where H is the head.
Proof. (⇒) It is straightforward since M is a model of Π.
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(⇐) Suppose that ∀i : M(Bodyi) = ⊥ and M(H) = >. Therefore, H ∈ M .
Moreover, we can ﬁnd another interpretation M ′ such that M/ {H } and M ′ is
also a model of Π. However, we know that M is a minimal model for ΠM but
we have M ′ ⊂M . Thus, there is a contradiction. 
We deﬁne new notations that we will use for the rest of the proofs.
 Let ΠQ be a program obtained from Request Q transformation.
 Let Πerr be a program indicating the error occurrence. Πerr = ∅ if there
is no error and Πerr = { error← >. } otherwise.
 Let ΠevalM be a program obtained from evalM transformation.
 Let ΠM be a program obtained by transforming MatchM = fMatchID(v, cat)
evaluation into a logic program.
 Let A = allof(Aid) : {M1, . . . ,Mn } be an AllOf component.
 ΠA denotes a logic program obtained by transforming A evaluation
into a logic program.
 ΠA =
⋃
ΠMi ∪ ΠA denotes a logic program obtained by joining all
logic programs obtained by evaluation transformation from each com-
ponent in A, including the transformation of A itself.
Remark: We use capital font to denote interpretations and calli-
graphic font to denote XACML components. Please note that the
symbol ΠA denotes a reduct program with respect to A and ΠA de-
notes as explained above.
 For the rest, see table below.
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Match M
ΠM = Πerr ∪ΠevalM ∪ΠM
AllOf A = allof(Aid) : {M1, . . . ,Mn }
ΠA =
⋃
ΠMi ∪ΠA
AnyOf E = anyof(Eid) : {A1, . . . ,An }
ΠE =
⋃
ΠAi ∪ΠE
Target T = target(Tid) : { E1, . . . , En }
ΠT =
⋃
ΠEi ∪ΠT
Condition C
ΠC
Rule R = rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C }
ΠR = ΠT ∪ΠC ∪ΠR
Policy P = policy(Pid) : {
⊕
id ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 }
ΠP =
⋃
ΠRi ∪ΠT ∪Π
⊕
id ∪ΠP
PolicySet PS = policyset(PSid) : {
⊕
id ; T ; 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉 }
ΠPS =
⋃
ΠPi ∪ΠT ∪Πcombid ∪ΠPS
Combining Algorithm
⊕
id is either do, po, dup, pud, fa, ooa, ldo, or lpo
Π
⊕
id =
⋃
ΠRi ∪ΠPid ∪Π⊕id
The map of the set { >,⊥, I } into each component's value is as following.
V3 Match, AllOf, AnyOf, Target Condition Rule, Policy, PolicySet
> match (m) true(t) applicable(deny, permit)
⊥ notmatch (nm) false(f) notapplicable(na)
I indeterminate (idt) indeterminate indeterminate(id, ip, idp)
B.1 XACML Components
B.1.1 Match Transformation
The evaluation of the request context in order to get attribute values in Request
element that match with attribute category is as follows.
evalM (cat ,Q) =
{
error if an error occurs during the evaluation process
{ v1, . . . , vm } if cat(vi) ∈ { A1, . . . ,An } , 1 ≤ i ≤ m ≤ n
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Match Evaluation.
JfMatchID(v, cat)K(Q) =

> if evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and
∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = >
⊥ if evalM (cat ,Q) = { } or
(evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and
∀v′ ∈ evalM (C,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = ⊥)
I if evalM (cat ,Q) = error or
((∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) 6= >) and
(∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = I))
Match Transformation.
ΠevalM :
evalM (cat , error) ← error.
evalM (cat , V ) ← cat(V ).
not_emptybag(cat) ← cat(V ).
evalM (cat , emptybag) ← not not_emptybag(cat).
ΠM :
val(M,m) ← evalM (cat , V ), V 6= error, fMatchID(v, V, true).
val(M, nm) ← evalM (cat , emptybag).
val(M, nm) ← evalM (cat , V ), V 6= error, fMatchID(v, V, false),
not not_false(fMatchID(v, cat)).
not_false(fMatchID(v, cat)) ← evalM (cat , V ), fMatchID(v, V, true).
not_false(fMatchID(v, cat)) ← evalM (cat , V ), fMatchID(v, V, idt).
val(M, idt) ← evalM (cat , error).
val(M, idt) ← evalM (cat , V ), fMatchID(v, V, idt),
evalM (cat , V ′), fMatchID(v, V ′, idt).
Lemma B.5 LetM be Match andM be an AS of Π = ΠQ∪ΠM∪Πerr. Then,
evalM (cat ,Q) = error if and only if evalM (cat , error) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that evalM (cat ,Q) = error. Then, an error occurs dur-
ing evaluation. Thus Πerr = { error← >. }. Hence, M(error) = >. There-
fore, evalM (cat , error) ∈M by Lemma B.1.
(⇐) Suppose that evalM (cat , error) ∈ M . By Lemma B.3 there is a clause
such that evalM (cat , error) as the head and the body should be true un-
der M . There is only one clause that evalM (cat , error) as the head, i.e.,
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evalM (cat , error) ← error. . Thus M(error) = > and error ∈ M . By
Lemma B.3 there is a clause such that error as the head and the body should
be true under M . There is only one possibility that error as the head, i.e.,
{ error← >. } = Πerr. Thus evalM (cat ,Q) = error. 
Lemma B.6 LetM be Match and M be an AS of Π = ΠM. Then,
evalM (cat ,Q) = { v1, . . . , vn } if and only if evalM (cat , vi) ∈M
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and vi 6= error.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that evalM (cat ,Q) = { v1, . . . , vn }. By deﬁnition,
cat(vi) ∈ Q, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By Q transformation, we get cat(vi)← >. ∈ ΠQ.
Thus, M(cat(vi)) = >). By Lemma B.1, evalM (cat , vi) ∈M
(⇐) Suppose that evalM (cat , vi) ∈ M . By Lemma B.3 there is a clause such
that evalM (cat , vi) as the head and the body should be true underM . There is
only one clause that evalM (cat , vi) as the head, i.e., evalM (cat , vi)← cat(vi)..
Thus M(cat(vi)) = > and cat(vi) ∈ M . By Lemma B.3 there is a clause
such that cat(vi) as the head and the body should be true under M . There is
only one possibility that cat(vi) as the head, i.e., cat(vi) ← >. ∈ ΠQ. By Q
transformation we get that cat(vi) ∈ Q. Thus, by deﬁnition, evalM (cat ,Q) =
vi. 
Lemma B.7 LetM be Match and M be an AS of Π = ΠM. Then,
evalM (cat ,Q) = ∅ if and only if evalM (cat , emptybag) ∈M
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that evalM (cat ,Q) = ∅. Then, there exists no v such
that cat(v) ∈ Q. Therefore, cat(v) ← >. /∈ ΠQ. Hence, M(cat(v)) = ⊥.
Since M is a model of Π, and there exists no v such that M(cat(v)) = >, then
M(not_emptybag(cat)) = ⊥ and M(not not_emptybag(cat)) = >. Therefore,
evalM (cat , emptybag) = >. Thus, evalM (cat , emptybag) ∈M
(⇐) Suppose that evalM (cat , emptybag) ∈M . By Lemma B.3 there is a clause
such that evalM (cat , emptybag) as the head and the body should be true un-
der M . There is only one clause that evalM (cat , emptybag) as the head, i.e.,
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evalM (cat , emptybag) ← not not_emptybag(cat). . Therefore, we get that
M(not not_emptybag(cat)) = >. Thus, M(not_emptybag(cat)) = ⊥. By
Lemma B.4, we get that ∀i : M(cat(vi)) = ⊥. Thus, there is noQtransformation
such that cat(vi)← >. is in ΠQ. Hence, ∀i : cat(vi) /∈ Q. Therefore, by deﬁni-
tion of evalM we get that evalM (cat ,Q) = ∅. 
Now we will proof the Match evaluation. The rest of the proof depends on the
transformation of fMatchID/2. We assume that the transformation of fMatchID/2
into logic programs has the result as represented by the following conjecture.
Conjecture B.8 Let fMatchID be a function used in performing the Match
evaluation, v and v′ be attribute values. Let M = fMatchID(v, cat) be Match
and M be an AS of Π = ΠM. Then,
fMatchID(v, v
′) = X if and only if fMatchID(v, v′, X) ∈M .
Lemma B.9 LetM = fMatchID(v, cat) be Match andM be an AS of Π = ΠM.
Then,
JMK(Q) = m if and only if val(M,m) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JMK(Q) = m.
By Match evaluation, evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and ∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) :
fMatchID(v, v
′) = >.
By Lemma B.6, evalM (cat , v′) ∈M , and v′ 6= error.
By Conjecture B.8, fMatchID(v, v′, true) ∈M .
By Lemma B.1, val(M,m) ∈M since
{ evalM (cat , v′), v′ 6= error, fMatchID(v, v′, true) } ⊆M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(M,m) ∈M .
By Lemma B.3, M(evalM (cat , v′)) = >, v′ 6= error and
M(fMatchID(v, v
′, true)) = >.
Let us consider M(evalM (cat , v′)) = >. Then, evalM (cat , v′) ∈M .
By Lemma B.6, we get that v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q).
Let us consider M(fMatchID(v, v′, true)) = >.
By Conjecture B.8, we get that fMatchID(v, v′) = >.
Therefore, by Match evaluation, JMK(Q) = m.

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Lemma B.10 LetM = fMatchID(v, C) be Match andM be an AS of Π = ΠM.
Then,
JMK(Q) = nm if and only if val(M, nm) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JMK(Q) = nm. Based on the deﬁnition, there are
two possibilities:
1. evalM (cat ,Q) = ∅.
Then, by Lemma B.7, evalM (cat , emptybag) ∈M and
M(evalM (cat , emptybag)) = >.
Thus, by Lemma B.1, val(M, nm) ∈M .
2. evalM (cat ,Q) 6= error and ∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = ⊥.
Then, by Lemma B.6, evalM (cat , V ) ∈M and V 6= error.
By Conjecture B.8, ∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′, false) ∈M .
Since ∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = ⊥, then,
6 ∃v′ : fMatchID(v, v′) = > or fMatchID(v, v′) = idt.
Thus, we will not have fMatchID(v, v′, true) ∈M or
fMatchID(v, v
′, idt) ∈M .
Therefore M(not_false(fMatchID(v, cat))) = ⊥ since M is a model.
Hence, M(not not_false(fMatchID(v, cat))) = >.
Since { evalM (cat , V ), V 6= error,not not_false(fMatchID(v, cat)) } ⊆M .
Thus, by Lemma B.1, val(M, nm) ∈M
(⇐) Suppose that val(M, nm) ∈M . By Lemma B.3, there are two possibilities:
1. M(evalM (cat , emptybag)) = >.
Thus, evalM (cat , emptybag) ∈M .
By Lemma B.7, we get that evalM (cat ,Q) = ∅.
Hence, by deﬁnition, JMK(Q) = nm.
2. M(evalM (cat , V )) = >, V 6= error,M(not not_false(fMatchID(v, cat))) =
>.
Let us consider M(evalM (cat , V )) = > and V 6= error.
By Lemma B.6, evalM (cat ,Q) = V, V 6= error.
Let us consider M(not not_false(fMatchID(v, cat))) = >.
Therefore, M(not_false(fMatchID(v, cat))) = ⊥.
By Lemma B.4, we get that ∀vi ∈ evalM (cat , vi) : M(not fMatchID(v, vi, false)) =
⊥).
Moreover, ∀vi ∈ evalM (cat , vi) : M(fMatchID(v, vi, false)) = > since the
input of fMatchID/2 depends on evalM/2.
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By Lemma B.6 and Conjecture B.8, ∀vi ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, vi) =
⊥.
Therefore, by deﬁnition JMK(Q) = nm. 
Lemma B.11 LetM = fMatchID(v, C) be Match andM be an AS of Π = ΠM.
Then,
JMK(Q) = idt if and only if val(M, idt) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JMK(Q) = idt. Based on the deﬁnition, there are
two possibilities:
1. evalM (cat ,Q) = error.
Then, by Lemma B.5, evalM (cat , error) ∈M andM(evalM (cat , error)) =
>. Thus, by Lemma B.1, val(M, idt) ∈M .
2. ∃v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, v′) = idt and ∀v′ ∈ evalM (cat ,Q) :
fMatchID(v, v
′) 6= >.
By Lemma B.6 and Conjecture B.8, ∃v′ : evalM (cat , v′) ∈ M and
fMatchID(v, v
′, idt) ∈ M . By Lemma B.6 and Conjecture B.8,
∀v′ : evalM (cat , v′) ∈ M and fMatchID(v, v′, true) /∈ M because if
fMatchID(v, v
′, true) ∈ M it will lead a contradiction. Hence,
∀v′ : M(evalM (cat , v′), fMatchID(v, v′, true)) = ⊥. By Lemma B.4,
M(true(fMatchID(v, cat))) = ⊥. Then,M(not true(fMatchID(v, cat)) = >.
Since { evalM (cat , v′), fMatchID(v, v′, idt),not true(fMatchID(v, cat)) } ⊆
M , hence, by Lemma B.1, val(M, idt) ∈M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(M, idt) ∈M . By Lemma B.3, there are two possibilities:
1. M(evalM (cat , error)) = >.
Thus, evalM (cat , error) ∈M . By Lemma B.5, we get that evalM (cat ,Q) =
error. Hence, by deﬁnition, JMK(Q) = idt.
2. M(evalM (cat , V )) = >, M(fMatchID(v, V, idt)) = >, and
M(not true(fMatchID(v, cat))) = >.
By Lemma B.6 and Conjecture B.8, ∃v′ : evalM (cat ,Q) = v′ and
fMatchID(v, v
′, idt). Let us consider M(not true(fMatchID(v, cat))) = >.
Then,M(true(fMatchID(v, cat))) = ⊥. By Lemma B.4, ∀vi ∈ evalM (cat , vi) :
M(fMatchID(v, vi, true)) = ⊥. By Lemma B.6 and Conjecture B.8, ∀vi ∈
evalM (cat ,Q) : fMatchID(v, vi) 6= true since it leads contradiction if
fMatchID(v, vi, true) /∈M and fMatchID(v, vi) = true. Therefore, by deﬁ-
nition JMK(Q) = nm.
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
Proposition B.12 Let Π = ΠQ ∪ΠM be a program and M be an AS of Π.
Then,
JMK(Q) = V if and only if val(M, V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.9, Lemma B.10 and Lemma B.11 since the
value of V only has three possibilities, i.e., {m, nm, idt }. 
B.1.2 AllOf Transformation
AllOf Evaluation.
JAidK(Q) =

> if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JMiK = >
⊥ if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JMiK = ⊥
I otherwise
AllOf Transformation.
ΠAid :
val(Aid ,m) ← val(M1,m), . . . , val(Mn,m).
val(Aid , nm) ← val(Mi, nm). (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
val(Aid , idt) ← not val(Aid ,m),not val(Aid , nm).
Lemma B.13 Let A be an AllOf component and M be an AS of Π = ΠA.
Then,
JAK(Q) = m if and only if val(A,m) ∈M .
Proof. Let A = ∧ni=1Mi.
(⇒) Suppose that JAK(Q) = m holds. Then, by AllOf evaluation, ∀i : JMiK(Q) =
m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Based on Prop. B.12, ∀i : val(Mi,m) ∈M, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore,
M(val(M1,m)∧ . . .∧val(Mn,m)) = >. Hence, by Lemma B.1, val(A,m) ∈M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(A,m) ∈ M . Based on Lemma B.3, there is a rule where
val(A,m) as the head and the body is true underM . Since there is only one rule
in Π with val(A,m) in the head, i.e., val(A,m)← val(M1,m), . . . , val(Mn,m),
B.1 XACML Components 167
we ﬁnd that M(val(M1,m) ∧ . . . ∧ val(Mn,m)) = >. Therefore, val(Mi,m) ∈
M, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Based on Prop. B.12, JMiK(Q) = m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, by
AllOf evaluation, we obtain JAK(Q) = m. 
Lemma B.14 Let A be an AllOf component and M be an AS of Π = ΠA.
Then, JAK(Q) = nm if and only if val(A, nm) ∈M .
Proof. Let A = ∧ni=1Mi.
(⇒) Suppose that JAK(Q) = nm holds. Then, by AllOf evaluation we have that
∃i : JMiK(Q) = nm. Based on Prop. B.12 we get that ∃i : val(Mi, nm) ∈
M . Thus, we get that ∃i : M(val(Mi), nm) = >. Therefore, by Lemma B.1,
val(M, nm) ∈M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(A, nm) ∈M . Based on Lemma B.3 we get that there is a
rule where val(A, nm) as the head and the body is true underM . Based on AllOf
transformation, ∃i : M(val(Mi), nm) = >. Therefore, ∃i : val(Mi, nm) ∈ M .
Based on Prop. B.12 we get that ∃i : JMiK(Q) = nm. Therefore, by AllOf
evaluation, we obtain JAK(Q) = nm. 
Lemma B.15 Let A be an AllOf component and M be an AS of Π = ΠA.
Then, JAK(Q) = idt if and only if val(A, idt) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JAK(Q) = idt. Then, by AllOf evaluation, JAK(Q) 6=
m and JAK(Q) 6= nm. Thus, by Lemma B.13 and Lemma B.14, val(A,m) 6∈ M
and val(A, nm) 6∈ M . Hence, M(not val(A,m) ∧ not val(A, nm)) = >. There-
fore, by Lemma B.1, val(A, idt) ∈M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(A, idt) ∈M . Based on Lemma B.3, there is a rule where
val(A, idt) as the head and the body is true under M . There is only one rule
where val(A, idt) as the head in Π, i.e., val(A, idt)← not val(A,m),not val(A, nm).
Hence, val(A,m) 6∈M and val(A, nm) 6∈M . Based on Lemma B.13 and Lemma
B.14 we get that JAK(Q) 6= m and JAK(Q) 6= nm. Therefore, by AllOf evalua-
tion, we obtain JAK(Q) = idt. 
Proposition B.16 Let A be an AllOf component and M be an AS of Π =
ΠA. Then,JAK(Q) = V if and only if val(A, V ) ∈M .
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Proof. It follows from Lemma B.13, Lemma B.14 and Lemma B.15 since the
value of V only has three possibilities, i.e., {m, nm, idt }. 
B.1.3 AnyOf Transformation
AnyOf Evaluation.
JEidK(Q) =

> if ∃i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JAiK = >
⊥ if ∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n : JAiK = ⊥
I otherwise
AnyOf Transformation.
ΠEid :
val(Eid ,m) ← val(Ai,m). (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
val(Eid , nm) ← val(A1, nm), . . . , val(An, nm).
val(Eid , idt) ← not val(Eid ,m),not val(Eid , nm).
Lemma B.17 Let A be an AllOf component and M be an AS of Π = ΠA.
Then,
JAK(Q) = m if and only if val(A,m) ∈M .
Proof. Let E = ∨ni=1Ai
(⇒) Suppose that JEK(Q) = m holds. Then,by AnyOf evaluation, ∃i : JAiK(Q) =
m, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Based on Prop. B.20, ∃i : val(Ai,m) ∈ M, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus,
∃i : M(val(Ai,m)) = >. Therefore, by Lemma B.1, val(E ,m) ∈M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(E ,m) ∈ M . Based on Lemma B.3, here is a rule where
val(E ,m) as the head and the body is true under M . Based on AnyOf transfor-
mation, ∃i : M(val(Ei),m) = >. Therefore, ∃i : val(Ei,m) ∈M . Based on Prop.
B.20, ∃i : JEiK(Q) = m. Therefore, by AnyOf evaluation, we obtain JEK(Q) = m.

Lemma B.18 Let A be an AllOf component and M be an AS of Π = ΠA.
Then,
JAK(Q) = nm if and only if val(A, nm) ∈M .
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Proof. Let E = ∨ni=1Ai
(⇒) Suppose that JEK(Q) = nm holds. Then,by AnyOf evaluation, ∀i : JAiK(Q) =
nm. Based on Prop. B.20, ∀i : val(Ai, nm) ∈ M . Thus, M(val(A1, nm) ∧ · · · ∧
val(An, nm)) = >. Therefore, by Lemma B.1, val(E , nm) ∈M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(E , nm) ∈ M . By Lemma B.3, there is a rule where
val(E , nm) as the head and the body is true underM . There is only one rule in Π
with val(E ,m) in the head in Π, i.e., val(E , nm)← val(A1, nm), . . . , val(An, nm).
Thus,M(val(A1, nm)∧. . .∧val(An, nm)) = >. Therefore, val(Ai, nm) ∈M, 1 ≤
i ≤ n. Based on Prop. B.20, JAiK(Q) = nm, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, by AnyOf
evaluation, we obtain JEK(Q) = nm. 
Lemma B.19 Let A be an AllOf component and M be an AS of Π = ΠA.
Then,
JAK(Q) = idt if and only if val(A, idt) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JEK(Q) = idt. Then,by AnyOf evaluation, JEK(Q) 6=
m and JEK(Q) 6= nm. Thus, by Lemma B.17 and Lemma B.18, val(E ,m) 6∈ M
and val(E , nm) 6∈M . Hence,M(not val(E ,m)∧not val(E , nm)) = >. By Lemma
B.1, val(E , idt) ∈M .
(⇐) Suppose that val(E , idt) ∈M . Based on Lemma B.3, there is a rule where
val(E , idt) as the head and the body is true under M . There is only one rule in
Π with val(E , idt) in the head, i.e., val(E , idt) ← not val(E ,m),not val(E , nm).
Hence, val(E ,m) 6∈M and val(E , nm) 6∈M . Based on Lemma B.17 and Lemma
B.18, JEK(Q) 6= m and JEK(Q) 6= nm. Therefore, by AnyOf evaluation, we obtainJEK(Q) = idt. 
Proposition B.20 Let E be an AnyOf component and M be an AS of Π =
ΠE . Then,
JEK(Q) = V if and only if val(E , V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.17, Lemma B.18 and Lemma B.19 since the
value of V only has three possibilities, i.e., {m, nm, idt }. 
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B.1.4 Target Transformation
Lemma B.21 Let T = be an Target component and M be an AS of Π = ΠT .
Then, JT K(Q) = m if and only if val(T ,m) ∈M .
Proof. It is obvious from the deﬁnition of Target evaluation and the transfor-
mation into LP such as val(,m)← >. .
Proposition B.22 Let T be an Target component and M be an AS of Π =
ΠT . Then,JT K(Q) = V if and only if val(T , V ) ∈M .
The proof of Prop. B.22 is similar to the proof of Prop. B.16.
B.1.5 Condition Transformation
Proposition B.23 Let C be a Condition component and M be an AS of
Π = ΠC. Then,JCK(Q) = V if and only if val(C, V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows that the Condition evaluation based on the value of eval
function, the same case in the Condition program transformation. 
B.1.6 Rule Transformation
Rule Evaluation.
JRidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = > and E = deny
>p if JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = > and E = permit
Id if
(
(JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = I) or JT K(Q) = I) and
E = permit
Ip if
(
(JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = I) or JT K(Q) = I) and
E = deny
⊥ if (JT K(Q) = > and JCK(Q) = ⊥) or JT K(Q) = ⊥
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Rule Transformation.
ΠRid :
rule(Rid , E) ← >.
val(Rid , E) ← val(T ,m), val(C, t).
val(Rid , id) ← val(T ,m), val(C, idt), rule(Rid , E), E = deny.
val(Rid , id) ← val(T , idt), rule(Rid , E), E = deny.
val(Rid , ip) ← val(T ,m), val(C, idt), rule(Rid , E), E = permit.
val(Rid , ip) ← val(T , idt), rule(Rid , E), E = permit.
val(Rid , na) ← val(T ,m), val(C, f).
val(Rid , na) ← val(T , nm).
Lemma B.24 Let R = rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C } be a Rule component where
E is the Rule's eﬀect, either permit or deny. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠR.
Then,
JRK(Q) = E if and only if val(R, E) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JRidK(Q) = E.
 JT K(Q) = m and JCK(Q) = t (by deﬁnition Rule evaluation).
 val(T ,m) ∈M and val(C, t) ∈M (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.23).
 val(Rid , E) ∈M (since { val(T ,m), val(C, t) } ⊆M and by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that val(Rid , E) ∈M .
 M(val(T ,m) ∧ val(T , t)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 val(T ,m) ∈M and val(C, t) ∈M .
 JMK(Q) = m and JCK(Q) = t (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.23).
 JRidK(Q) = E (by deﬁnition Rule evaluation). 
Lemma B.25 Let R = rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C } be a Rule component where
E is the Rule's eﬀect, E = deny. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠR. Then,
JRK(Q) = id if and only if val(R, id) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JRidK(Q) = id. Based on Rule evaluation deﬁnition,
there are two possibilities:
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1. JT K(Q) = m, JCK = idt, and E = permit.
 val(T ,m) ∈M and val(C, idt) ∈M(by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.23).
 M(rule(Rid , E) ∧ (E = deny)) = > (since E = deny).
 val(Rid , id) ∈M (since { val(T ,m), val(C, idt) } ⊆M and by Lemma B.1).
2. JT K(Q) = idt and E = permit.
 val(T , idt) ∈M (by Prop. B.22).
 M(rule(Rid , E) ∧ (E = deny)) = > (since E = deny).
 val(Rid , id) ∈M (since { val(T , idt) } ⊆M and by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that val(Rid , id) ∈M . By Lemma B.3, there are two possibilities:
1. val(T , idt) ∈M , rule(Rid , E) ∈M , and E = deny.
 JT K(Q) = idt (by Prop. B.22).
 JRidK(Q) = id(by deﬁnition Rule evaluation).
2. val(T ,m) ∈M , val(C, idt) ∈M , rule(Rid , E) ∈M , and E = deny.
 JT K(Q) = m and JCK(Q) = idt(by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.23).
 JRidK(Q) = id(by deﬁnition Rule evaluation). 
Lemma B.26 Let R = rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C } be a Rule component where
E is the Rule's eﬀect, E = permit. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠR. Then,
JRK(Q) = ip if and only if val(R, ip) ∈M .
The proof of Lemma B.26 is similar like the proof Lemma B.25. The diﬀerence
is that in this lemma, E = permit.
Lemma B.27 Let R = rule(Rid) : {E ; T ; C } be a Rule component where
E is the Rule's eﬀect, either permit or deny. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠR.
Then,
JRK(Q) = na if and only if val(R, na) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JRidK(Q) = na. Based on Rule evaluation deﬁnition,
there are two possibilities:
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1. JT K(Q) = m, JCK = f.
 val(T ,m) ∈M and val(C, f) ∈M(by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.23).
 val(Rid , na) ∈M (since { val(T ,m), val(C, f) } ⊆M and by Lemma B.1).
2. JT K(Q) = nm.
 val(T , nm) ∈M (by Prop. B.22).
 val(Rid , nm) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that val(Rid , nm) ∈M . By Lemma B.3, there are two possibilities:
1. val(T ,m) ∈M , val(C, f) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = m and JCK(Q) = f (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.23).
 JRidK(Q) = na(by deﬁnition Rule evaluation).
2. val(T , nm) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = nm (by Prop. B.22).
 JRidK(Q) = nm(by deﬁnition Rule evaluation). 
Proposition B.28 Let R be a Rule component where E is the Rule's eﬀect,
either permit or deny. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠR. Then,
JRK(Q) = V if and only if val(R, V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.24, Lemma B.25, Lemma B.26, and Lemma B.27
since the value of V only has ﬁve possibilities, i.e., { permit, deny, id, ip, na }. 
B.2 Combining Algorithms Transformation
B.2.1 Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm
Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm Evaluation. Let 〈s1, . . . , sn〉
be a sequence of policy values from V6 and let S = { s1, . . . , sn } be a set of policy
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values from S. We deﬁne the permit-overrides combining algorithm under V6 as
follows:
V6⊕
po
(S) =
⊔
po
S
Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm Transformation.
Πpo :
algo(po, P, permit) ← decision_of (P,R, permit).
algo(po, P, idp) ← not algo(po, P, permit), decision_of (P,R, idp).
algo(po, P, idp) ← not algo(po, P, permit),
decision_of (P,R1, ip), decision_of (P,R2, deny).
algo(po, P, idp) ← not algo(po, P, permit),
decision_of (P,R1, ip), decision_of (P,R2, id).
algo(po, P, ip) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
decision_of (P,R, ip).
algo(po, P, deny) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
not algo(po, P, ip), decision_of (P,R, deny).
algo(po, P, id) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
not algo(po, P, ip),not algo(po, P, deny),
decision_of (P,R, id).
algo(po, P, na) ← not algo(po, P, permit),not algo(po, P, idp),
not algo(po, P, ip),not algo(po, P, deny),
not algo(po, P, id).
We use PO for an abbreviation of permit-overrides combining algorithm.
Lemma B.29 Let P = policy(Pid) : { po ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = permit if and only if algo(po,Pid , permit) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that⊕po(R) = permit.
 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = permit (by PO evaluation).
 val(Ri, permit) ∈M (by Prop. B.28).
 There is a clause in Π decision_of (Pid ,Ri, permit) ← val(Ri, permit).
(by Policy transformation).
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 decision_of (Pid ,Ri, permit) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
 algo(po,Pid , permit) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(po,Pid , permit) ∈M .
 M(decision_of (Pid ,R, permit)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 M(val(R, permit)) = > (by Lemma B.3). Therefore, val(R, permit) ∈
M .
 JRK(Q) = permit (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
po(R) = permit (by PO evaluation). 
Lemma B.30 Let P = policy(Pid) : { po ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = idp if and only if algo(po,Pid , idp) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that ⊕po(R) = idp. Based on PO evaluation deﬁnition,
there are three possibilities:
1. ∀i : JRiK(Q) 6= permit and ∃j : JRjK(Q) = idp.
 ∀i : val(Ri, permit) 6∈M and ∃j : val(Rj , idp) ∈M (by Prop. B.28).
 algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈M by Lemma B.29 since if it is inM , there ex-
ists a Rule R in the Policy Pidsequence such that JRK(Q) = permit.
 decision_of (Pid ,Rj , idp) ∈M (by Policy transformation and Lemma B.1).
 algo(po,Pid , idp) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
2. ∀i : JRiK(Q) 6= permit and ∃j : JRjK(Q) = ip and ∃j′ : JR|′K(Q) = deny.
 ∀i : val(Ri, permit) 6∈M and
∃j : val(Rj , ip) ∈M and ∃j : val(Rj′ , deny) ∈M (by Prop. B.28).
 algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈M by Lemma B.29 since if it is inM , there ex-
ists a Rule R in the Policy Pidsequence such that JRK(Q) = permit.
 decision_of (Pid ,Rj , ip) ∈ M and decision_of (Pid ,Rj′ , deny) ∈ M
(by Policy transformation and Lemma B.1).
 algo(po,Pid , idp) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
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3. ∀i : JRiK(Q) 6= permit and ∃j : JRjK(Q) = ip and ∃j′ : JR|′K(Q) = id.
 ∀i : val(Ri, permit) 6∈M and ∃j : val(Rj , ip) ∈M and ∃j : val(Rj′ , id) ∈
M (by Prop. B.28).
 algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈M by Lemma B.29 since if it is inM , there ex-
ists a Rule R in the Policy Pidsequence such that JRK(Q) = permit.
 decision_of (Pid ,Rj , ip) ∈ M and decision_of (Pid ,Rj′ , id) ∈ M (by
Policy transformation and Lemma B.1).
 algo(po,Pid , idp) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(po,Pid , idp) ∈M . By Lemma B.3, there are three possi-
bilities:
1. M(not algo(po,Pid , permit) ∧ decision_of (Pid ,R, idp)) = >.
 Then, algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈M and decision_of (Pid ,R, idp) ∈M .

⊕
po(R) 6= permit (by Lemma B.29 since there is a contradiction if⊕
po(R) = permit).
 M(val(R, idp)) = > (by Policy transformation and Lemma B.3).
 Then, val(R, ip) ∈M .
 ∀i : JRiK(Q) 6= permit since⊕po(R) 6= permit (by PO evaluation).
 JRK(Q) = idp (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
po(R) = idp (by PO evaluation).
2. M(not algo(po,Pid , permit)∧decision_of (Pid ,R, ip)∧decision_of (Pid ,R′, deny)) =
>.
 Then, algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈ M , decision_of (Pid ,R, ip) ∈ M , and
decision_of (Pid ,R′, deny) ∈M .

⊕
po(R) 6= permit (by Lemma B.29 since there is a contradiction if⊕
po(R) = permit).
 M(val(R, ip)) = > and M(val(R, deny)) = > (by Policy transforma-
tion and Lemma B.3).
 Then, val(R, ip) ∈M and val(R, deny) ∈M .
 ∀i : JRiK(Q) 6= permit since⊕po(R) 6= permit (by PO evaluation).
 JRK(Q) = ip and JRK(Q) = deny (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
po(R) = idp (by PO evaluation).
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3. M(not algo(po,Pid , permit)∧decision_of (Pid ,R, ip)∧decision_of (Pid ,R′, id)) =
>.
 Then, algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈ M , decision_of (Pid ,R, ip) ∈ M , and
decision_of (Pid ,R′, id) ∈M .

⊕
po(R) 6= permit (by Lemma B.29 since there is a contradiction if⊕
po(R) = permit).
 M(val(R, ip)) = > and M(val(R, id)) = > (by Policy transformation
and Lemma B.3).
 Then, val(R, ip) ∈M and val(R, id) ∈M .
 ∀i : JRiK(Q) 6= permit since⊕po(R) 6= permit (by PO evaluation).
 JRK(Q) = ip and JRK(Q) = id (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
po(R) = idp (by PO evaluation). 
Lemma B.31 Let P = policy(Pid) : { po ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = ip if and only if algo(po,Pid , ip) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that ⊕po(R) = ip.
 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = ip and ∀j : JRjK(Q) 6= ip ⇒ JRjK(Q) = na (by PO
evaluation).
 ∃i : val(Rj , ip) ∈M (by Prop. B.28).
 algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈M by Lemma B.29 since if it is in M , there exists
a Rule R in the Policy Pidsequence such that JRK(Q) = permit.
 algo(po,Pid , idp) 6∈M by Lemma B.29 since if it is inM there exists a Rule
R in the Policy Pidsequence such that JRK(Q) = idp, and JRK(Q) = d or id.
 decision_of (Pid ,Ri, ip) ∈M (by Policy transformation and Lemma B.1).
 algo(po,Pid , ip) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(po,Pid , ip) ∈M .
 M(not algo(po,Pid , permit)∧not algo(po,Pid , idp)∧decision_of (Pid ,R, ip)) =
> (by Lemma B.3).
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 Then, algo(po,Pid , permit) 6∈ M , algo(po,Pid , idp) 6∈ M and
decision_of (Pid ,R, ip) ∈M .

⊕
po(R) 6= permit and
⊕
po(R) 6= idp (by Lemma B.29 and Lemma B.30
since there is a contradiction if
⊕
po(R) = permit and
⊕
po(R) = idp).
 ∀i : JRiK(Q) 6= p and JRiK(Q) 6= (idp or d or id) (by PO evaluation)
 M(val(R, ip)) = > (by Policy transformation and Lemma B.3).
 Then, val(R, ip) ∈M .
 JRK(Q) = ip (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
po(R) = ip (by PO evaluation). 
Lemma B.32 Let P = policy(Pid) : { po ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = deny if and only if algo(po,Pid , deny) ∈M .
Lemma B.33 Let P = policy(Pid) : { po ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = deny if and only if algo(po,Pid , deny) ∈M .
Lemma B.34 Let P = policy(Pid) : { po ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = na if and only if algo(po,Pid , na) ∈M .
The proofs of Lemma B.32, Lemma B.33, and Lemma B.34 are similar to the
proof of Lemma B.31.
Proposition B.35 Let M be an AS of Π = Πpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = V if and only if algo(po,Pid , V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.29, Lemma B.30, Lemma B.31, Lemma B.32,
Lemma B.33 and Lemma B.34 since the value of V only has six possibilities,
i.e., { permit, deny, ip, id, idp, na }. 
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B.2.2 Deny-Overrides Combining Algorithm
Proposition B.36 Let M be an AS of Π = Π. Then,⊕
po
(R) = V if and only if algo(po,Pid , V ) ∈M .
The proof of Prop. B.36 is similar to the proof of Prop. B.35 since deny-overrides
combining algorithm is the mirror of permit-overrides combining algorithm.
B.2.3 Legacy-Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm
Legacy Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm Evaluation. Let S =
〈s1, . . . , sn〉 be a sequence of policy values from V6. We deﬁne the legacy permit-
overrides combining algorithm under V6 as follows:
V6⊕
lpo
(S) =
{
Idp if
⊕V6
po (S) ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
}⊕V6
po (S) otherwise
Permit-Overrides Combining Algorithm Transformation.
algo(lpo, P, idp) ← algo(po, P, ip)
algo(lpo, P, idp) ← algo(po, P, id)
algo(lpo, P, idp) ← algo(po, P, idp)
algo(lpo, P, permit) ← algo(po, P, permit)
algo(lpo, P, deny) ← algo(po, P, deny)
algo(lpo, P, na) ← algo(po, P, na)
We use LPO for an abbreviation of legacy permit-overrides combining algorithm.
Lemma B.37 Let P = policy(Pid) : { lpo ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πlpo. Then,⊕
lpo
(R) = idp if and only if algo(lpo,Pid , idp) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that ⊕lpo(R) = idp.
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
⊕
po(R) = (idp or ip or id) (by LPO evaluation).
 algo(po,Pid , idp) ∈ M or algo(po,Pid , ip) ∈ M or algo(po,Pid , id) ∈ M (by
Prop. B.35).
 algo(lpo,Pid , idp) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(lpo,Pid , idp) ∈M .
 algo(po,Pid , idp) ∈ M or algo(po,Pid , id) ∈ M or algo(po,Pid , ip) ∈ M (by
Lemma B.3).

⊕
po(R) = idp or
⊕
po(R) = id or
⊕
po(R) = ip (by Prop. B.35).

⊕
lpo(R) = idp (by LPO evaluation). 
Lemma B.38 Let P = policy(Pid) : { lpo ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πlpo. Then,⊕
lpo
(R) = permit if and only if algo(lpo,Pid , permit) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that ⊕lpo(R) = permit.

⊕
po(R) = permit (by LPO evaluation).
 algo(po,Pid , permit) ∈M (by Prop. B.35).
 algo(lpo,Pid , permit) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(lpo,Pid , permit) ∈M .
 algo(po,Pid , permit) ∈M (by Lemma B.3).

⊕
po(R) = permit (by Prop. B.35).

⊕
lpo(R) = permit (by LPO evaluation). 
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Lemma B.39 Let P = policy(Pid) : { lpo ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πlpo. Then,⊕
lpo
(R) = deny if and only if algo(lpo,Pid , deny) ∈M .
Lemma B.40 Let P = policy(Pid) : { lpo ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πlpo. Then,⊕
lpo
(R) = na if and only if algo(lpo,Pid , na) ∈M .
The proofs of Lemma B.39 and Lemma B.40 are similar to the proof of Lemma B.38
Proposition B.41 Let M be an AS of Π = Πlpo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = V if and only if algo(po,Pid , V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.37, Lemma B.38, Lemma B.39, Lemma B.40
since the value of V only has four possibilities, i.e., { permit, deny, idp, na }. 
B.2.4 Legacy Deny-Overrides Combining Algorithm
Proposition B.42 Let M be an AS of Π = Πldo. Then,⊕
po
(R) = V if and only if algo(po,Pid , V ) ∈M .
The proof of Prop. B.42 is similar to the proof of Prop. B.41 since legacy deny-
overrides combining algorithm is the mirror of legacy permit-overrides combining
algorithm.
B.2.5 Permit-Unless-Deny Combining Algorithm
Permit-Unless-Deny Combining Algorithm Evaluation.
V6⊕
pud
(S) =
{
>d if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si = >d
>p otherwise
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Permit-Unless-Deny Combining Algorithm Transformation.
Πpud :
algo(pud, P, deny) ← decision_of (P,R, deny).
algo(pud, P, permit) ← not algo(dup, P, deny).
We use PUD for an abbreviation of permit-unless-deny combining algorithm.
Lemma B.43 Let P = policy(Pid) : { pud ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpud. Then,⊕
pud
(R) = deny if and only if algo(pud,Pid , deny) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that⊕pud(R) = deny.
 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = deny (by PUD evaluation).
 val(Ri, deny) ∈M (by Prop. B.28).
 There is a clause in Π decision_of (Pid ,Ri, deny) ← val(Ri, deny). (by-
Policy transformation).
 decision_of (Pid ,Ri, deny) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
 algo(pud,Pid , deny) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(pud,Pid , permit) ∈M .
 M(decision_of (Pid ,R, deny)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 M(val(R, deny)) = > (by Lemma B.3). Therefore, val(R, deny) ∈M .
 JRK(Q) = deny (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
pud(R) = deny (by PO evaluation). 
Lemma B.44 Let P = policy(Pid) : { pud ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πpud. Then,⊕
pud
(R) = permit if and only if algo(pud,Pid , permit) ∈M .
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Proof. (⇒) Suppose that⊕pud(R) = permit.
 ∀i : JRiK(Q) = V and V 6= deny (by PUD evaluation).
 val(Ri, V ) ∈M and V 6= deny (by Prop. B.28).
 Then,
⊕
pud(R) 6= deny.
 algo(pud,Pid , deny) 6∈M (by Lemma B.43 since there will be a contradic-
tion if algo(pud,Pid , deny) ∈M ).
 Then, M(not algo(pud,Pid , deny)) = >
 algo(pud,Pid , permit) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(pud,Pid , permit) ∈M .
 M(not algo(pud,Pid , deny)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 Then, M(algo(pud,Pid , deny)) = ⊥.
 ∀i : M(decision_of (Pid ,Ri, deny)) = ⊥ (by Lemma B.4).
 ∀i : M(val(Ri, deny)) = ⊥ (by Lemma B.4). Therefore, val(R, deny) 6∈
M .
 6 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = deny (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
pud(R) = permit (by PUD evaluation). 
Proposition B.45 Let M be an AS of Π = Πpud. Then,⊕
pud
(R) = V if and only if algo(pud,Pid , V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.43 and Lemma B.44 since the value of V only
has two possibilities, i.e., { permit, deny, idp, na }. 
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B.2.6 Deny-Unless-Permit Combining Algorithm
Proposition B.46 Let M be an AS of Π = Πpud. Then,⊕
dup
(R) = V if and only if algo(dup,Pid , V ) ∈M .
The proof of Prop. B.46 is similar to the proof of Prop. B.45 since deny-unless-
permit combining algorithm is the mirror of permit-unless-deny combining al-
gorithm.
B.2.7 First-Applicable Combining Algorithm
First-Applicable Combining Algorithm Evaluation.
V6⊕
fa
(S) =

Idp if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈
{
Id, Ip, Idp
} ∧ ∀j : (j < i)⇒ (sj = ⊥)
si if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈
{>p,>d } ∧ ∀j : (j < i)⇒ (sj = ⊥)
⊥ otherwise
First-Applicable Combining Algorithm Transformation.
Πfa :
algo(fa,Pid , V ) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, V ), V 6= na.
algo(fa,Pid , V ) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, na), decision_of (Pid ,R2, V ), V 6= na.
...
algo(fa,Pid , V ) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, na), . . . , decision_of (Pid ,Rn−1, na),
decision_of (Pid , Rn, V ).
We use FA for an abbreviation of ﬁrst-applicable combining algorithm.
Proposition B.47 Let P = policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be
a Policy component and M be an AS of Π = Πfa. Then,⊕
fa
(R) = V if and only if algo(fa,Pid , V ) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that⊕fa(R) = V .
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 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = V and V 6= na and ∀j : j < i ⇒ JRjK(Q) = na (by FA
evaluation).
 ∃i : val(Ri, V ) ∈ M where V 6= na and ∀j : j < i⇒ val(Rj , na) ∈ M (by
Prop. B.28).
 decision_of (P,Ri, V ) ∈ M and ∀j : j < i ⇒ decision_of (P,Rj , na) ∈
M (by Policy transformation and since M is a minimal model for Π).
 algo(fa,P, V ) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(fa,P, V ) ∈M .
 Based on Lemma B.3, there is a clause in P where algo(fa,P, V ) as
the head and the body is true under M . There are several clauses in
P where algo(fa,P, V ) as the head. We can see that in each rule the
body contains ∃i : decision_of (P,Ri, V ), V 6= na and ∀j : j < i ⇒
decision_of (P,Rj , na).
 ∃i : decision_of (P,Ri, V ) ∈M and ∀j : j < i⇒ decision_of (P,Rj , na) ∈
M .
 ∃i : M(val(Ri, V )) = > and ∀j < i : M(val(Rj , na)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 Then, ∃i : val(Ri, V ) ∈M and ∀j : j < i⇒ val(Rj , na) ∈M .
 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = V and ∀j : j < i⇒ JRjK(Q) = na (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
fa(R) = V (by FA evaluation). 
B.2.8 Only-One-Applicable Combining Algorithm
Only-One-Applicable Algorithm Evaluation.
V6⊕
ooa
(S) =

si if ∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈ {>d,>p }∧
∀j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : j 6= i⇒ sj = ⊥
Idp if
(∃i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : si ∈ { Id, Ip, Idp } )∨(∃i, j ∈ { 1, . . . , n } : i 6= j ∧ si, sj ∈ {>d,>p } )
⊥ otherwise
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Only-One-Applicable Algorithm Transformation.
Πooa :
algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ← decision_of (Pid ,R1, V1), decision_of (Pid ,R2, V2),R1 6= R2,
applicable_value(V1), applicable_value(V2).
algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ← decision_of (Pid ,R, V ), idt_value(V ).
algo(ooa,Pid , V ) ← not algo(ooa,Pid , idp),
decision_of (Pid ,R, applicable_value), applicable_value(V ).
algo(ooa,Pid , na) ← not algo(ooa,Pid , idp),not algo(ooa,Pid , deny),
not algo(ooa,Pid , permit).
We use OOA for an abbreviation of permit-overrides combining algorithm.
Lemma B.48 Let P = policy(Pid) : { ooa ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πooa. Then,⊕
ooa
(R) = idp if and only if algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that⊕ooa(R) = idp. Based on OOA evaluation deﬁnition,
there are two possibilities:
1. ∃i : JRiK(Q) = (id or ip or idp).
 ∃i : val(Ri, V ) ∈M and idt_value(V ) ∈M (by Prop. B.28).
 There is a clause in Π decision_of (Pid ,Ri, V ) ← val(Ri, V ). (by
Policy transformation).
 decision_of (Pid ,Ri, V ) ∈M and idt_value(V ) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
 algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
2. ∃i, j : i 6= j and semanticsRi(Q) = permit or deny and semanticsRj(Q) =
permit or deny and Ri 6= Rj .
 ∃i, j : val(Ri, V1) ∈M and val(Rj , V2) andM(applicable_value(V1)) =
> and M(applicable_value(V2)) = > and Ri 6= Rj (by Prop. B.28).
 decision_of (Pid ,Ri, V1) ∈M and decision_of (Pid ,Rj , Vj) ∈M and
M(applicable_value(V1)) = > and M(applicable_value(V2)) = >
and Ri 6= Rj (by Policy transformation and by Lemma B.1).
 algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ∈ M . By Lemma B.3, there two three
possibilities:
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1. M(decision_of (Pid ,R1, V1) ∧ decision_of (Pid ,R2, V2) ∧ R1 6= R2∧
applicable_value(V1) ∧ applicable_value(V2)) = >.
 M(val(R2, V1)) = >, M(val(R2, V2)) = >, R1 6= R2,
M(applicable_value(V1)) = >, andM(applicable_value(V2)) = >(by
Lemma B.3). Therefore, val(R1, V1) ∈M , val(R2, V2) ∈M .
 JR1K(Q) = V1, JR2K(Q) = V2, R1 6= R2, V1, V2 ∈ { deny, permit }
(by Prop. B.28).

⊕
ooa(R) = idp (by OOA evaluation).
2. M(decision_of (Pid ,R, V ) ∧ idt_value(V )) = >.
 M(val(R, V )) = > and M(idt_value(V )) = > (by Lemma B.3).
Therefore, val(R, V ) ∈M .
 JRK(Q) = V , and V ∈ { id, ip, idp } (by Prop. B.28).

⊕
ooa(R) = idp (by OOA evaluation). 
Lemma B.49 Let P = policy(Pid) : { ooa ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πooa. Then,⊕
ooa
(R) = Deny if and only if algo(ooa,Pid ,Deny) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that ⊕ooa(R) = deny.
 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = deny, ∀j : i 6= j ⇒ JRjK(Q) = na (by OOA evaluation).
 ∃i : JRiK(Q) = deny, and ⊕ooa(R) 6= idp.
 ∃i : val(Ri, deny) ∈M and algo(ooa,Pid , idp) 6∈M (by Prop. B.28 and by
Lemma B.48 since there is a contradiction if algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ∈M).
 There is a clause in Π decision_of (Pid ,Ri, deny) ← val(Ri, deny). (by
Policy transformation).
 decision_of (Pid ,Ri, deny) ∈ M and applicable_value(deny) ∈ M and
M(not algo(ooa,Pid , idp)) = > (by Lemma B.1).
 algo(ooa,Pid , deny) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(ooa,Pid , deny) ∈M .
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 M(not algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ∧ decision_of (Pid ,R, deny)
∧applicable_value(deny)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 Then, M(algo(ooa,Pid , idp)) = ⊥, decision_of (Pid ,R, deny) ∈M .

⊕
ooa(R) 6= idp (by Lemma B.48 since there will be a contradiction if⊕
ooa(R) = idp). M(val(R, deny)) = > (by Lemma B.3). Therefore,
val(R, deny) ∈M .
 @i : JRiK(Q) ∈ { id, ip, idp } and @i, j : i 6= j∧JRiK(Q), JRjK(Q) ∈ { deny, permit }
and JRK(Q) = deny (by Prop. B.28).
 ∀i : JRiK 6∈ { id, ip, idp }. We have a particular i such that JRiK(Q) = deny.
Thus, for the second equation, we conclude that ∀j : i 6= j ⇒ JRjK(Q) 6∈
{ deny, permit }.
 Hence, the only possible value of ∀j : JRjK(Q) = na.

⊕
ooa(R) = deny (by OOA evaluation). 
Lemma B.50 Let P = policy(Pid) : { ooa ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πooa. Then,⊕
ooa
(R) = Permit if and only if algo(ooa,Pid ,Permit) ∈M .
The proof of Lemma B.50 is similar to the proof Lemma B.49.
Lemma B.51 Let P = policy(Pid) : { ooa ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Policy
component and M be an AS of Π = Πooa. Then,⊕
ooa
(R) = na if and only if algo(ooa,Pid , na) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that ⊕ooa(R) = na.

⊕
ooa(R) 6= idp,
⊕
ooa(R) 6= deny, and
⊕
ooa(R) 6= permit (by OOA evalu-
ation).
 algo(ooa,Pid , idp) 6∈ M , algo(ooa,Pid , deny) 6∈ M , and
algo(ooa,Pid , permit) 6∈M (by Lemma B.48, Lemma B.49 and Lemma B.50),
 M(algo(ooa,Pid , idp) = ⊥), M(algo(ooa,Pid , deny) = ⊥),
M(algo(ooa,Pid , deny) = ⊥).
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 M(not algo(ooa,Pid , idp) = >), M(not algo(ooa,Pid , deny) = >),
M(not algo(ooa,Pid , deny) = >).
 algo(ooa,Pid , na) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that algo(ooa,Pid , na) ∈M .
 M(not algo(ooa,Pid , idp) ∧ not algo(ooa,Pid , deny) ∧
not algo(ooa,Pid , permit)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 algo(ooa,Pid , idp) 6∈M ,algo(ooa,Pid , deny) 6∈M and algo(ooa,Pid , permit)
6∈M .

⊕
ooa(R) 6= idp,
⊕
ooa(R) 6= deny and
⊕
ooa(R) 6= permit (by Lemma B.48,
Lemma B.49 and Lemma B.50).

⊕
ooa(R) = na (by OOA equation). 
Proposition B.52 Let M be an AS of Π = Πooa. Then,⊕
ooa
(R) = V if and only if algo(ooa,Pid , V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.48, Lemma B.49, Lemma B.50, and Lemma B.51
since the value of V only has four possibilities, i.e., { permit, deny, idp, na }. 
B.2.9 All Combining Algorithms
Proposition B.53 Let M be an AS of Π = Πcombid . Then,⊕
combid
(R) = V if and only if algo(combid,Pid , V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Prop. B.35, Prop. B.36, Prop. B.41, Prop. B.42, Prop. B.45,
Prop. B.46, Prop. B.47, Prop. B.52. 
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B.3 Policy and PolicySet Transformation
Policy Evaluation.
JPidK(Q) =

>d if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = >d
>p if JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = >p
Idp if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Idp) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (I or Idp))
Id if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Id) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (>d or Id))
Ip if
(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = Ip) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = (>p or Ip))
⊥ if JT K(Q) = ⊥ or(JT K(Q) = > and ⊕combid(R) = ⊥) or(JT K(Q) = I and ⊕combid(R) = ⊥)
where R = 〈JR1K(Q), . . . , JRnK(Q)〉.
Policy Transformation.
ΠPid :
val(Pid , permit) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , permit).
val(Pid , deny) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , deny).
val(Pid , idp) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , idp).
val(Pid , idp) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , idt).
val(Pid , idp) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , idp).
val(Pid , id) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , id).
val(Pid , id) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , deny).
val(Pid , id) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , id).
val(Pid , ip) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , ip).
val(Pid , ip) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , permit).
val(Pid , ip) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , ip).
val(Pid , na) ← val(T , nm).
val(Pid , na) ← val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , na).
val(Pid , na) ← val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , na).
Lemma B.54 Let P = policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Pol-
icy component. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠP . Then,
JPidK(Q) = deny if and only if val(Pid , deny) ∈M .
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Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JPidK(Q) = deny.
 JT K(Q) = m and⊕combid(R) = deny (by deﬁnition of Policy evaluation).
 val(T ,m) ∈ M and algo(combid,Pid , deny) ∈ M (by Prop. B.22 and
Prop. B.53).
 val(Pid , deny) ∈ M (since { val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , deny) } ⊆ M and
by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) Suppose that val(Pid , deny) ∈M .
 M(val(T ,m) ∧ algo(combid,Pid , deny)) = > (by Lemma B.3).
 Then, val(T ,m) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , deny) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = m and ⊕combid(R) = deny (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.53).
 JPidK(Q) = deny (by deﬁnition Policy evaluation).

Lemma B.55 Let P = policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Pol-
icy component. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠP . Then,
JPidK(Q) = permit if and only if val(Pid , permit) ∈M .
The proof of Lemma B.55 is similar like the proof Lemma B.54. The diﬀerence
is that in this lemma,
⊕
combid
(R) = permit.
Lemma B.56 Let P = policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Pol-
icy component. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠP . Then,
JPidK(Q) = id if and only if val(Pid , id) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JPidK(Q) = id. Based on Policy evaluation deﬁnition,
there are three possibilities:
1. JT K(Q) = m and⊕combid(R) = id.
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 val(T ,m) ∈ M and algo(combid,Pid , id) ∈ M (by Prop. B.22 and
Prop. B.53).
 val(Pid , id) ∈ M (since { val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , deny) } ⊆ M
and by Lemma B.1).
2. JT K(Q) = idt and⊕combid(R) = deny.
 val(T , idt) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , deny) ∈M (by Prop. B.22 and
Prop. B.53).
 val(Pid , id) ∈ M (since { val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , deny) } ⊆ M
and by Lemma B.1).
3. JT K(Q) = idt and⊕combid(R) = id.
 val(T , idt) ∈ M and algo(combid,Pid , id) ∈ M (by Prop. B.22 and
Prop. B.53).
 val(Pid , id) ∈ M (since { val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , deny) } ⊆ M
and by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) By Lemma B.3, there are three possibilities:
1. M(val(T ,m) ∧ algo(combid,Pid , id)) = >.
 Then, val(T ,m) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , id) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = m and⊕combid(R) = id (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.53).
 JPidK(Q) = id (by deﬁnition Policy evaluation).
2. M(val(T , idt) ∧ algo(combid,Pid , deny)) = >.
 Then, val(T , idt) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , deny) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = idt and⊕combid(R) = deny (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.53).
 JPidK(Q) = id (by deﬁnition Policy evaluation).
3. M(val(T , idt) ∧ algo(combid,Pid , id)) = >.
 Then, val(T , idt) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , id) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = idt and⊕combid(R) = id (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.53).
 JPidK(Q) = id (by deﬁnition Policy evaluation).

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Lemma B.57 Let P = policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Pol-
icy component. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠP . Then,
JPidK(Q) = ip if and only if val(Pid , ip) ∈M .
Lemma B.58 Let P = policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Pol-
icy component. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠP . Then,
JPidK(Q) = idp if and only if val(Pid , idp) ∈M .
The proofs of Lemma B.57 and Lemma B.58 are similar to the proof of Lemma B.56.
Lemma B.59 Let P = policy(Pid) : { combid ; T ; 〈R1, . . . ,Rn〉 } be a Pol-
icy component. Let M be an AS of Π = ΠP . Then,
JPidK(Q) = na if and only if val(Pid , na) ∈M .
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that JPidK(Q) = id. Based on Policy evaluation deﬁnition,
there are three possibilities:
1. JT K(Q) = nm.
 val(T , nm) ∈M (by Prop. B.22).
 val(Pid , na) ∈M (by Lemma B.1).
2. JT K(Q) = m and⊕combid(R) = na.
 val(T ,m) ∈ M and algo(combid,Pid , na) ∈ M (by Prop. B.22 and
Prop. B.53).
 val(Pid , na) ∈ M (since { val(T ,m), algo(combid,Pid , na) } ⊆ M and
by Lemma B.1).
3. JT K(Q) = idt and⊕combid(R) = na.
 val(T , idt) ∈ M and algo(combid,Pid , na) ∈ M (by Prop. B.22 and
Prop. B.53).
 val(Pid , na) ∈M (since { val(T , idt), algo(combid,Pid , na) } ⊆M and
by Lemma B.1).
(⇐) By Lemma B.3, there are three possibilities:
1. M(val(T ,m) ∧ algo(combid,Pid , id)) = >.
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 Then, val(T ,m) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , id) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = m and⊕combid(R) = id (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.53).
 JPidK(Q) = id (by deﬁnition Policy evaluation).
2. M(val(T , idt) ∧ algo(combid,Pid , deny)) = >.
 Then, val(T , idt) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , deny) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = idt and⊕combid(R) = deny (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.53).
 JPidK(Q) = id (by deﬁnition Policy evaluation).
3. M(val(T , idt) ∧ algo(combid,Pid , id)) = >.
 Then, val(T , idt) ∈M and algo(combid,Pid , id) ∈M .
 JT K(Q) = idt and⊕combid(R) = id (by Prop. B.22 and Prop. B.53).
 JPidK(Q) = id (by deﬁnition Policy evaluation).

Proposition B.60 Let P be a Policy component and M be an AS of Π =
ΠP . Then,
JPK(Q) = V if and only if val(P, V ) ∈M .
Proof. It follows from Lemma B.54, Lemma B.55, Lemma B.56, Lemma B.57,
Lemma B.58, Lemma B.59 since the value of V only has six possibilities, i.e.,
{ permit, deny, id, ip, idp, na }. 
Proposition B.61 Let PS be a PolicySet component and M be an AS of
Π = ΠPS . Then,
JPSK(Q) = V if and only if val(PS, V ) ∈M .
The proof of Prop. B.61 is similar to the proof of Prop. B.60 since the PolicySet
is constructed in the same way as Policy.
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Corollary B.62 Let Π = ΠQ ∪ΠXACML be a program obtained by merging
Request transformation program ΠQ and all XACML components transforma-
tion programs ΠXACML. Let M be an AS of Π. Then,
JXK(Q) = V if and only if val(X,V ) ∈M
where X is an XACML component.
Proof. It follows from Prop. B.12, Prop. B.16, Prop. B.20, Prop. B.22, Prop.
B.23, Prop. B.28, Prop. B.60, and Prop. B.61. 
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Appendix C
Listing of Access Control
Policies in Smart Grid
Listing C.1: Access Control Policies for Smart Grid
1 policyset(smartgrid):{ ooa;
2 target(smartgrid):{null};
3 < eha , data , powerline , billing , pricelist >
4 }
C.1 Access Control Policies for EHA
1. SM can turn on an EHA and it is mandatory to write a log when the EHA
is started.
2. SM can turn oﬀ an EHA and it is mandatory to write a log when the
EHA is ended.
3. Through SM, the SP can do a particular action to the corresponding EHA,
for example, update a new software, and it is mandatory to write the
description on the action in the log.
We assume that there is only one request that is allowed each time. However,
there might be possibility two policies are applicable, for example, SM received
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an request from SP in order to turn oﬀ a particular EHA. Thus, policy 1 and
policy 3 are both applicable. Hence, in this policy set, we prefer to set ﬁrst-
applicable combining operator.
Listing C.2: Access Control Policies for EHA
1 policy(eha):{fa;
2 target(eha):{
3 anyof(ehaany):{
4 allof(ehaall):{
5 string -equal(eha , resource -type)
6 }}};
7 < eha1 , eha2 , eha3 >
8 }
9
10 rule(eha1):{ permit;
11 target(eha1):{
12 anyof(eha1 -any):{
13 allof(eha1 -all):{
14 string -equal(sm, subject), string -equal(turn -on, action)
15 }}};
16 condition(eha1):{true}
17 }
18
19 rule(eha2):{ permit;
20 target(eha2):{
21 anyof(eha2 -any):{
22 allof(eha2 -all):{
23 string -equal(sm, subject),
24 string -equal(turn -off , action)
25 }}};
26 condition(eha2):{true}
27 }
28
29 rule(eha3):{ permit;
30 target(eha3):{
31 anyof(eha3 -any):{
32 allof(eha3 -all):{
33 string -equal(sp, subject),
34 string -equal(update , action)
35 }}};
36 condition(eha2):{(eha -id(X) /\ sp-id(Y) /\ eha -sp(X,Y))}
37 }
C.2 Access Control Policies for Data
1. SM can write the aggregated data consumption and technical data.
2. DSO can read the aggregated data consumption from SM.
C.2 Access Control Policies for Data 199
3. HC can read the detailed consumption data from SM.
4. SP can read the data about a particular EHA.
In order to protect data secrecy, we prefer to deny all access request unless we
are sure that the requestor has access to it. Hence, we use deny-unless-permit
combining algorithm.
Listing C.3: Access Control Policies for Data
1 policy(data):{ dup;
2 target(data):{ null };
3 <data1 , data2 , data3 , data4 , data5 >
4 }
5
6 rule(data1):{ permit;
7 target(data1):{
8 anyof(data1 -any):{
9 allof(data1 -all):{
10 string -equal(sm, subject),
11 string -equal(read , action),
12 anyURI -equal(urn:example:DSO:
aggregated -data -record ,
target -namespace),
13 string -equal(aggregate -data -
record , resource -type)
14 }
15 }
16 };
17 condition(data1):{true}
18 }
19
20 rule(data2):{ permit;
21 target(data2):{
22 anyof(data2 -any):{
23 allof(data2 -all):{
24 string -equal(sm, subject),
25 string -equal(write , action),
26 anyURI -equal(urn:example:DSO:
technical -data -record ,
target -namespace),
27 string -equal(technical -data -
record , resource -type)
28 }
29 }
30 };
31 condition(data2):{true}
32 }
33
34 rule(data3):{ permit;
35 target(data3):{
36 anyof(data3 -any):{
37 allof(data3 -all):{
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38 string -equal(dso , subject),
39 string -equal(write , action),
40 anyURI -equal(urn:example:DSO:
aggregate -data -record ,
target -namespace),
41 string -equal(aggregate -data -
record , resource -type)
42 }}};
43 condition(data3):{true}
44 }
45
46 rule(data4):{ permit;
47 target(data4):{
48 anyof(data4 -any):{
49 allof(data4 -all):{
50 string -equal(customer , subject),
51 string -equal(read , action),
52 anyURI -equal(urn:example:SM:
detailed -data -record , target
-namespace),
53 string -equal(detailed -data -
record , resource -type)
54 }}};
55 condition(data4):{( subject -id(X) /\ customer -id(X))}
56 }
57
58 rule(data5):{ permit;
59 target(data5):{
60 anyof(data5 -any):{
61 allof(data5 -all):{
62 string -equal(read , action),
63 anyURI -equal(urn:example:SM:
technical -data -record ,
target -namespace),
64 string -equal(technical -data -
record , resource -type)
65 }
66 }
67 };
68 condition(data5):{( subject -id(X) /\ related -EHA(X,Y) /\
technical -data -id(Y))}
69 }
C.3 Access Control Policies for Power Line
1. SM can connect to the power line.
2. SM can disconnect from the power line.
3. DSO can connect SM to the power line.
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4. DSO can disconnect SM from the power line if the customer has not paid
the bill or there is a technical safety reason.
5. EHA can connect the electricity through SM and it is mandatory to write
a log when the EHA is started.
6. EHA can disconnect the electricity through SM and it is mandatory to
write a log when the EHA is ended.
In order to make sure that the supply power is always available, any permitted
access to the power system should be allowed. In this case, we use permit-
unless-deny combining operator.
Listing C.4: Access Control Policies for Power Line
1 policy(powerline):{ pud;
2 target(powerline):{
3 anyof(powerline -any):{
4 allof(powerline -all):{string -equal(
electric -power , resource -type)}
5 }
6 };
7 <powerline1 , powerline2 , powerline3 , powerline4 ,
powerline5 , powerline6 >
8 }
9
10 rule(powerline1):{ permit;
11 target(powerline1):{
12 anyof(powerline1 -any):{
13 allof(powerline1 -all):{
14 string -equal(sm, subject),
string -equal(connect , action
)
15 }
16 }
17 };
18 condition(powerline1):{true}
19 }
20
21 rule(powerline2):{ permit;
22 target(powerline2):{
23 anyof(powerline2 -any):{
24 allof(powerline2 -all):{
25 string -equal(sm, subject),
string -equal(disconnect ,
action)
26 }
27 }
28 };
29 condition(powerline2):{true}
30 }
31
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32 rule(powerline3):{ permit;
33 target(powerline3):{
34 anyof(powerline3 -any):{
35 allof(powerline3 -all):{
36 string -equal(dso , subject),
string -equal(connect , action
)
37 }
38 }
39 };
40 condition(powerline3):{true}
41 }
42
43 rule(powerline4):{ permit;
44 target(powerline4):{
45 anyof(powerline4 -any):{
46 allof(powerline4 -all):{
47 string -equal(dso , subject),
string -equal(disconnect ,
action)
48 }
49 }
50 };
51 condition(powerline4):{technical -issue(critical) \/
billing -status(not -yet -paid)}
52 }
53
54 rule(powerline5):{ permit;
55 target(powerline5):{
56 anyof(powerline5 -any):{
57 allof(powerline5 -all):{
58 string -equal(eha , subject),
string -equal(connect , action
)
59 }
60 }
61 };
62 condition(powerline5):{true}
63 }
64
65 rule(powerline6):{ permit;
66 target(powerline6):{
67 anyof(powerline6 -any):{
68 allof(powerline6 -all):{
69 string -equal(eha , subject),
string -equal(disconnect ,
action)
70 }
71 }
72 };
73 condition(powerline6):{true}
74 }
75
76
77 rule(powerline1):{ permit;
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78 target(powerline1):{
79 anyof(powerline1 -any):{
80 allof(powerline1 -all1):{
81 string -equal(sm, subject),
string -equal(connect , action
)
82 },
83 allof(powerline1 -all2):{
84 string -equal(eha , subject),
string -equal(connect , action
)
85 }
86 }
87 };
88 condition(powerline1):{true}
89 }
90
91 rule(powerline2):{ permit;
92 target(powerline2):{
93 anyof(powerline2 -any1):{
94 allof(powerline2 -all):{
95 string -equal(sm, subject),
string -equal(disconnect ,
action)
96 }
97 },
98 anyof(powerline2 -any2):{
99 allof(powerline2 -all):{
100 string -equal(eha , subject),
string -equal(disconnect ,
action)
101 }
102 }
103 };
104 condition(powerline2):{true}
105 }
C.4 Access Control Policies for Billing Statement
1. HC can read the billing statement from the FI.
2. HC can pay the billing to the FI.
3. DSO can send bill to the FI.
4. DSO can read the payment bill from FI.
5. FI can update the payment status after the payment transaction succeed
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We would like that the bill is always paid and the access to the billing statement
is always granted. However, since secrecy is important, we only give permission
to the trustworthy requestor. Thus, we use permit-overrides combining oper-
ator.
Listing C.5: Access Control Policies for Billing Statement
1 policy(billing):{ po;
2 target(billing):{
3 anyof(billing -any):{
4 allof(billing -all):{
5 anyURI -equal(urn:example:FI:
billing -statement -record ,
target -namespace), string -
equal(billing -statement ,
resource -type)}
6 }
7 };
8 <billing1 , billing2 , billing3 , billing4 , billing5 >
9 }
10
11 rule(billing1):{ permit;
12 target(billing1):{
13 anyof(billing1 -any):{
14 allof(billing1 -all):{
15 string -equal(customer , subject),
string -equal(read , action)
16 }
17 }
18 };
19 condition(billing1):{( customer -id(X) /\ fi -id(F) /\
customer -list(F, X) /\ billing -record -id(F, X))}
20 }
21
22 rule(billing2):{ permit;
23 target(billing2):{
24 anyof(billing2 -any):{
25 allof(billing2 -all):{
26 string -equal(customer , subject),
string -equal(pay , action)
27 }
28 }
29 };
30 condition(billing2):{( customer -id(X) /\ fi -id(F) /\
customer -list(F, X) /\ billing -record -id(F, X))}
31 }
32
33 rule(billing3):{ permit;
34 target(billing3):{
35 anyof(billing3 -any):{
36 allof(billing3 -all):{
37 string -equal(dso , subject),
string -equal(send , action)
38 }
39 }
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40 };
41 condition(billing3):{(dso -id(X) /\ fi -id(F) /\ dso -list(
F, X) /\ billing -record -id(F, X) /\ billing -status(X
, new))}
42 }
43
44 rule(billing4):{ permit;
45 target(billing4):{
46 anyof(billing4 -any):{
47 allof(billing4 -all):{
48 string -equal(dso , subject),
string -equal(read , action)
49 }
50 }
51 };
52 condition(billing4):{(dso -id(X) /\ fi -id(F) /\ dso -list(
F, X) /\ billing -record -id(F, X))}
53 }
54
55 rule(billing5):{ permit;
56 target(billing5):{
57 anyof(billing5 -any):{
58 allof(billing5 -all):{
59 string -equal(fi, subject),
string -equal(update , action)
60 }
61 }
62 };
63 condition(billing4):{( customer -id(X) /\ fi -id(F) /\
customer -list(F, X) /\ billing -record -id(F, X) /\
payment -status(X, paid))}
64 }
C.5 Access Control Policies for Price List
1. DSO can update the price list to the SM.
2. HC through SM can see the price list.
3. SM can access the price list in order to make a plan.
The price list is available to public and not secret. Thus, we use permit-unless-
deny combining operator.
Listing C.6: Access Control Policies for Price List
1 policy(pricelist):{ pud;
2 target(pricelist):{
3 anyof(pricelist -any):{
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4 allof(pricelist -all):{
5 anyURI -equal(urn:example:DSO:pricelist , target -namespace
), string -equal(pricelist , resource -type)}
6 }
7 };
8 <pricelist1 , pricelist2 >
9 }
10
11 rule(pricelist1):{ permit;
12 target(pricelist1):{
13 anyof(pricelist1 -any):{
14 allof(pricelist1 -all):{
15 string -equal(dso , subject),
string -equal(update , action)
16 }
17 }
18 };
19 condition(pricelist1):{true}
20 }
21
22 rule(pricelist2):{ permit;
23 target(pricelist2):{
24 anyof(pricelist2 -any):{
25 allof(pricelist2 -all):{
26 string -equal(customer , subject),
string -equal(read , action)
27 }
28 }
29 };
30 condition(pricelist1):{(dso -id(X) /\ SM-id(SM) /\ dso -SN
(X, SM) /\ subject -id(S) /\ customer -id(S))}
31 }
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